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Through the 1990s barriers to low-income homeownership decreased sharply, 
and by the early 2000s low-income mortgage borrowers enjoyed unprecedented 
access to expanded home financing options, lower downpayment requirements, 
increased governmental subsidy, and the lowest interest rates in decades. This 
happened not by accident but through determination: beginning in the early 1970s, 
federal housing policy makers began promoting the idea of increasing housing demand 
through expanded low-income household market participation as a strategy to solve 
the country’s affordable housing crisis. Indeed, homeownership increased more rapidly 
amongst this group through the 1990s than for any other segment of the population. 
This research examines housing opportunity outcomes for low-income black 
households by tenure (owning versus renting) in five large U.S. metropolitan areas—
Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC— between 1990 and 
2000 through analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Survey (PUMS) 
data. Housing opportunity is defined as a low-income household’s ability to find a home 
that is 1) proportionately affordable to its income, 2) located in an area that provides 
access to higher quality public education, and 3) located in close proximity to 
employment. These housing characteristics encapsulate the most potent wealth 
creation benefits that policy makers maintain are inherent to homeownership.  
The research findings indicate that a greater proportion of low-income black 
renter households as compared to homeowner households paid a smaller proportion of 
 their income for housing, commuted shorter distances to work, and had greater access 
to higher quality schools in 2000 in three of the five metropolitan areas studied 
(Chicago, Detroit and New York). Homeownership provided only slightly greater 
housing opportunity than renting in the other two metropolitan areas examined 
(Philadelphia and Washington DC). While outcomes varied by metropolitan area, 
between 1990 and 2000, low-income black renters experienced greater increases or 
smaller decreases in housing opportunity than did low-income black owners in four of 
the five metropolitan areas examined (Chicago, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia). 
The research findings support a main study conclusion that under the present 
market structure low-income homeownership does not necessarily result in greater 
housing opportunity for low-income buyers as compared to renters, and that renting is 
often a better tenure choice for many low-income households in these metropolitan 
housing markets. The study findings also suggests that federal subsides supporting 
low-income homeownership should be reconsidered based on careful analysis of 
existing market conditions in the metropolitan area of purchase. The study concludes 
by making several federal housing policy recommendations, including expanding direct 
funding and support for the development of low-income rental property, and extending 
personal tax deductions to low-income renters to make renting a more financially 
attractive option for low-income households. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW AND STUDY RELEVANCE 
Introduction 
Through the 1990s barriers to low-income homeownership decreased sharply, 
and by the early 2000s low-income mortgage borrowers enjoyed unprecedented access 
to expanded home financing options, lower downpayment requirements, increased 
governmental subsidy, and the lowest interest rates in decades. This happened not by 
accident but through determination: beginning in the early 1970s, federal housing policy 
makers began promoting the idea of increasing housing demand through expanded low-
income household market participation as a strategy to solve the country’s affordable 
housing crisis.  
This strategy—to subsidize demand rather than supply—was a radical departure 
from prior federal housing policy, which had primarily focused on subsidized unit 
production (i.e. supply). While the roots of subsidizing housing demand can be found in 
federal programs aimed at mainly assisting the middle-class, demand-side subsidies for 
low-income households began in earnest with the passage the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974. This landmark bill introduced tenant-based subsidies such as 
housing certificates and vouchers and marked the onset of the federal government’s 
steady withdrawal from unit-based subsidies—those that provided federally subsidized 
affordable rental housing units. In the decades that followed, federal housing policy 
moved increasingly towards subsidized tenant-based demand-side programs such as 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, Section 8 vouchers and, through the 1990s, 
subsidies for low-income homeownership, while it simultaneously curtailed unit-based 
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subsidies. By the mid-2000s U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) dedicated 
over seventy percent of its budget to demand-side, tenant-based programs (author’s 
analysis of HUD budgets FY2000-05).Together, these changes represented a dramatic 
shift in U.S. housing policy, from one based in subsidizing units to one based in 
subsidizing marketsfrom subsidizing housing supply to subsidizing housing demand 
(Barton 1996).  
The economic logic behind this shift was quite simple: Policy makers hoped that, 
given low-income households’ improved access to financing, demand for lower-priced 
housing would increase and the housing market would respond accordingly: i.e. supply 
would meet demand through expanded housing production. For affordable housing, this 
would occur in two dimensions: 1) with the expectation that, as demand for lower-priced 
homes increased, producers would build more affordable units, and more importantly, 2) 
more for-sale units would become available to the poor through market filtering. Filtering 
describes the process by which newer housing units depreciate over time and become 
affordable to lower income households (Green and Malpezzi 2003).  
These anticipated market responses, however, never materialized. Buoyed by a 
strong economy and low interest rates, housing market participation expanded across 
the full spectrum of income levels through the 1990s and into the 2000s. In many fast 
growing metropolitan markets housing supply could not keep pace with demand and 
housing prices increased so rapidly that filtering failed. Thus, for example, small two-
bedroom houses in modestly-priced California neighborhoods, once considered 
affordable by their size, amenity and location, began selling at hugely inflated prices. 
Conditions like these effectively priced the available stock of lower-priced for-sale 
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housing beyond the means of many low-income (and even middle-income) buyers. In 
many places, the poor no longer simply competed against one another for a limited 
supply of affordably-priced homes; they went head-to-head with much wealthier and 
more financially stable middle-income buyers for an increasingly anemic supply of 
lower-priced homes.  
As a result, many low-income buyers bought homes priced well above their 
means and discovered that homeownership’s long held promise of financial security 
was far from guaranteed. And while more low-income households were able to finance 
a mortgage through the 1990s—homeownership increased more rapidly amongst these 
groups between 1993 and 1999 than for any other segment of the population (Retsinas 
and Belsky 2003)—many discovered they could only afford a home that was located far 
from amenities and public services such as employment and good schools (Bier 2001).  
The federal government’s primary response at the time was to increase funding 
for demand-side programs and further expand available home financing options for low-
income buyers. As home prices increased so did the federal government’s commitment 
to facilitate greater low-income homeownership market participation. While overall 
federal government housing outlays stagnated in 1995 (Green and Malpezzi 2003), 
there was in the early- to mid-2000s an active shifting of funds amongst HUD’s housing 
programs. Invariably, these shifts curtailed supply-side subsidy programs, those that 
subsidize unit development, in favor of demand-side programs aimed at expanding low-
income participation in the housing market.  
In 2008 the U.S. economy suffered its most significant economic downturn since 
the great depression. This “great recession” has been attributed to an inflated and 
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poorly regulated housing market, that has resulted in thousands of mortgage 
foreclosures and a decline in homeownership from its high point of 69.1% in the mid 
2000s to 66.4% in 2011, a level not seen since the early 1990s (U.S. Census Bureau). 
This dissertation addresses a significant question that was raised during the housing 
bubble and has become even more important as low income people lose the homes 
they purchased to foreclosure. That question is does homeownership serve the needs 
of the low-income population? This dissertation looks at the period from 1990 to the 
mid-2000s when policies were still operating to foster low-income home ownership and 
at the outcomes that were becoming visible, and questions the degree to which federal 
housing policy came to rely on subsidies aimed at expanding low-income household 
market participation—specifically those policies that promoted low-income 
homeownership. The questions raised in this research challenge the dominant role 
homeownership assumed in federal housing policy through the 1990s and into the mid-
2000s, and highlight the unintended consequences that often befall low income 
households under less than ideal homeownership circumstances.  
My research findings suggest that, while the shift in federal housing policy from 
subsidizing supply to subsidizing demand resulted in greater numbers of low-income 
homeowners, it also allowed far too many of those buyers to purchase homes they 
could not afford. It also promoted a buying pattern where many low-income households 
purchased homes in areas that offered fewer of the purported financial returns or social 
amenities generally associated with homeownership, or both. While downpayment and 
other subsidies got more low-income buyers in the door, so to speak, the longer-term 
financial burden of homeownership led many buyers down a path of financial risk with 
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devastating consequences. Under such circumstances, this research argues that 
renting would be a better option for many low-income households and that the federal 
government should recognize and support such opportunities. 
Of course, “affordability” and “affordable housing” are somewhat relative terms. 
What might be considered affordable in California may not be so in rural Ohio. 
Generally, to be considered affordable, a housing unit should cost its occupant no more 
than 30% of total household income (HUD 2005).
1
 Naturally, income varies by 
household and location, and most income calculations are based on area median 
income (AMI) as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau or HUD. A “low-income” 
household is one that earns less than 80% of area median income, and a “moderate 
income” household earns between 80% and 100% of area median income. This 
income/cost quotient is the most accepted measure in use today, and one that I employ 
throughout this work.  
This research examines housing opportunity outcomes for low-income black 
households by tenure (owning versus renting) in five large U.S. metropolitan areas—
Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC— between 1990 and 
2000 through analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Survey (PUMS) 
data. Housing opportunity is defined as a low-income household’s ability to find a home 
                                                     
1 All measures of housing affordability have two major components—income and price—and most 
measures use these components in their rawest forms to determine a percentage of income quotient, 
usually 30%, that serves as the upper limit of allowable income spent on housing (over time or at a given 
point in time) it to be considered affordable. This is the conventional public policy indicator of housing 
affordability in the U.S., and most agencies base calculations on area median income (AMI) as reported 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. Percentage of income measures offer several advantages including an ease 
of calculation and comprehension, availability of data and the fact that they are applicable across time 
and space (Bogdon and Can 1997). Analysts have relied on the home-price-to-income-ratio as a 
measure of affordability because home expenditure tends to rise comparably with home price 
(Megbolugbe 1992). 
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that is 1) proportionately affordable to its income, 2) located in an area that provides 
access to higher quality public education, and 3) located in close proximity to 
employment. These housing characteristics have been proven factors in making 
housing a viable means of wealth creation (Rohe et al. 1997, 2000). These factors also 
encapsulate the values imbued in homeownership as the “American Dream” and the 
accompanying rhetoric from both the federal government and homebuilding industry 
that holds that homeownership is good for all, good for America.  
This research seeks to expand our knowledge of low-income homeownership 
and its benefits compared to renting by examining these three indicators, and measures 
homeownership as a means to provide appropriate affordable housing for low-income 
households. I examine how housing opportunity changed for low-income black home 
buyers versus renters through the 1990s as an increasing numbers of low-income 
households became homeowners. 
Study Relevance 
The need to investigate low-income housing opportunity has never been greater: 
homeownership for low-income and minorities expanded substantially through the 
1990s, and we need to understand the outcomes of federal housing policy that 
promoted this change so we may better understand when, where and under what 
circumstances low-income homeownership makes sense. Such information has never 
carried more weight than it does today as increasing numbers of Americans are losing 
their homes to foreclosure or are struggling to hold on to them after having invested 
record proportions of their wealth in their homes. This is especially relevant because 
conditions through the early 2000s were such that housing prices increased faster in the 
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last 5 years than during any other period in history (Shiller 2005). While the housing 
market continued to defy economic analysts’ predictions for an imminent cooling down 
period to come, the public and the federal government seemed to be increasingly sold 
on the idea that homeownership was a no-lose proposition.  
This faith shared similarities with the “irrational exuberance” of the stock market 
of the 1990s (Shiller 2005). The difference is, of course, that relatively few low-income 
households played the stock market in the 1990s (although many saw their pensions 
evaporate when it crashed). Through the housing bubble, however, it was not just the 
wealthy at risk; the increases observed in low-income and minority homeowners 
through the 1990s suggest that a greater number of these households, the most 
financially vulnerable in our society, staked their financial future in the housing market. 
Another important difference worth considering is the active role the federal government 
played in encouraging and facilitating low-income participation in a housing market 
whose future stability was questionable at best. Those conditions were far from the 
norm, and therefore great capacity existed to provide a false sense of security. Yet, 
under such conditions, we seemed sure that, by directing a large proportion of our 
federal housing budget towards the goal of expanding low-income homeownership, we 
were making the right decision and that it was in the best interest of those it was 
intended to serve. 
But, simply calling attention to the situation ex post facto or saying that we should 
have exercised more caution as we entered unfamiliar territory is not enough. To 
accurately assess the situation and determine when, where and under what conditions 
low-income homeownership makes sense, we must know more about how well low-
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income buyers fared as homeowners through this period. While ample research exists 
on the benefits of homeownership generally, comparatively little is known about whether 
or the extent to which low-income homeowners experience these same benefits 
(Foundation 2005), and even less research exists on the outcomes of low-income 
buyers through the 1990s, the period that saw the fastest growth in history in low-
income homeownership.  
For many years questioning homeownership was anathema, and only recently 
have academics shifted their focus to seriously question the American Dream for low-
income households. And the results are mixed at best. For example, there exists 
significant disagreement regarding the financial and social benefits of owning a home: 
some researchers question the investment logic of homeownership compared to other 
investment vehicles (see Goetzmann 2001), while others question whether the social 
benefits often attributed to homeownership are part and parcel of tenure choice. A 
prudent reading of this research suggests that the observed social benefits are 
attributable to factors more closely associated with the types of households that buy 
compared to those that rent than to tenure itself (Rohe and Basolo 1997) (Rohe, Van 
Zandt et al. 2000) (Foundation 2005).  
Finally, as housing prices continued to rise faster than income in many parts of 
the country through the 1990s,
2
 the financial logic of tenure choice became an 
increasingly important topic to many, not just those on the lowest rungs of the economic 
                                                     
2
 In late 2005, Moody’s Economy.com, a leading independent provider of economic research, found that, 
while families in the vast majority of the country can still buy a house for a smaller share of their income 
than they could have 20-years ago, places that have become less affordable over the last generation 
accounted for only a quarter of the country's population. In major metropolitan areas like New York and 
Los Angeles, families who bought their first home often spent more than half of their income on mortgage 
payments, far more than they once did (Daley 2005).  
 9 
ladder. As far back as September 25, 2005, a New York Times article entitled “Is It 
Better to Buy or Rent?” (Leonhardt 2005) was ranked the most popularly emailed article 
of the day, and remained in the top slot for more than a week following its publication. 
And as late as October 21, 2005, twenty-six days after its publication, it remained the 
paper’s most-emailed article for the 30-days prior. Its popularity attests to the public’s 
interest at the time not only in housing costs and affordability, but also increasingly in 
tenure choice. 
Study Overview 
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between housing demand and supply to 
answer the question: Is there enough affordable for-sale housing? This is accomplished 
through an examination of low-income housing outcomes through the 1990s, a period 
that saw record increases in low-income homebuyers. While policy makers celebrated 
these gains, academic research suggests that the national supply of affordable housing 
actually decreased during that period. This was due in part to decreasing production of 
affordably-priced units and unprecedented price appreciation of existing home values, 
which outpaced both inflation and income growth nationwide.  
Also, despite the gains in the number of low-income and minority homeowners, in 
absolute terms there was very little change through this period in the overall low-income 
and minority homeownership rates or in the reduction of the gaps in homeownership 
rates between white and minority or wealthier and poorer households in this country. I 
close Chapter 2 by asserting that, while the increase in the actual number of low-income 
homeowners through the 1990s was promising, it by no means provides sufficient 
evidence to suggest that, even in the best of economic times, demand-side housing 
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subsidies alone are robust enough to address the nation’s demand for affordable 
housing.  
In Chapter 3 I question federal housing policy’s initiatives for market-based 
demand-side subsidies over those that traditionally subsidized unit supply, and discuss 
how and why federal housing policy came to rely so heavily the former. I assess the 
extent to which federal housing policy became entrenched in demand-side housing 
policies by auditing HUD’s fiscal year budgets between 2000 and 2005, dividing 
program spending by line item for demand- versus supply-based programs.  
In Chapter 4 I examine the extent to which homeownership may be considered 
an appropriate tenure option for low-income households by assessing the financial 
costs and risks associated with low-income homeownership.  
From these analyses, I craft a benchmark that employs three indicators factors to 
evaluate and measure successful low-income homeownership: 1) affordability, 2) 
access to better-performing elementary schools, and 3) proximity to work. While these 
variables encapsulate the most potent wealth creation characteristics that policy makers 
associated with successful homeownership, from a practical standpoint, these are three 
of the most basic characteristics most people consider when purchasing a home. 
Generally speaking, people want a home they can afford, a home in a good school 
district, and a home that is close to work, and in that order. Collectively these variables 
form a measure of low-income housing opportunity that I use in my analysis presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
It is not enough to question whether homeownership is an appropriate housing 
option for low-income households; we need to look at the conditions that affect low-
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income housing opportunity within a specific geography. As a first step, I conduct a 
detailed analysis of low-income housing opportunity for low-income black households in 
five U.S. metropolitan areas between 1990 and 2000 (New York, Philadelphia, 
Washington, Chicago and Detroit). For this analysis, I draw on 1990 and 2000 U.S. 
Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Survey data to determine where low-income black 
homeowners maximized their housing opportunity compared to low-income black 
renters considering three variables discussed above: 1) housing costs as a percentage 
of household income, 2) access to better-performing elementary schools, and 3) 
proximity to workplace. I present my study methodology in Chapter 5 and study findings 
in Chapter 6. The analysis supports a main study hypothesis that, despite the gains 
observed through the 1990s, homeownership did not result in demonstratively better 
housing outcomes as compared to renting for low-income black households in the five 
study metropolitan areas with respect to the three variables of interest. 
In Chapter 7 I employ study findings to support several study conclusions. These 
include a determination that, even under the most robust market conditions such as 
those observed through the 1990s, demand subsides alone cannot supply enough 
adequate affordable housing. Nor will these sorts of subsidies be potent enough to 
overcome market constraints that relegate a large proportion of low-income 
homeowners to properties that fall short of fulfilling the much-lauded promise that 
homeownership holds in our collective consciousness: the promise that homeownership 
guarantees desirable financial and social benefits. This dissertation is not at odds with 
research that has previously identified positive outcomes associated with 
homeownership; rather, the findings herein reinforce a notion that suggests that positive 
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outcomes are more likely to occur when a home is affordable, when it is located near 
places of employment, and when it provides low-income homeowners access to good 
public schools.  
Also in Chapter 7, I recommend that the federal government reconsider 
programs based in supply-side subsidies, not as replacements for existing demand-
oriented programs, but as supplements, especially in metropolitan markets where 
homeownership is less likely to provide good low-income housing opportunity. I outline 
what a new federal housing policy might look like, and argue that a new national 
housing policy should include a high degree of flexibility in how it balances these two 
policy approaches (supply versus demand) depending upon extant metropolitan housing 
market conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
OUTCOMES FROM THE 1990S HOUSING BOOM  
AND THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING.  
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the relationship between housing demand and housing 
supply to answer the question: Is there enough low-income affordable housing? I also 
assess the housing outcomes for low-income and minority households from the 1990s 
housing boom, a period that saw the largest increase in homeownership since the early 
1950s and record growth in low-income and minority homeownership. It is necessary to 
examine these outcomes in greater detail in order to assess the efficacy of the demand-
side incentives that policy makers claimed were instrumental to the gains in low-income 
homeownership through the 1990s. If we are to gauge policies’ true import, it will be 
helpful to examine them relative to gains through the same period made by wealthier 
and non-minority households. Policy makers and planners would also find it helpful to 
know more about the kinds of housing—i.e. the supply—that low-income and minorities 
bought through the housing boom and where it is located geographically. I begin by 
reporting some of the good news—providing facts and figures on gains in low-income 
homeownership through the 1990s. I then put these figures into perspective through an 
examination of several key studies on the subject and through an examination of the 
supply and production of affordable housing.  
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Low-Income Homeownership and the 1990s Housing Boom 
While reported homeownership rates vary, it is safe to say that in the early 2000s 
better than two-thirds of American households owned their homes. U.S. homeownership 
rates have risen steadily over the past century from less than half (47.8%) in 1890 to an 
all time high of about 69.1% in 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). Between 1890 and 
1920 homeownership declined but it began an upswing through the prosperous 1920s. 
The onset of the Great Depression hit the homebuilding industry hard, and from 1929 
through World War II homeownership declined to 43.6%, the lowest level of the 20th 
century. A booming post-war economy, favorable tax incentives and pro-
homeownership government policies spurred exceptional market growth and 
homeownership surged to just over 60% in the two decades following WWII. 
Homeownership rates continued to rise through the 1960s and 70s reaching 64.4% by 
1980. But economic conditions including record high interest rates, and federal cutbacks 
in social spending hindered growth through the 1980s, and homeownership fell by 0.2 
percentage points to 64.2% by 1990. Buoyed by strong growth in the U.S. economy in 
the 90s, American homeownership rebounded, and between 1990 and 2000, owner-
occupied units increased 18.3%, from 102.2 million to 115.9 million (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2001). This brought the U.S. homeownership rate to 66.2% by early 2000. The 
strong growth in the homeownership rate through the 1990sspecifically from 1994 to 
the end of the century during which a net 7 million more households became owners, 
and the homeownership rate increased by nearly 3 percentage points to 
66.8%became known as the “1990s housing boom” (Belsky and Duda 2003). 
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What is most noticeable about the 1990s housing boom is that for the first time in 
history, growth in the homeownership rate included low-income and minority 
households. Between 1993 and 1999, homeownership increased more rapidly for low-
income and minority buyers than for any other segment of the population. Minority 
households accounted for only 15% of owners in 1993, but accounted for 41% of the 
net growth in owners over the following five years. And while the number of low-income 
(those earning less than 80% of the area median income) non-Hispanic white owners 
declined by 225,000 over that same period, the number of minority low-income owners 
increased by more than 800,000 (Belsky and Duda 2003). Similarly, between 1993 and 
1999 the share of minority homebuyers among all first time buyers rose from 19% to 
30% (Retsinas and Belsky 2003). Paralleling these increases in low-income 
homeownership rates were gains in the share of mortgage loans to both low-income 
and minority households, which increased 94% between 1993-99. Loans to black  and 
Hispanic buyers increased 98% and 125% respectively during this same period.  
Policy makers attributed the gains in low-income and minority homeownership to 
record low mortgage interest rates and federal housing policies aimed at increasing 
demand for low-income and minority homeownership, including the lowering of credit 
barriers and pre-purchase homeownership counseling (Hirad and Zorn 2003). Other 
contributing factors were technological advancements led to innovations in mortgage 
lending, including a wider range of mortgage products and purported increased 
accuracy in measuring risk. Together these enabled “more income constrained and 
cash-strapped borrowers at the margin to qualify for mortgage loans” than ever before 
(JCHS 1998). But as encouraging as the gains in low-income and minority 
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homeownership appear, little changed in the overall homeownership rates for these 
groups or in the homeownership gaps that separate these households from more 
affluent segments of society. The following section examines the evidence in greater 
detail. 
The 1990s Housing Boom: A Qualified Success 
The easing of low-income credit constraints and its accompanying low-income 
housing “boom,” while impressive prima facie, did not greatly improve overall low-
income and minority homeownership rates. Research on the structure of the lending 
industry found that the supply of affordable prime mortgage lending measured as a 
fraction of total prime market originations held about constant over the 1993-99 period 
(Nothaft and Surette 2003).
3
 This suggests that, as the proportional share of low-income 
buyers outpaced other segments of the market, a good portion of low-income lending 
occurred in the more expensive and predatory sub-prime market. Further, this study 
found that while very small and very large depositories tend to devote larger 
percentages of their originations to the affordable segments of the market than do 
middle-sized firms, across the board, larger companies tend to originate less affordable 
lending than do smaller companies. The net effect of the easing of credit constraints on 
the overall low-income and minority homeownership gap was therefore negligible. And 
while improved credit and financing products expanded homeownership opportunities 
for many minority and low-income households, several negative outcomes have 
accompanied the 1990s increases in low-income and minority homeownership such as 
                                                     
3 “Affordable lending” refers to prime rate (as opposed to sub-prime), regulated lending to low- and 
moderate-income families and families living in underserved areas. 
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a noticeable increase in the foreclosure rate among these groups, and a sharp rise in 
the low-income household debt-to-income ratio (Aizcorbe, Kennickell et al. 2003) 
(Pitcoff 2003).
4
 
Evidence from HUD suggests that a significant portion of the gains observed in 
minority homeownership through the 1990s represented a rebound or catch-up to 
losses that occurred during the period prior to the 1990s housing boom. For example, 
for the 13 years between 1983 and 1996, white homeownership increased steadily from 
69.1% to 71.6% (slipping in only one year from 70.2% to 70.1% in 1993-94), while black 
homeownership decreased from 45.6% to 45.0%, dropping as low as 42.0% in 1993. 
For all other minorities, homeownership rates during the same period decreased slightly 
from 52.5% to 52.6%, bottoming out at 48.7% in 1987 (HUD 1997).
5
 While increases 
were observed in the years following (from 1998 to 2000), large gaps and shortfalls in 
minority and low-income homeownership rates remain despite the celebrated increases 
in the number of minority and low-income homebuyers through the 1990s. By the end of 
the 90s less than half (47.4% or 12.8 million) of all minority households owned their 
homes compared to better than 75% of white households (Staff 2004) (HUD 2002). And 
despite a 40% increase in minority homeownership from 9.5 million in 1994 to a record 
high of 13.3 million in 2001, minority rates47% for blacks, 48% for Hispanics and 53% 
                                                     
4 Data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances suggest that among families with any 
type of home-secured debt (including a second mortgage, home equity line of credit, or home equity 
loan), the proportion of those who used such borrowing for a purpose other than simply financing their 
home increased from 22.1% to 32.1% between 1995 and 2001. And defaults on loans in 2000 amounted 
to approximately one million households losing their homes to foreclosure, during the height of an 
unprecedented economic expansion. As the economy has softened, those numbers have worsened, with 
delinquencies and foreclosures on all loans rising steadily and reaching a then all-time high in the second 
quarter of 2002. Foreclosures on FHA-backed loans to low-income households increased the fastest, to a 
rate of nearly 3%, with an additional 12% behind in their payments in the second quarter of 2002 
(Author's tabulation of Survey of Consumer Finances). 
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for Asianslagged far behind those of white American households in 2001 (Mozilo 
2003) (Staff 2004). In 2003, the gap between minority and white homeownership was 
25.8 percentage pointsan improvement of just over one percentage point over the 
previous decade (Mozilo 2003)and the gap between white and black households was  
wider at 26.6 percentage points. These numbers reflect only a slight narrowing since 
1994, the year when homeownership rates began to surge (Harvard 2000), and do not, 
in my opinion, present a persuasive enough argument that current housing policy is 
working effectively.  
While the 1990s saw marked gains in homeownership for some lower-income 
households, this was not the case for the poorest households. For example, 
homeownership declined from 46% to 41% between 1974 and 1995 for households with 
annual incomes of $10,000 or less (Joint Center for Housing Studies 1996) (Anonymous 
1996). Less than 48% of very low-income householdsthose earning less than 50% of 
area median incomeowned their homes at the end of the decade (Bratt 2002). While 
nearly one-third of new home loans in large metropolitan areas in 1999 went to 
households earning less than 80% of area median income (Joint Center for Housing 
Studies 2001, p.38), only a fraction of these loans went to very low-income households 
(Bratt 2002). Nor were the gains impressive for households earning just under U.S. 
median income: A 1997 Chicago Title and Trust Company survey of 20 major 
metropolitan areas found homeownership among households earning less than $30,000 
(approximately 80% of national median income) increased just half a percentage point 
from 12% in 1996 to 12.5% in 1997 (Marcelonis 1998). These less than spectacular 
                                                                                                                                                                           
5 Source: http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/spring97/histdat2.html#tbl4_31 
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outcomes for the poorest members of our society reflect reality that direct assistance for 
homeownership tends to serve the upper ends of the low-income scale, not those most 
in need (Dolbeare, Saraf et al. 2004).  
Further evidence suggests that the housing boom failed to provide optimal 
outcomes for many low-income households who bought during the 1990s. A study 
conducted by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University found that the 
increases in low-income and minority homeownership rates through the 90s may not 
have resulted in significantly lower levels of segregation by race and income (Belsky 
and Duda 2003). Similar to earlier studies by Frey et al. (1993, 1995, 1996 and 1998) 
on spatial trends of minority homeownership, Belsky and Duda look specifically at the 
1990s housing boom. Citing studies by Stuart (2000) and Immergluck (1998), they 
argue convincingly that minority and low-income buyers in Boston and Chicago remain 
sharply segregated from non-Hispanic white and high-income home buyers.  
In their analysis, Belsky and Duda (2003) found that, while all buyers are 
decentralizing, whites and Asians have done so to a greater extent than blacks and 
Hispanics (41). While acknowledging studies by Frey, Speare and colleagues (Spere 
1993; Frey and Spere 1995; Frey and Farley 1996; Frey and Geverdt 1998) as the most 
notable body of work in this area, Belsky and Duda conceptualize concentric rings of 
distance-to-central business district to measure home purchase locations over the 
1993-99 period in nine metropolitan areas. Mapping these findings for four metropolitan 
areas with large black and Hispanic population shares (two metros each for blacks and 
Hispanics), they determine that, while some of both groups are able to select homes in 
sectors further out from urban cores, both low-income and minority buyers are 
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concentrated near the city center (41). They conclude that, despite escalating 
homeownership in the 1990s and evidence to suggest that large shares of low-income 
and minority borrowers are purchasing in the suburbs and outside of low-income tracts, 
low-income homebuyer clustering near the poorer urban core remains the rule rather 
than the exception (57). This is more true for black and Hispanics than for Asians, which 
served to skew the results for all minorities as a group. Whites and Asians largely 
avoided buying homes in areas where a majority of other minority buyers purchased 
over the 1993-99 period (57).  
Official governmental figures and reports that celebrated the gains in low-income 
homeownership rarely mentioned the increasing share of low- and very low-income 
households occupying and buying manufactured homes. Collins, Crowe, et al. (2002) 
found that a significant proportion of low-income owned homes and a substantial 
majority of the affordable units added to the stock through the 1990s were 
manufactured homes. Manufactured (or mobile) homes differ from modular homes in 
that they are movable dwelling units, 8 feet or more wide and 40 feet or more long, and 
are built to standards defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Because manufactured homes need no permanent foundation, no building permit is 
required for their placement. Modular homes, often leave the factory in multiple 
sections, require a building permit and are subject to local zoning and building code 
standards (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).  
Collins, Crowe, et al. (2002) determined that the share of affordable units that 
were manufactured homes increased from about 16% to 18% between 1997 and 1999, 
while Apgar et al. (2002) determined that about two-thirds of all units added to the 
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nation's stock of affordable housing during that period were manufactured (Apgar, 
Calder et al. 2002). This trend is reflected in national manufactured home production 
(shipments), which increased 85% between 1990 and 1999, from approximately 
188,172 units to 348,671 units (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). That growth represents an 
increasing proportion of all privately constructed homes during that period, from 14.3% 
in 1990 to 21.7% in 1999, an increase of 51% (see Figure 2-1).  
Collins, Crowe, et al. (2002) found that while the overall share of manufactured 
homes occupied by low-income households increased through the late 90s, occupancy 
varied by regionlow-income manufactured home occupancy was more prevalent in 
the South and West than in the Northeast and Midwest. That much of the growth in 
manufactured homes occurred in the South and West is most likely a function of climate 
and available open space allowing for easier occupancy and placement and 
development of mobile home parks in these regions. 
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Low-income homebuyers are most likely to occupy manufactured home units 
because of their price relative to site-built housing. In 2004, the average price of a 
manufactured home was $58,100. The average price of a single-section manufactured 
home was $32,800 and the average price for a multi-section unit cost $63,300, prices 
far below the median price of $185,200 for a site-built home (NAR Quarterly Housing 
Affordability Index cited in Bandy 2002). These prices make manufactured homes a 
viable option for low-income household who desire to take advantage of available 
homeowner assistance and subsidy programs. Indeed, between 1993 and 1999, 23% of 
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the growth in homeownership among very low-income families
6
 was in manufactured 
housing (CFED 2005). 
While manufactured homes represent a potentially important source of affordable 
housing, the increasing share of homeownership in manufactured units amongst low- 
and very low-income households should be of concern for at least two reasons. First, 
while manufactured homes provide adequate shelter and can in many instances offer 
pleasant places to live, approximately two-thirds do not include ownership of the land on 
which they sit. This fact challenges conventional notions of homeownership and 
undermines many of the financial benefits championed in the pro-homeownership 
debate. For example, mortgage interest and real estate taxes can only be deducted 
from federal income taxes if a manufactured home occupant owns the land on which the 
unit sits. Mortgage interest on a rental home site is also deductible, but rent payments 
typically are not, unless the land is being leased for 15 or more years 
(LendingTree.Com 2005).
7
 While land ownership among manufactured homeowners 
has increased in recent years, well over half of units do not include land ownership. 
Land tenure varies by location. Manufactured homes located in urbanized areas are 
more likely to be on rented land (usually in mobile home parks) than those in rural 
areas, and those in suburban and central city areas are almost twice as likely to be on 
rented land compared to those in the rural environs.  
                                                     
6 Very low-income households earn 50% or less of area median income. 
7 Renting a site, on the other hand, may mean that the occupant will not have to pay real estate taxes. 
According to Lending Tree, a clearinghouse that puts lenders in contact with borrowers, homes on rental 
sites are taxed as personal property, so they carry a book value (estimated average retail value based on 
age and condition of home) similar to a car. Since most manufactured homes depreciate over time, their 
book value declines, as do personal property taxes. The National Automobile Dealers Association 
publishes a manual on manufactured home prices. 
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This issue is important to housing advocates and the Corporation for Enterprise 
Development (CFED), a not for profit entity, which along with the Ford Foundation and 
the Manufactured Housing Institute launched a multi-million dollar program in 2005 to 
address the most pressing challenges facing low-income manufactured homeowners 
calls land tenure “…one of the most important determinants of whether a homeowner's 
investment in MH will appreciate in value” (CFED 2005). 
The second reason cause for concern regarding growth in low-income 
manufactured homeownership is that, unlike site-built homes, manufactured homes 
typically depreciate quickly in value. So much so that they are legally deeded similarly to 
automobiles—prices are tracked and published by the National Automobile Dealers 
Association. I discuss returns to investment for low-income homeowners in Chapter 4, 
but, briefly, home appreciation (i.e. equity) is the most important financial variable in the 
equation of successful homeownership. Evidence suggests that manufactured homes 
typically do not offer returns to investment on par with site-built units, and manufactured 
homes typically depreciate in value over time or appreciate only slightly. For example, a 
study by the University of Michigan, the first to use repeat sales data for manufactured 
homes, examined 455 homes that sold twice between 1987 and 1990 and found that 
these homes sold on average for more than their purchase price but few units 
experienced unit appreciation greater than the general rate of inflation (Warner and 
Scheuer 1993). Another study determined that the average appreciation rate of 
manufactured homes on owner owned land is not consistently statistically different than 
the appreciation rate of site built homes. But that was not to say that manufactured 
homes performed in line with site-built units: manufactured homes on owned land 
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appreciated less than the site built homes in three of the four data series it examined—
in one instance where manufactured homes and site built homes had a similar average 
appreciation rates: 13.9% of manufactured homes lost value compared to only 5.7% of 
site built homes (HAC 1996). 
The dismal financial performance of manufactured homes is not necessarily 
associated with unit typology—evidence suggests that few inherent differences exist to 
explain why a home built in a factory should perform differently than one built on site.
8
  
Manufactured homes have deservedly emerged from the stereotypical negative 
reputation that once surrounded them, and units today are generally spacious, well built 
and last upwards of three to four decades (Vermeer and Louie 1997).  
Several factors, however, contribute to manufactured homes’ lackluster resale 
price performance; these include location, land tenure, sales price and maintenance. 
Not surprisingly, land tenure is the strongest determinant, boosting appreciation of the 
bundle of housing goods and services and as well as that of the unit itself. For example, 
on average between 1985 and 1999, manufactured homes appreciated on 6% less per 
year than site built homes, but manufactured homes that included land appreciated 
similarly to site-built units (Jewell 2003). Furthermore, manufactured home appreciation 
varies depending upon type of unit and location within the metropolitan area. For 
example, larger (double-wide) units hold their value better than smaller (single-wide) 
                                                     
8 This is a far cry from the manufactured (or mobile) homes of the past and from the image they often 
carry. Manufactured homes today are comparable to site-built homes in terms of maintenance, wind 
safety, fire safety, and thermal efficiency (Vermeer, K. and J. Louie (1997). "The Future of Manufactured 
Housing." Cambridge MA, Joint Center for Housing Studies. This is due in large part to the passage of 
the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act, which directed HUD to 
develop national building standards for a federal oversight program for the construction of manufactured 
homes. Those standards eventually became law in June 1976 with the passage of the Federal 
Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards on June 15, 1976 (also known as the “HUD 
Code”). 
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units, and, according to one study using American Housing Survey data, manufactured 
units located in central cities appreciated approximately 14% compared to those sited in 
suburban or non-metropolitan areas, which depreciated 1% (HAC 1996) (Vermeer and 
Louie 1997). These studies suggests that on the whole price appreciation rates for 
manufactured homes vary greatly as compared to site built homes and that these rates 
do not appreciate as fast (HAC 1996).  
In short, the gains in low-income and minority homeownership through the 1990s 
must be kept in perspective. While the gains observed provided some cause for 
celebration, it is important to bear in mind that there was effectively no change in the 
overall homeownership rate for low-income and minority groups (Asians excluded). 
Gains occurred primarily in the upper end of the low-income scale, and few of the 
poorest households were included in the boom. And research suggests that outcomes 
were not entirely positive for those who were included: it appears that low-income and 
minority buyers are not any less segregated than before, and that the foreclosure rate 
and income-to-debt ratio among these groups increased sharply. Finally, much of the 
increase in homeownership amongst low-income buyers included manufactured homes. 
This trend may be problematic for low-income homeowners because manufactured 
homes defy conventional notions of homeownership for various reasons, one being that 
approximately two-thirds do not include land ownership (Collins, Crowe, et al. 2001), 
and they do not, in most cases, match the financial returns of conventional site built 
homes. 
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Explaining Outcomes of the 1990s Housing Boom 
Why were more low-income and minority households not able to prosper through 
the 1990s housing boom, the greatest surge in homeownership in half a decade? One 
explanation has to do with their financial position relative to other cohorts when the 
boom began. Race and income are inextricably related in America, and unlike their 
middle- and upper-income Caucasian counterparts, low-income minority households 
were by their very definition less financially equipped and prepared to participate in the 
housing market when the boom hit. Demand-oriented housing subsidies are designed to 
remedy this by providing buyers greater financial wherewithal (mostly in form of 
downpayment assistance but also in limited cases mortgage payment assistance), but 
the majority of these programs were designed reach moderate- to low-income buyers, 
generally those earning between 60% and 80% of area median income (about $35,000-
$45,000 on a national basis) (Foundation 2005). The very poor earn too little to qualify 
to buy a home even with the subsidies available. 
Income, race and program capacity and focus explain only part of the story. 
Another important factor is a shortage in the supply of affordable housing units in many 
metropolitan markets. A plentiful supply of affordable for-sale units contributes positively 
to low-income homeownership—where there is ample supply, prices remain lower and 
people can buy—but the market was not been able to supply enough affordably-priced 
units. For example, between 1999 and 2003, the market share of new homes priced 
affordably for low-income buyers (and even to those earning slightly above median 
income) decreased steadily, while the share of homes costing above $250,000 
increased from 20% in 1999 to 34% in 2003. The share of those priced in the middle-
range (between $150,000 and $249,999) remained constant at approximately 53% 
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(author’s tabulation of U.S. Census Bureau data). Notably, as mentioned above, the 
figures on the number of homes priced affordable include manufactured homes, which 
comprise a majority of the affordable units added to the stock between 1997 and 1999, 
especially in the South.  
Beyond the decreasing supply of affordable units, I argue in the remainder of the 
chapter that several additional factors also contributed to the less than stellar outcomes 
for low-income home buyers during the 1990s. These include a federal housing policy 
that relied too heavily on demand side subsidies to spur market behavior, a failure in 
filtering, a key mechanism in economic theory which purports that affordable housing 
can be supplied from existing stock when wealthier families move up into newer and 
more expensive housing, and changes in the structure of the homebuilding industry that 
prevented suppliers from building new affordable units.  
The Supply of Affordable Housing 
Generally, however, calculating affordability relies on two components—income 
and price—to determine a percentage of income to housing cost quotient. The 
conventional public policy indicator of housing affordability in the U.S. is a quotient of 
30%, which serves as the upper limit of allowable income spent on housing for it to be 
considered affordable. Most agencies base calculations on area median income (AMI) 
as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. A percentage of income measure offer several 
advantages including an ease of calculation and comprehension, availability of data, 
and the fact that it is applicable across time and space (Bogdon and Can 1997). Also, 
analysts have traditionally relied on the home-price-to-income-ratio as a measure of 
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affordability because home expenditure tends to rise comparably with home price 
(Megbolugbe 1992). 
Between 1999 and 2003, the number and percentage of new homes priced 
affordable to low-income buyers and to those earning slightly above median income 
decreased steadily while the production of pricier homes increased. For illustrative 
purposes, assume a hypothetical low-income household earning $35,000 
(approximately 80% of U.S. median) buying on a 30 year fixed rate mortgage at 6% 
interest (considering $2500 in local property taxes, annual homeowners insurance, 
$10,000 in liquid assets and no monthly debt obligations). In 1999, approximately 
102,000 new units (12% of all new homes built) were affordable to this buyer (i.e. 
homes costing less than $100,000). By 2003, approximately 55,000 new units (less than 
5% of all new homes built) were priced affordably for this buyer (inflation adjusted in 
calculation). While the annual number of units with middle-range pricesthose between 
$150,000 and $249,999increased steadily through this time period, their market share 
(percentage) remained steady at approximately 53%. However, higher priced 
homesthose costing more than $250,000increased in market share from 20% (or 
179,000 units) in 1999 to 34% (or 372,000 units) of all new homes built in 2003 (see 
Table 2-1). In short, the market is supplying fewer affordably-priced new units, keeping 
middle-range unit production steady, and increasing its output of higher priced houses. 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-1: New Housing Production by Price: U.S. 1999-2003 (Thousands of 
Units) 
Year Total Units 
Number of Housing Units and Percentage of Total  
(Real U.S. Dollars) 
< $100K % $100K-$124,999 % 
$150K-
$249,999 % >$250K % 
1999 880 102 12% 126 14% 473 54% 179 20%
2000 877 88 10% 112 13% 471 54% 205 23%
2001 908 75 8% 105 12% 499 55% 228 25%
2002 973 62 6% 94 10% 514 53% 303 31%
2003 1,085 55 5% 98 9% 560 52% 372 34%
Source: Author’s tabulation U.S. Census DataManufacturing, Mining and Construction 
Statistics, Economic Census 1997 and 2002 
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Research suggests that despite the impressive gains in low-income and minority 
homeownership through the 1990s, home price appreciation, which outpaced inflation 
and income growth, actually reduced the supply of affordable for-sale units available to 
low-income households. In this study, Collins, Crowe, et al. (2001) used one set of 
mortgage underwriting assumptions for sixteen metropolitan areas in 1999 and found 
that approximately 44% of owner-occupied units were affordable to households with 
incomes below 80% of the area median income, a decreasing share from 1997. Further, 
approximately 78% of owner-occupied units affordable in 1997 continued to be 
affordable in 1999, and those homes affordable for homeownership are being lost 
specifically to house price inflation and vacancies. During this two-year period alone, a 
net 1.7 million units became unaffordable because of increases in their value, a net 
153,000 units were lost from the affordable housing stock due to tenure switching (i.e. 
being converted to rental units), and 157,000 were lost to vacancies, meaning that they 
were no longer available in circulation. Overall there were approximately 500,000 fewer 
affordable owner-occupied homes in 1999 than in 1997 (Collins, Crowe, et al. 2001). 
Table 2-2 presents the proportion of units affordable to occupants by income level. The 
largest proportional losses of units were those affordable to households earning less 
than 50% of area median income (AMI).  
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Table 2-2: Percentage Existing Housing Units Affordable to Occupants by 
Income Level, 1997-1999 
Household Income 
Share of Affordable 
Housing Including 
Manufactured Homes 
Share of Affordable 
Housing Excluding 
Manufactured Homes 
1997 1999 1997 1999 
<50% of AMI 65.3 62.3 60.9 56.3 
50-80% of AMI 61.8 59.1 57.9 54.7 
80-120% of AMI 51.0 50.1 47.1 45.3 
120% of AMI 27.1 26.1 25.0 23.3 
All Owner Occupied Housing 47.3 44.2 43.3 39.4 
Source: Collins, Crowe, et al. “Supply-Side Constraints on Low-Income Homeownership” 
(2001) 
 
According to Collins et al. the share of homes locally affordable to low-income 
households varied by region—it was highest in the South and Midwest and lowest in the 
West. However, much of the South’s affordable housing stock appears to be 
concentrated in manufactured homes, an ownership vehicle that escapes many of the 
traditional benefits associated with homeownership (as previously discussed in this 
chapter). Thus, the overall increasing low-income homeownership rates have to be 
qualified considering these details decreased appear to be decreasing, especially in 
markets in the Northeast and West.  
In a second study, Collins et al. (2002) provides a more comprehensive 
examination of low-income homeownership through the 1990s. This research suggests 
that low-income and minority homebuyers are more concentrated than white and 
higher-income buyers, suggesting that they are buying in areas of town that are not 
experiencing the strong returns to investment as other homeowners.  
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Housing Filtering and the Supply of Affordable Housing 
While the analysis above suggests that the market share and production of 
affordably-priced homes is decreasing, economic theory suggests that construction of 
higher priced homes can positively and indirectly affect the supply affordable housing 
through filtering. Filtering is a key mechanism in the economic theory of demand-side 
housing policy because it explains in theory the mechanics of how the market is 
supposed to work to meet increasing demand for affordable housing units. Simply put, 
as newer and more expensive housing is built, the theory states that wealthier families 
will move up and their existing units become affordable to the poor (due to age, wear 
and obsolescence, etc.). With fewer new affordable housing units in production and the 
number of low-income homebuyers increasing, filtering of existing units through the 
housing market price strata assumes greater importance.  
Debate about what effects filtering has on the supply of affordable housing (i.e. 
housing that is price affordable to low-income households) has rested on primarily on 
the quality of the units themselves and the process of deterioration: new units displace 
older ones, which in turn become less expensive and “filter down” to lower-income 
households. Eventually, older substandard units are removed from the market. 
Researchers have identified at least three ways in which filtering occurs (Green and 
Malpezzi 2003) (Galster 1996): 1) by household income, 2) unit price and 3) unit 
quantity. While obvious inter-dependencies exist among these factors, they suggest 
three corresponding market conditions necessary for filtering to function properly. 
Units will not “filter down” unless people can afford to move up to a home in the 
next price/value tier. This is tied directly to income, but the amount of available equity a 
buyer can apply to purchase from his/her existing home also contributes to successful 
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upward movement. Therefore, incomes must rise and housing values must increase, 
but not to the point where buyers at the lower end of the price spectrum will be priced 
out of the market. 
The value unit’s bundle of housing services must decrease over time so that it 
becomes outdated or less desirable in the market of comparative offerings. For 
example, houses built with only one bathroom are today considered outdated by most, 
and therefore are less desirable. When built, these units may have been considered a 
part of high quality stock and may have been priced accordingly, but have now “filtered 
down” to the lower segments of the market. 
For quantity filtering to occur successfully, new home construction must keep 
pace with household formation and demolition (or removal) of existing older stock so 
that new units replace substandard units and keep pace with population growth and 
demographic change. Depending upon market conditions, if these conditions are in all in 
equilibrium “upward movement to higher-valued real estate (should) parallel the 
downward filtering of existing real estate” (Bier 2001).  
A generally accepted indicator of housing market’s capacity to effectively filter 
housing is its vacancy rate. The vacancy rate indicates the number of unoccupied units 
in a housing market and includes those units for rent and sale (including those rent and 
sold), units for seasonal, recreational or occasional use and units vacant for other 
reasons (e.g. migrant housing). A market with a very low vacancy rate is said to be 
“tight” (demand for housing is high relative to supply) and a market with a high vacancy 
rate is said to be loose—i.e. supply is high relative to demand, and therefore it 
presumably has enough capacity to accommodate growth and movement within and 
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among price levels. If we look at vacancy rates through the 1990s across the country for 
the 50 largest metropolitan areas we notice that vacancy rates decreased through the 
decade. Suggesting that filtering of existing stock down to lower-income households did 
not occur in many markets, especially in the rapidly growing cities in the Western and 
Southern regions of the country.  
The average gross vacancy rate for the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the 
country decreased approximately 18 percent from 8.3% to 6.8% between 1990 and 
2000 (author’s tabulation of U.S. Census Bureau data). Regionally, this rate decreased 
in three of four Census Bureau regions with the largest declines occurring in the South 
(from 10.2% to 7.6%) and the West (from 7.8% to 6.1%). When rental units, housing 
units for seasonal and recreational uses, and units vacant for other reasons are 
removed—producing what can be interpreted as a net for-sale vacancy rate—the rate 
decreased approximately 28%. In fact, net for-sale vacancy rates increased in only 18 
of 50 metropolitan areas examined through the 1990s, with over half of these occurring 
in the Midwest and, with a few exceptions, the remainder occurring in midsized markets 
in the south (Raleigh, Greensboro, Louisville and Charlotte) and Northeast (Pittsburgh, 
Rochester and Buffalo). Notable exceptions were Portland and Seattle in the West, in 
which net for-sale vacancy rates increased 101% and 35% respectively. Table 2-3 
summarizes the findings from this analysis.  
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Table 2-3: Change in Population, Housing Units and Net For-Sale Vacancy 
Rates for 50 Largest Metropolitan Areas (U.S. 2000): 1990 to 2000 (Summary 
Table by Region) 
Geography Category 1990 2000 Change Percent Change 
U.S.  
(50 Metro 
Areas) 
Total Population 135,178,768 162,514,411 27,335,643  20.2%
Housing Units  54,194,250 64,311,028 10,116,778  18.7%
For-Sale Units 657,076 564,622 (92,454) -14.1%
Net Vacancy 
Rate 1.21% 0.88% 0.33 -27.6%
Midwest 
Total Population 28,632,142 32,813,205 4,181,063  14.6%
Housing Units 11,364,686 13,214,300 1,849,614  16.3%
For-Sale Units 97,698 103,999 6,301  6.4%
Net Vacancy 
Rate 0.86% 0.79% 0.07 -8.5%
Northeast 
Total Population 34,820,082 40,206,158 5,386,076  15.5%
Housing Units 13,802,115 16,055,939 2,253,824  16.3%
For-Sale Units 148,591 106,294 (42,297) -28.5%
Net Vacancy 
Rate 1.08% 0.66% 0.42 -38.5%
South 
Total Population 37,141,421 46,920,790 9,779,369  26.3%
Housing Units 15,604,425 19,084,610 3,480,185  22.3%
For-Sale Units 253,667 206,046 (47,621) -18.8%
Net Vacancy 
Rate 1.63% 1.08% 0.55 -33.6%
West  
Total Population 34,585,123 42,574,258 7,989,135  23.1%
Housing Units 13,423,024 15,956,179 2,533,155  18.9%
For-Sale Units 157,120 136,601 (20,519) -13.1%
Net Vacancy 
Rate 1.17% 0.86% 0.31 -26.9%
Source: Author’s Tabulation of U.S. Census Bureau Data 
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The analysis suggests that between 1990 and 2000, there was a shorter supply 
of houses available for sale in the 50 largest housing markets and further suggests that 
these markets therefore had less capacity to effectively filter in 2000 than in 1990. While 
the net for-sale vacancy rates declined in all regions of the country, rate increases were 
observed in metropolitan areas throughout the Midwest—increases were observed in 8 
of the 11 metropolitan areas analyzed.  
But do very low vacancy rates automatically translate into housing price 
increases and/or shortages in the supply of affordably-priced homes? Bluestone (2006) 
examined data on the cost of living, internal net migration (between 2000 and 2004), 
and the change in employment levels during this period for 245 MSAs. By statistically 
fitting housing vacancy rates and housing price appreciation, he found a non-linear 
relationship: At very low vacancy rates, below 1.5 to 2 percent, housing prices 
accelerate rapidly. With fewer homes on the market, sellers have an edge over buyers. 
At higher vacancy rates, prices begin to moderate and may even fall slightly as buyers 
begin to gain some bargaining power. But as vacancy rates for single-family homes rise 
much above 4-percent, housing prices begin to decrease. The sellers’ market turns into 
a buyers’ market. This has occurred in a number of communities throughout the country 
(including Boston, Worcester, and Springfield between 1988 and 1995). In the worst 
case scenario, prices can fall by 20 percent or more and not recover to their peaks for 
twelve years or more.  
Other research suggests that filtering is more successful in Midwestern markets, 
where new construction has outpaced household growth and unit abandonment for 
quite some time. For example, new construction outpaced household growth in the 
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Detroit metropolitan area through the 1980s. During this time about 144,000 housing 
units were built while the area gained only 49,000 new households. Nearly three units 
were built for each additional household, which enabled substantial filtering to occur 
(Bier 2001). In Cleveland, the ratio of housing units to households increased from 1.2 to 
2.5 between 1950 and 1980, and significant new unit development occurred in places 
like Youngstown, Ohio area even when household growth was zero or negative.  
My analysis of housing production from the early 70s to late 90s suggests that, 
while states in the South and West dominated housing production in terms of overall 
number of housing units built through the 25-year study period, Illinois, Ohio and 
Michigan remained solidly in the 80th percentile of housing unit production between 
1972 and 1997 (ranking 6th, 7th and 10th respectively in overall unit production). The 
outcome has been the creation of a glut of housing at the core and in the older inner-
ring suburbs of many Midwestern cities, thus creating conditions conducive to filtering 
and making housing more affordable where the urban poor are concentrated. Under 
these conditions, where housing production at the higher end of the market meets or 
outpaces household growth, filtering appears to work effectively. 
For filtering to have desirable price effects on the housing consumed by low-
income households (i.e. create more affordable for-sale housing), occupant incomes 
must outpace housing values, older houses must deteriorate and/or be removed from 
the market, and new housing production must outpace household growth. At a 
minimum, incomes must outpace housing prices and production must outpace 
household growth. When these market conditions are not met, filtering slows and/or 
stops working, housing prices rise and existing affordable units become scarce and 
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disappear from the ranks because demand drives up price. Reverse filtering can even 
occur—i.e. units pass from poor households to wealthier ones—if a neighborhood is 
undergoing “revitalization” or “gentrification” (Green and Malpezzi 2003). This appears 
to be what has happened in the hot markets of the South and West, and in certain 
markets in the Northeast, where rapid population growth and household formation 
outpaced unit production, and incomes outran housing price increases through the 
1990s and into the early 2000s (Daley 2005) (Shiller 2005).  
Further, analyses by Collin, Crowe et al. (2001, 2002) illustrate important 
limitations to filtering theory, especially in hot housing markets: As the authors point out, 
the correlation between house prices and incomes is far from perfect because evidence 
suggests that a large share of affordably valued units in the metropolitan areas 
examined are occupied not by low-income households but by those with moderate and 
higher incomes. This is not how filtering is supposed to work, but it appears to be what 
is happening in hot markets when housing demand outstrips supply. 
Even when ideal market conditions are met and filtering occurs, there is little 
empirical evidence that its results positively affect the low-income housing submarket 
enough to lower rents, even in the long run. Weicher and Thibodeau (1988) found new 
unit production replaced dilapidated units at a rate of 4 to 1 between 1950 and 1970, but 
subsequent new housing production did not result in significantly fewer lower-quality 
units after 1970 (Weicher and Thibodeau 1988) (see Galster 1996). Further, Vitaliano 
found no statistically significant relationship between the numbers of new units built in a 
metropolitan area and reduction in the inhabited slum-quality stock 5-15 years later 
(Vitaliano 1983) (see also Galster 1996). Even when filtering does not occur to any 
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great extent—i.e. new units are not replacing units at the bottom but, rather, are simply 
increasing supply of the housing stock—it is unlikely that short run price effects will 
benefit the poor because neighborhood downgrading would erode such gains (Galster 
1996). Eventually neighborhood property values and land rents bottom out creating 
conditions ripe for gentrification and real estate redevelopment, both of which are 
unlikely to include much housing for the poor (Smith 1996) (Fainstein 1994, 2001).  
This thinking is supported by research on the factors that affect change in the 
stock of market-rate housing affordable to low-income households, which found unit 
filtering more sensitive to variation in neighborhood conditions than to unit 
characteristics (DiPasquale 1997). This study also found that the affordable housing 
submarket is not strongly integrated with the larger housing market. The implications 
being that units located in better neighborhoods are more likely to filter-up than down, 
and will never become a part of the affordable housing submarket. Units that are most 
likely to “filter down” are located in the least desirable neighborhoods. These findings 
are supported by those mentioned previously in this chapter regarding the evident 
spatial segregation that occurred in the low-income homebuyer market through the 
1990s. 
At best, these findings suggest that filtering is likely to make available little, if any, 
affordable housing units in good neighborhoods thus supplying properties that could 
provide low-income buyers with much needed equity. At worst, they suggest that a 
substantive proportion of units made available to low-income households through the 
filtering process will be located in our cities’ least desirable neighborhoods, an outcome 
that will likely perpetuate economic and racial segregation. These findings strongly call 
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into question our federal housing policy that relied heavily on the theory of filtering by 
providing demand subsidies to low-income home buyers so they can participate in the 
housing market—a housing policy in which filtering became de facto affordable housing. 
Given the findings presented in this chapter, I turn my attention in the next to 
federal housing policy in order to explain how and why federal housing policy came to 
champion subsidies that increase demand for low-income housing over those that 
subsidize supply, and assess the extent to which the federal housing policy has become 
entrenched these policies.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE ORIGINS OF DEMAND-DRIVEN FEDERAL HOUSING 
POLICY 
Introduction 
I begin this chapter with a history of U.S. federal housing policy to explain how 
the shift from supply-side to demand-side programs occurred and why federal housing 
policy has come to rely on homeownership to remedy the nation’s affordable housing 
crisis. I also assess the extent to which the federal housing policy has become 
entrenched in demand-side housing policies by auditing HUD’s fiscal year budgets 
between 2000 and 2005, dividing program spending by line item to compare spending 
on demand- versus supply-based programs. These analyses provide background to 
explain the logic behind the shift in federal housing policy that occurred in the early 70s, 
and what has changed since then. 
Federal Housing Policy 1970-2000: From Supply to Demand Subsidies 
U.S. federal housing policy has long been and remains complicit in shaping the 
housing market, especially that for affordable housing. What began as an effort to spur 
economic growth and stability in the early 1930s, evolved in a relatively short period to a 
grand vision to provide “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every 
American.” This in fact was the slogan of the 1949 Federal Housing Act. Early federal 
housing policy was comprised of a variety well-funded programs that collectively 
provided a multi-pronged approach to the housing shortage at hand. In fact, one of the 
great strengths of federal housing policy almost from its inception was that it generously 
funded two kinds of programs with more-or-less equal vigor—those that subsidized 
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demand for housing and those that subsidized supply. Since the early 1970s, however, 
federal housing budget authority has decreased 48% in real dollars (Changing Priorities 
NILC 4 2005), and federal housing policy slowly shifted its agenda to demand-side 
oriented and pro-homeownership subsidies (Barton 1996).  
For example, overall housing assistance budget authority (i.e. money which 
legislation allows the federal government to dedicate to housing assistance in a fiscal 
year or over a specified multi-year period of program life) has decreased by almost half 
since 1976, from $57.7 billion to $29.2 billion in 2004 (in 2004 dollars). During that same 
period, housing assistance outlays (i.e. the money the federal government actually 
spends) increased by 403%, from $7.4 billion to $37.3 billion in 2004 (in 2004 dollars). 
While housing assistance outlays were 13% of budget authority in 1976 and 128% of 
budget authority in 2004, the increase is misleading. Outlays have caught up with 
budget authority because longer-term housing development commitments from past 
decades have been completed and are now being renewed annually.
9
 Meanwhile, the 
federal government increased housing-related tax expenditures (i.e. “departures from 
the normal tax structure designed to favor a particular industry, activity or class of 
                                                     
9 Federal budget outlays refer to housing spending in a particular fiscal year, whereas federal budget 
authority refers to new multi-year spending authorized over a future period of time. Therefore, when 
future program spending is curtailed or a program reaches its terminus years, outlays are often higher 
than budget authority in a given year. Some researchers argue that confusion between budget authority 
and outlays misleads housing advocates to contend that the federal government has reduced its support 
of housing since the early 1980s. Malpezzi and Green point out, for example, that, while federal budget 
authority for housing fell from around $70 billion in the late 1970s to about $12 billion in 2003, federal 
outlays (actual spending) increased virtually every year and only since 1995 have outlays begun to 
stagnate. Increases in budget outlays prima facie suggest increased federal support of housing, but 
thinking only about outlays also has pitfalls. First of all, unless it is expected that the affordable housing 
crisis will evaporate in the near future, it is important to balance current program spending with 
guarantees for spending in the future. Second, it is important to remember that a substantial proportion of 
current spending is being used to maintain existing supply programs for which cost are increasing or for 
moving people from existing public housing to market housing as Section-8 contracts expire. 
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Figure 3-1:  Ratio of Federal Housing Budget Authority (i.e. 
Spending Authorization) to Federal Housing-Related Tax 
Expenditures (i.e. Tax Benefits), 1976-2004
Source: NLIHC 
persons” see Burman 2003) by 260% between 1976 and 2004, from $33.2 billion to 
$119.3 billion (in 2004 dollars) (Dolbeare, Saraf et al. 2004).  
This change in the ratio between housing authority and housing-related tax 
expenditures is startling because it reveals a dramatic shift in spending from supply- to 
demand-side subsidies. In 1976, the law authorized the federal government to spend 
about twice as much on housing assistance subsidies than could be given-up in the 
form of tax revenue for housing-related subsidies. By 2004, this relationship had 
completely reversed itself: housing-related expenditures totaled four times that of 
housing assistance authority (see Figure 3-1). 
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Demand-side subsidies took front seat with a) the effective abandonment of 
public (rental) housing programs in the early 1970s, b) the removal of depreciation and 
tax investment incentives for multi-family housing through the passage of the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act (TRA), and c) through the 80s and 90s, substantial expansion of funding for 
low-income and minority homeownership programs. Green and Malpezzi describe the 
shift accordingly: “From the 1930s to the 1960s the federal government (housing 
policies) focused on subsidizing units. Since the 1970s there has been a shift to 
subsidizing people” (Green and Malpezzi 2003). And Michael Teitz adds further 
definition:  
We (the federal government) have moved away from the assumption 
embodied in public housing, (that) the best way to approach the problem of 
supplying adequate and affordable housing for the poor should be the 
construction and supply of housing specifically for their use. In its place, we 
have assumed instead that the object of policy should be to ensure that the 
poor participate in housing markets in much the same way as other groups in 
society, and that public programs should support that participation (Teitz in 
Green and Malpezzi 2003).  
 
In other words, federal housing policy for all practical purposes abandoned the 
philosophical foundation that underpinned just about every housing program it 
sponsored to help the poor between 1930 and 1970. How and why did this happen?  
Federal subsidy for housing demand is nothing new: it has its roots in the 
homeownership programs of the Homeowners Loan Corporation Act of 1933 and with 
the creation of the Federal Housing Association (a year later). The concept was 
irreversibly institutionalized with the passage of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act in 
1944. These programs were solidly aimed at the middle-class; what was different in the 
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late 1990s and early 2000s was the application of demand-oriented subsidy to help the 
poor.  
Federal leadership in social stewardship had emerged in the 1930s with the 
FDR’s New Deal social and welfare programs and progressed through the post-war 
economic expansion to the programs of Johnson’s Great Society. The strength of 
unionized labor and the Civil Rights Movement further established the federal 
government as a central force in social welfare. But by the end of the post-war 
expansion, marked most identifiably by the 1973 oil crisis, the federal leadership came 
under severe attack from conservatives. This ushered in a new era of federalism, one 
that brought massive reductions in federal social welfare and housing program 
spending. The Nixon administration launched the first large-scale welfare and housing 
dismantling efforts, but “New Federalism,” as it became known, reached its apex in the 
1980s with the Reagan presidency (Peterson and Lewis 1986). Most significantly in the 
area of housing policy, New Federalism formally introduced housing vouchers as a 
replacement for government subsidized units. This began gradually with the reduction of 
and eventual moratorium on unit production during the Nixon administration.  
It is possible to view the shift within the larger context of economic restructuring 
that began in the early 1970s and the rise of deregulation and market reliance in 
everything from airline travel to pollution control. The shift was marked by, among other 
things, a substantial change in the pattern of state intervention in markets and the social 
welfare arena (Castells 1991; Sassen 2001; Fainstein 1994). New Federalism cannot be 
held solely responsible for the federal governments’ shift in housing policy, however, 
because housing programs at the time produced housing so deficient that they were 
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popular with neither beneficiaries (tenants) nor benefactors (taxpayers). Even liberal 
thinkers at the time recognized the failures of U.S. housing policy. Possibly most 
emblematic were those of the urban renewal program (Title I of the 1949 Housing Act), 
which razed many vibrant communities replacing them with revenue generating 
commercial development (see Jacobs 1961 and others). Persistent racial and socio-
economic segregation in public housing provided further pressure to shift the course of 
housing policy.
10
 These failures were the catalyst for a shift in federal housing policy’s 
focus from urban renewal to human renewal (Fainstein 1993). Housing programs that 
followed including Johnson’s Model Cities Act (1966) and Nixon’s Housing and 
Community Development Act (1974) placed greater emphasis on community 
development (i.e. people) and stressed local government flexibility over program 
production (i.e. units).  
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 introduced housing 
certificates, an idea first advanced in the 1930s by the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards (Orlebeke 1983), and Community Development Block Grants, which 
provided housing funding directly to municipalities. While the shift to vouchers was 
gradualSections, 235 and 236 still provided federal subsidy for mortgage and building 
loans starting in 1968 (Hays 1995)the Housing and Community Development Act 
effectively placed a moratorium on federally built units. In the mid- to late-70s, President 
Carter, although eager to address housing issues early in his term, later abandoned his 
modest proposals to increase public housing production and eventually succumbed to 
                                                     
10 Interestingly, this subject was given minimal attention in the National Housing Review, HUD’s 
comprehensive review of government housing programs and policies Nixon ordered in March 1974 when 
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the tide of Congressional support for increased production through market (demand) 
driven subsidies for private housing development. The Reagan administration’s 1981 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act removed whatever was left of HUD’s supply-side 
budget save Section 202 (housing for the elderly). 
Since then, funding for new government-sponsored housing production has been 
all but non-existent and many of the incentives that once encouraged private developers 
to build affordable multi-family housing have disappeared. The 1986 Tax Reform Act 
(TRA) increased tax incentives favoring owner-occupied housing relative to rental 
housing by increasing the minimum standard home mortgage interest deduction and 
phasing out many tax incentives associated with building rental units (Follain, 
Hendershott et al. 1992) (Staff 2003). This effectively decreased the supply of housing 
accessible to low-income earners because they are more likely to occupy rental housing 
than owner-occupied units. The federal government, realizing its mistake, quickly offset 
this change by introducing Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) a few months 
later. These credits allocate funds directly to for-profit and not-for-profit developers for 
the production of low-income multi-family rental housing.
11
 While the LIHTC program 
has resulted in the production of between 550,000 and 600,000 dwellings since its 
inception (Cummings and DiPasquale 1999), many observers criticize its high 
                                                                                                                                                                           
he suspended all federal housing programs. See Kain, J. F. (1974). “What Should Housing Policies Be?” 
Journal of Finance 29(2): 683. 
11
 A 2003 national survey of LIHTC property owners found that approximately 30% of LIHTC projects are 
developed by not-for-profit outfits and that the projects tend to be small, newly constructed, and managed 
by their owners (see Abravanel, M. D. and J. E. H. Johnson 2003). The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
Program: National Survey of Property Owners. Washington DC, U.S. Housing and Urban Development. 
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transaction costs; perhaps as much as 30% of the tax expenditures are never applied to 
bricks and mortar but remain in the hands of syndicators (Hartman 1998).
12
  
The negative effects of the Tax Reform Act on multi-family housing development 
cannot be understated: it caused a substantial drop in multi-family housing production 
by eliminating the tax investment incentives for the production of that type of housing. 
While multi-family development has decreased steadily since the early 70s, it decreased 
far more rapidly post-Tax Reform Act, decreasing 26% in the ten years after enactment 
compared to only 9% in the decade prior (author’s analysis of U.S. Census Building 
Permit data and 5-year Construction Industries data 1972-1997). While the annual 
number of multi-family units built between 1972 and 1997 decreased 69% from 
approximately 1.2 million units to 378,740 units, the largest percentage drop (-64%) in 
production occurred in 1987 to 1992, the period immediately following passage of the 
1986 Tax Reform Act.13 
Apart from Section 42 (LIHTC), the only other unit production program of any 
substantial measure (excluding the trickle of pre-funded pre-moratorium units) has been 
the Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) VI program. This program 
rehabilitates distressed low-income government housing to lower density “New 
Urbanism”-style town homes. Ultimately netting fewer units, HOPE VI programs marked 
the end of a long drought of federal funding for the construction of affordable housing 
                                                     
12 Syndicators are third party partnerships or limited liability corporations that assemble a group of 
investors to whom a developer of low-income housing may sell future tax credits earned on a project for 
cash up front. This money is usually used to finance the project. Syndicators act as the investors’ 
representative in the process and as general partners responsible for managing the project and 
partnership for which, according to HUD, they often receive a large share of any positive cash flow, often 
structured in the form of fees for services such as partnership management, incentive management, or 
investor services. 
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units, but HOPE VI funding has steadily dwindled in recent years. Since 2000, HOPE VI 
funding decreased from $628 million to $156 million in 2004 (in 2004 dollars), and will 
receive no funding at all in FY2005 according to HUD budget projections (HUD 2001; 
HUD 2002; HUD 2003; NLIHC 2003; HUD 2004).  
As recently as the early 1970s, federal housing policy comprised a balance of 
supply- and demand-side programs subsidized a variety of housing opportunities, from 
homeownership assistance to the production, development and provision of affordable 
rental housing. By the mid-2000s, federal policy was firmly rooted in assisting the poor 
to participate in housing markets with the express goal of homeownership. This began 
in the early 1970s and steadily gained momentum through the 1980s and 90s. 
Whatever supply-oriented subsidies remain, they do so to fulfill housing development 
commitments from earlier decades. The following section outlines how this philosophy 
dominates HUD’s budget in the early 2000s. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Further analysis of the impacts of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on low-income households' wealth 
creation, specifically with respect to its effect on mortgage interest deductions, is presented on page 66. 
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Federal Housing Policy in the Mid-2000s: A Supply and Demand Subsidy Audit of 
HUD Budget 2000-2005 
Following in the footsteps of President George H. W. Bush and President Bill 
Clinton, President George. W. Bush remained committed to homeownership as the 
solution to America’s affordable housing crisis. In June 2002 he issued “America’s 
Homeownership Challenge to increase minority homeownership by 5.5 million through 
2010 and continue high overall homeownership rates” (OMB 2004). HUD’s spending on 
demand-side programs under President G. W. Bush outpaced supply-side spending 
three to one: the agency dedicated over 72% of its budget between FY2000 and 
FY2005 (projected) to demand-side programs (author’s tabulation of U.S. Census 
Bureau data). Tables 3-1 and 3-2 list budget allocations for HUD’s primary housing 
programs17 demand-side and 11 supply-side oriented programsbetween 2000 and 
2005 in 2004 dollars. While some programs could fit into either category, programs are 
categorized as either demand- or supply-oriented based on whether their funding 
streams are predominantly aimed at directly funding the development of new housing 
units or not. 
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Table 3-1: HUD Budget Allocations for Selected Demand-Side Housing 
Programs: 2000-05 (millions of 2004 U.S. dollars) 
PROGRAM 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* TOTAL 
Housing Assistance for 
Needy Families    0 0  0  0
Contract Renewals 
(Section 8) 11,617 13,770 15,455 16,994 19,001  17,810  94,646
New Section 8 
Vouchers 378 481 148 0 0  0  1,006
Resident Opportunity & 
Self Sufficiency 60 58 56 56 55  54  340
Rental Housing 
Assistance    0 0  0  0
Downpayment 
Assistance   51 77 87  196  411
Housing Counseling 
Assistance 16 21 20 41 40  44  183
Self-Help 
Homeownership 
Opportunity 
22 21 23 26 27  64  182
Homeless Assistance 
Grants 1,114 1,088 1,151 1,243 1,260  1,230  7,086
Shelter Plus Care 
Renewals 0 106 0 0 0  0  106
Samaritan Housing     0  49  49
Housing for Persons 
with AIDS 253 274 284 296 295  289  1,691
Rural Housing and 
Economic 
Development 
27 27 26 26 25  0  130
Housing Certificate 
Fund 12,420 14,798 16,024 17,483 19,257  18,073  98,056
FHA 822 1,058 916 778 778  717  5,069
GNMA 10 10 9 10 11  11  61
CDBG  (Other Than 
A.H.) 1,572 1,610 1,537 1,503 1,476  1,356  9,055
 
* Requested/Estimated FY2005 
Source: Author’s tabulation U.S. HUD Data 2000-05 and Data from NLIHC (HUD 2001; HUD 
2002; HUD 2003; NLIHC 2003; HUD 2004) 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2: HUD Budget Allocations for Selected Supply-Side Housing 
Programs: 2000-05 (millions of 2004 U.S. dollars) 
PROGRAM 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* TOTAL 
Project-Based Rental 
Assistance    0 0  (20)  -20
Contract Administration 212 204 201 199 100  100  1,015
Public Housing Capital 
Fund 3,166 3,185 2,913 2,771 2,695  2,617  17,346
Public Housing 
Operating Fund 3,426 3,441 3,581 3,655 3,579  3,497  21,179
HOPE VI 628 610 588 582 149  0  2,558
Native American Housing 
Block Grants 677 690 665 659 650  633  3,974
Native Hawaiian Housing 
Block Grant    10 9  10  29
Elderly Housing (Section 
202) 775 827 802 795 774  757  4,730
Disabled Housing 
(Section 811) 219 230 247 254 249  244  1,444
HOME Investment 
Partnership Program 1,747 1,911 1,891 2,030 2,005  2,040  11,624
CDBG (A.H. Production) 3,668 3,758 3,586 3,508 3,445  3,164 21,129
TOTAL  
(Tables 3-1 and 3-2) 42,830 48,178 50,172 52,997 55,967 52,933 303,077
* Requested/Estimated FY2005 
Source: Author’s tabulation U.S. HUD Data 2000-05 and Data from NLIHC (HUD 2001; HUD 
2002; HUD 2003; NLIHC 2003; HUD 2004) 
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Spending (in real dollars) for demand-side programs during this period increased 
an average of 7% annually (approximately $2.3 billion/year) and totaled $280 billion 
(72% of HUD’s budget) while spending for supply-side programs decreased an average 
of 2% annually (approximately $2.5 million/year) and totaled less than $122 billion (28% 
of budget) (see Table 3-2 and Figure 3-2). 
Three demand-subsidy programs in particular received exceptionally strong 
funding increases: American Dream Downpayment Assistance, Self-Help 
Homeownership Opportunity, and Housing Counseling Assistance. These programs 
saw average annual budgetary spending increases of 63%, 32% and 27% respectively. 
All but six demand-side programs experienced positive average annual funding 
increases, while only two of the eleven supply-side programsSection 202-Elderly 
Housing and Section 811-Disabled Housingreceived average annual increases, and 
even then averaged increases of only 2% and 3% annually.  
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Table 3-3: Summary of HUD Budget Allocations for Selected Demand- and 
Supply-Side Housing Programs: 2000-2005 (millions of 2004 U.S. dollars) 
Fiscal Year Unit 
Supply-Side 
Program 
Spending 
Demand-Side 
Program 
Spending 
Total HUD Budget 
(Selected 
Programs) 
2000 $ 14,519  28,311  42,830  % 34% 66% 100% 
2001 $ 14,856  33,323  48,178  % 31% 69% 100% 
2002 $ 14,473  35,699  50,172  % 29% 71% 100% 
2003 $ 14,464  38,533  52,997  % 27% 73% 100% 
2004 $ 13,655  42,312  55,967  % 24% 76% 100% 
2005* $ 13,042  39,892  52,933  % 25% 75% 100% 
* Requested/Estimated FY2005 
Source: Author’s tabulation U.S. HUD Data 2000-05 and Data from NLIHC (HUD 2001; 
HUD 2002; HUD 2003; NLIHC 2003; HUD 2004) 
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The President’s FY2004 HUD budget illustrates the federal government’s 
continuum of support for demand-side housing subsidies, and especially for those that 
subsidize low-income homeownership. In February 2003, the President requested 
significant cuts in public housing assistance to offset funding increases for 
homeownership programs. Congress did not grant all requests, but the net result was a 
smaller overall housing assistance budget from FY2003 (Crowley 2003) with notable 
increases to homeownership and demand-side programs and reductions to many 
existing supply-side programs, including vouchers. The figures below report those 
enacted for FY2004 (NLIHC 2003) (HUD 2003). For example, funding for the American 
Dream Downpayment Assistance program, which provides downpayment assistance to 
low-income homebuyers, increased by 160% from $75 million in FY2003 to $200 million 
in FY2004. The budget also included a 14% increase in funding for Housing Counseling 
Assistance, a centerpiece of the efforts to expand low-income homeownership (Hirad 
and Zorn 2003), from $35 million in FY2003 to $40 million in FY2004. Approximately 
two-thirds of these funds were allocated solely for homeownership counseling. The Self 
Help Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP) that funneled grants through faith-
based and community organizations to low-income households willing to put “sweat 
equity” into building a home saw an 8% increase from $25 to $27 million.
14
 The 
President had requested to triple funding for this program to $75 million.  
The FY2004 budget also contained line items for several new homeownership 
programs, all demand-side subsidies:  
 
                                                     
14 Sweat equity refers to a contribution to the construction or rehabilitation of a property by the 
homebuyer in the form of labor or services rather than cash (NAR 2005). 
 58 
 
New Single-Family FHA Financing to assist low-income homeowners 
who establish a record of timely mortgage payments. 
 
Single-Family Affordable Housing Tax Credit that provides tax credits 
of up to 50% of construction and/or rehabilitation (for existing homes) costs 
for single-family low-income homeowners (with incomes of 80% or less of 
area median income).  
 
New FHA Mortgage Product that offers FHA loan insurance to families 
that, due to poor credit, would be subject to sub-prime market lending. The 
insurance applies to maintenance existing and/or purchase of a new home. 
 
Housing Choice Voucher Program. The budget included a proposal to 
authorize PHAs to use Section 8 funds as down payment assistance for 
individuals already receiving assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher 
program. This program, Housing Assistance for Needy Families (HANF), 
would allow individuals to use up to one year’s worth of rental assistance 
voucher funds as a down payment to purchase a home. 
 
These budget proposals could be seen as part of a heroic effort to extend 
homeownership to low-income and minority households if they did not come in absence 
of any new supply-side subsidy programs and at the expense of those that were already 
in existence, or if the affordable housing supply was increasing as a result of existing 
demand-side subsidies. The President's Budget Summary FY2005 continued this trend: 
increasing support for homeownership-oriented programs (HUD 2004) at the expense of 
those that supported multi-family rental programs. Most alarming was the President’s 
proposal for a reduction in Section 8 vouchers, the first reduction in that program’s 30-
year history. The proposal included converting the Section 8 housing voucher program 
into a block grant program to the states and provided an inadequate funding level for 
the voucher program in fiscal year 2004 (NLIHC 2004) (NLIHC 2003). The House VA-
HUD appropriations subcommittee rejected much of the Section 8 funding cuts, but did 
so by robbing Peter to pay Paul—by cutting the HOME program, public housing, 
homelessness programs, and senior and disabled housing by more than 4% to fund 
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Section 8 (NLIHC 2004). These proposals underscored the President’s pro-market and 
pro-homeownership agenda but they must also be viewed in the context of larger 
priority shifts in the federal budget, which was facing increasing funding pressures due 
in part to the Republican tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss the financial risks associated with homeownership for low-
income households, from mobility to return on investment, and question the benefits of 
increasing low-income homeownership given these risks. I assess the extent to which 
homeownershipthe then present objective of federal housing policycan be 
considered an appropriate strategy for low-income households by examining the 
financial benefits and costs if offers.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LOW-INCOME 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Introduction 
In order to assess the impacts of the change in federal housing policy, we need 
to examine and understand the risks facing low-income homebuyers. While 
homeownership offers many benefits for many peopleboth financial and socialthe 
distribution of financial benefits, which were the heart of its appeal for policy makers, is 
less equitable for poorer than wealthier households, and many low-income homeowners 
experience increased financial risk over other tenure choices, such as renting, or 
investment strategies. This is due in part to lower equity returns on home purchase 
associated with property location and sale/resale timing, inequitable tax benefits, and 
burdensome mortgage and maintenance costs.  
For many low-income homeowners, the long- and popularly-held financial 
benefits associated with homeownership can be elusive. Evidence suggests that for 
many poorer households the use of traditional investment vehicles and renting is a 
better choice for wealth creation than homeownership. Finally, homeownership may not 
be the best choice for many low-income households because of the restrictions it places 
on mobility (see Rohe et al. 2000).  
Given the degree to which the federal housing policy promoted homeownership, 
if we are to better grasp policy success we need to consider not only the increase in 
number of low-income families that have become homeowners, but also the outcomes 
of homeownership for low-income households. In this chapter, I assess the extent to 
which homeownership may be considered appropriate for low-income households by 
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examining the financial benefits and costs it offers. I begin by assessing the costs low-
income households incur in ownership, including maintenance costs, and the incidence 
and effects of debt accumulation and foreclosures. Further, I review recent studies that 
analyze the returns on investment that low-income homeowners have received and how 
the mortgage interest income tax deduction eludes many low-income homeowners. 
Low-Income Homeownership: Wealth Creation and Financial Risk 
Academics have long questioned the benefits of homeownership for lower-
income households (Marcuse 1972, Roulac 1974, Rosen 1980, Linneman 1985, Mills 
1990, Barta 2001, McCarthy et al. 2001, Coulson 2002). Much of this analysis has 
revolved around the financial and tax benefits associated with homeownership. Most 
analyses  have found the federal mortgage interest tax deduction to be negligible for 
low-income households post 1986 Tax Reform Act.  
For middle- or upper-income households the substantial tax benefits afforded 
through the federal mortgage interest deduction and capital gains represent the most 
important economic benefits of owning a home. These have been and remain the 
primary basis for popular federal support for homeownership—in the early 2000s these 
deductions total about $100 billion each year, more than three times HUD’s current 
annual budget to support affordable housing (Pitcoff 2003).  
However, as early as the 1970s, academics began to question the 
disproportional benefits these deductions provide higher-income households. According 
to Marcuse (1972), "there are no tax advantages to homeownership" for low-income 
families, defined in his study as those earning less than $4,950 in 1973 ($20,893 in 
2004 dollars) or about 50% of U.S. median income. More recently, McCarthy et al. 
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(2001) questioned the benefits of the mortgage interest deduction for low-income 
households holding that, because their gross taxable income is so small, the standard 
deduction available to all taxpayers quite often outweighs any benefits gained through 
itemizing. In this section, I explain how the federal mortgage interest deduction works, 
update Marcuse’s calculations using 2005 allowable deductions and income levels, and 
present my own findings on why the federal mortgage interest deduction treats low-
income homeowners unfairly. 
To understand the economic advantages the mortgage interest deduction 
provides it is helpful to think of homeowners as investors and compare them to other 
property investors (i.e. those who do not occupy as their primary residence the property 
in which they have invested). Federal law requires both types of investors to report 
gross income, but does not require a homeowner to report rent that s/he could have 
obtained on the market for housing services on a primary (owner-occupied) residence 
because s/he effectively leased it him/herself. For both investors, the difference 
between gross rental income and allowable deductions would be taxable income. But by 
not requiring homeowners to report net imputed rental incomei.e. the difference 
between what a property would earn for the housing services provided and allowable 
federal deductions (e.g. mortgage interest, property taxes, maintenance expenditures 
and economic depreciation)federal tax law provides a substantial subsidy to 
homeowners compared to other property investors. Under this system, all homeowners 
are entitled to deduct from their taxable income the interest they paid on their mortgage. 
Because a wealthier household can afford higher priced housing and carry a larger 
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mortgage, tax deductions are more valuable to wealthier households than lower-income 
households on three counts:  
1. Wealthier households have more financial incentive to itemize on their tax 
returns and take advantage allowable deductions; 
2. Wealthier households are more likely to own higher value housing, and 
hence receive greater mortgage interest deduction and none taxable 
imputed rental income; and 
3. Wealthier households are more likely to operate in a higher tax bracket 
and thus receive a greater value of the deduction of a given amount 
(Green 2003). 
These entitlements allow wealthier a household to deduct more interest than a 
lower-income household, and thus receive a larger subsidy per unit of housing.  
A hypothetical example explains this inequity more clearly. Consider two home-
owning householdsone wealthy (earning greater than 80% of median U.S. income) 
and another low-income (earning 80% of median U.S. income). In 2004 on a 30 year 
fixed rate mortgage at 6% interest (considering $2500 in local property taxes, annual 
homeowners insurance, $10,000 in liquid assets and no monthly debt obligations) the 
wealthy household (earning $100,000 or 2.85 times U.S. median income) could qualify 
for approximately $343,590 in mortgage loan and could deduct approximately 
$20,500.00 in mortgage interest and taxes during the first year of that loan. Over the 30-
year life of the loan, this household could potentially deduct a total of $393,008 in 
interest payments. By contrast, a household earning $35,000 (approximately 80% of 
U.S. median income) with identical taxes and assets as the wealthier household could 
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qualify for approximately $90,623 in mortgage debt (see Figure 4-1). This household 
would deduct approximately $5,407 in mortgage interest and taxes during the first year 
of the loan and would potentially deduct a total of $104,976 over the life of the loan. 
First year deductions might be greater for both households depending on closing costs 
such as loan origination points, but these evaporate for both households after the first 
year of ownership. 
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Figure 4-1: Hypothetical Annual Mortgage Interest Deductions: 2004
Loan 1 for Houshold Income = $35,000 
(Approx. 80% of Median U.S. Income)
Loan 2 for Household Income = $100,000 
(2.9 times Median U.S. Income)
Loan 1 = 90,623
Loan 2 = $343,590
Based on 30 yr. Fixed rate mortgage at 6% interest 
Source: http://www.interest.com
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This deduction scenario was, according to Follain and Ling (1991), a reasonable 
characterization of the tax-benefit subsidy available to homeowners before the 1986 
Tax Reform Act (TRA), which raised the standard deduction and lowered the benefits of 
itemizing deductions for households in tax brackets with lower marginal rates. The TRA 
sought to simplify tax law by broadening the tax base and eliminating many tax shelters, 
but it also increased incentives for homeownership by increasing the home mortgage 
interest deduction while simultaneously phasing out many investment incentives for 
rental housing (Staff 2003) (Garson 2003).  
The TRA affected lower-income homeowners in two ways: 1) it raised the 
allowable standard deduction amount and 2) reduced the amount of allowable non-
housing itemized deductions.  
These provisions had a combined effect of eliminating any benefit derived from 
the mortgage interest deduction for lower-income homeowners (Follain, Hendershott et 
al. 1992), who could suddenly deduct more through the standardized deduction than by 
itemizing. The net result of this legislation for most lower- and moderate-income 
households was that it negated the tax advantages of ownership (Capone 1995), 
(Follain and Ling 1991). In 1991 it was estimated that "the homeowner subsidy from 
interest, discount points, and property taxes is worth less than $50 for the first year [of 
ownership] and zero after that” (McCarthy, Van Zandt et al. 2001).  
At first glance, a higher standard deduction might seem to provide a greater 
benefit for lower-income households—after all it allows them to deduct a higher dollar 
amount from their gross taxable income than by itemizing deductions. But by using the 
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standard deduction, lower-income households in effect increase their after-tax cost of 
owner-occupied housing.  
To understand the mechanics of the TRA in this context, consider again the two 
previously discussed households from the mortgage interest deduction example. 
Looking only at the first year of mortgage under the TRA, the low-income household 
earning $35,000/year would realize greater benefit by taking the standard allowable 
deduction of $9,700 (in 2004) than it would by itemizing deductions, while the household 
earning $100,000/year would find more benefit by itemizing. If we consider the 
allowable standardized deduction to be a benefit available to all (either household may 
opt to take it), the wealthier household pays $10,800 less per unit of housing over the 
first year ($20,500-$9,700=$10,800) than the low-income household, because it can 
itemize that amount above and beyond the standardized deduction available to all 
households.  
While studies suggest that low-income renters could have been economically 
better off than homeowners under this tax policy, ironically, the TRA discouraged multi-
family rental unit production. In short, the TRA increased a low-income households’ 
marginal after-tax cost of owner-occupied housing and sharply raised the costs relevant 
to their tenure and quantity decisions (Follain, Hendershott et al. 1992). Simultaneously, 
the TRA removed many investment incentives for multi-family rental housing and 
therefore investors built less. In fact, the U.S. Census Bureau’s 5-year Economic 
Censuses reports that the number of multi-family units built annually in the U.S. 
decreased 69% between 1972 and 1997, with the most dramatic decreased in 
production occurring post-1986 TRA period (see Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2). Multi-family 
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units as a percentage of all housing units decreased over the period studied, from 
approximately 53% in 1972 to 26% in 1997. 
 
Table 4-1: Production of Multi-Family Units in U.S. 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997): Number of Units, Percentage of All Units and Change per 5-Year Period. 
  1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Avg. All 
Years 
Multi-Family Units Built 1,185,795 563,945 454,052 510,398 184,254 378,740 546,197 
Percentage of All 
Housing Units Built 53.4% 33.4% 45.4% 33.3% 16.8% 26.3% 34.8% 
Percent Change  -52% -19% 12% -64% 106% 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Multi-Family Housing Production in the US (1972-97)
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U.S. tax policy post TRA put low-income households at a disadvantage in two 
ways. First, TRA’s net result was to amplify the already inequitable distribution of 
benefits available from the federal mortgage interest deduction making renting a more 
economically attractive option. Since the mortgage interest deduction and related 
benefits are available only to those with incomes high enough to itemize, the National 
Housing Institute, a not-for-profit housing advocacy group, estimates that in the early 
2000s approximately 63% of these deductions went to those in the top one-fifth of the 
income distribution, and only 18% went to those in the bottom fifth (Pitcoff 2003). The 
second way in which tax policy disadvantages low-income households is by effectively 
removing market incentive to build affordable rental units.  
Risk of Overpayment: Housing Costs and Low-Income Homeowners 
The risk of overpayment for housing is of particular concern for low-income 
households. Many families often believe ownership to be a sure-fire way to build wealth, 
and that success will surely be forthcoming if they only work hard enough and endure 
temporary hardship. This belief is so strong that many are willing to risk everything for a 
chance to do so.  
A Historical Analysis of Housing Overpayment 
 
Two variables determine overpayment: income and costs, and, for housing, costs 
are a function of price. Shiller (2005) examined national home prices from 1890 to 2004 
and found that real housing prices in the U.S. increased 66% between 1890 and 2004, 
and that most of the gain occurred during two periods: one following WWII and another 
between 1997 and 2004. For this latter period, real home prices increased 52% and, 
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while gains were higher in some places than in others, home prices increased much 
faster than incomes. These findings explain the historical relationship between housing 
prices, other goods and services, construction costs and interest rates, but reports less 
on the historical relationship between housing costs and incomes.  
To investigate this further, I present an index of home prices and rents and 
incomes back to 1930 to examine the cost of housing relative to what people earned 
through the years. Using data from U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the analysis compares median decennial rents and home values to incomes between 
1930 and 2000 in four cities—Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago (see 
Tables 4-2 and 4-3)—selected for their enduring dominance in the urban hierarchy and 
similarity in population size.15 Housing cost is measured as the proportion of a median-
priced house that a median income earner could buy at a given point in time; a measure 
referred to as a household’s “income housing quotient.”  
 
 
 
 
 
While price-to-income ratio measures are admittedly imperfect (see Appendix C 
for details), they serve to sketch an illuminating picture of housing affordability through 
the period of study. I discuss results in the following section.  
                                                     
15 Boston and Chicago were also analyzed in Belsky and Duda’s 2001 comparative study of asset 
appreciation and returns to low-income homeownership. Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles were 
analyzed by Case and Maynchenko’s (2003) in their examination of the performance of housing 
submarkets between 1983-1998. I discuss both studies in detail in the section after next. 
Median Area Annual Income 
 
       Median House Value 
INCOME HOUSING QUOTIENT      = 
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Table 4-2: Median Housing Costs versus Income—Boston, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and Chicago: 1930-2000 (Current U.S. Dollars) 
 Median Area Income 
Median 
Housing 
Value 
Median 
Contract 
Rent 
Income 
Housing 
Quotient 
Income 
Rental 
Quotient 
Decade 
Change 
Housing 
Value 
Decade 
Change 
Contract 
Rent 
Boston 
1930 N/A $ 7,449 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $ 3,954 $388 — — 53% — 
1950 $   2,171 $ 10,878 $438 0.20 4.96 275% 113%
1960 $   6,481 $ 15,900 $756 0.41 8.57 146% 172%
1970 $ 11,449 $ 23,800 $1,272 0.48 9.00 150% 168%
1980 $ 18,649 $ 59,600 $2,676 0.31 6.97 250% 210%
1990 $ 40,089 $ 186,100 $6,972 0.22 5.75 312% 261%
2000 $ 42,091 $ 191,000 $8,976 0.22 4.69 103% 129%
San Francisco 
1930 N/A $ 6,783 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $ 4,967 $395 — — 73% — 
1950 $ 2,470 $ 11,333 $482 0.22 5.12 228% 122%
1960 $ 7,092 $ 16,300 $996 0.44 7.12 144% 207%
1970 $ 10,064 $ 26,900 $1,560 0.37 6.45 165% 157%
1980 $ 20,017 $ 99,000 $3,192 0.20 6.27 368% 205%
1990 $ 40,093 $ 332,400 $7,956 0.12 5.04 336% 249%
2000 $ 57,259 $ 427,938 $10,788 0.13 5.31 129% 136%
Los Angeles 
1930 N/A $ 6,628 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $ 3,639 $352 — — 55% — 
1950 $ 2,171 $ 9,899 $520 0.22 4.18 272% 148%
1960 $ 7,066 $ 15,908 $864 0.44 8.18 161% 166%
1970 $ 9,280 $ 24,300 $1,320 0.38 7.03 153% 153%
1980 $ 17,551 $ 87,400 $2,928 0.20 5.99 360% 222%
1990 $ 34,498 $ 226,400 $6,840 0.15 5.04 259% 234%
2000 $ 35,546 $ 199,011 $7,956 0.18 4.47 88% 116%
Chicago 
1930 N/A $ 8,228 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $ 4,167 $431 — — 51% — 
1950 $ 2,505 $ 11,977 $530 0.21 4.73 287% 123%
1960 $ 7,393 $ 18,600 $960 0.40 7.70 155% 181%
1970 $ 11,931 $ 24,300 $1,284 0.49 9.29 131% 134%
1980 $ 20,726 $ 67,900 $2,868 0.31 7.23 279% 223%
1990 $ 34,555 $ 111,200 $5,052 0.31 6.84 164% 176%
2000 $ 38,213 $ 147,742 $7,644 0.26 5.00 133% 151%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau SF-1; U.S. Census Bureau American Housing Survey; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
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Table 4-3: Median Housing Costs versus Income—Boston, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and Chicago: 1930-2000 (Y2000 U.S. Dollars) 
 Median Area Income 
Median 
Housing 
Value 
Median 
Contract 
Rent 
Income 
Housing 
Quotient 
Income 
Rental 
Quotient 
Decade 
Change 
Housing 
Value 
Decade 
Change 
Contract 
Rent 
Boston 
1930 N/A $76,810 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $48,634 $4,776 — — 63% — 
1950 $15,512 $77,725 $3,132 0.20 4.95 160% 66%
1960 $37,704 $92,500 $4,404 0.41 8.56 119% 141%
1970 $50,812 $105,627 $5,640 0.48 9.01 114% 128%
1980 $38,973 $124,552 $5,592 0.31 6.97 118% 99%
1990 $52,817 $245,187 $9,180 0.22 5.75 197% 164%
2000 $42,091 $191,000 $8,976 0.22 4.69 78% 98%
San Francisco 
1930 N/A $69,942 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $61,094 $4,860 — — 87% — 
1950 $17,649 $80,977 $3,444 0.22 5.12 133% 71%
1960 $41,258 $94,827 $5,796 0.44 7.12 117% 168%
1970 $44,665 $119,385 $6,924 0.37 6.45 126% 119%
1980 $41,832 $206,890 $6,672 0.20 6.27 173% 96%
1990 $52,823 $437,937 $10,488 0.12 5.04 212% 157%
2000 $57,259 $427,938 $10,788 0.13 5.31 98% 103%
Los Angeles 
1930 N/A $68,340 — — — — — 
1940 N/A $44,760 $4,332 — — 65% — 
1950 $15,512 $70,730 $3,720 0.22 4.17 158% 86%
1960 $41,107 $92,546 $5,028 0.44 8.18 131% 135%
1970 $41,186 $107,846 $5,856 0.38 7.03 117% 117%
1980 $36,678 $182,649 $6,120 0.20 5.99 169% 104%
1990 $45,451 $298,282 $9,012 0.15 5.04 163% 147%
2000 $35,546 $199,011 $7,956 0.18 4.47 67% 88%
Chicago 
1930 N/A $84,842 —         
1940 N/A $51,254 $5,292     60%   
1950 $17,899 $85,578 $3,792 0.21 4.72 167% 71%
1960 $43,010 $108,207 $5,580 0.40 7.71 126% 147%
1970 $52,951 $107,846 $5,700 0.49 9.29 100% 102%
1980 $43,313 $141,897 $5,988 0.31 7.23 132% 105%
1990 $34,555 $146,506 $6,660 0.24 5.19 103% 111%
2000 $38,213 $147,742 $7,644 0.26 5.00 101% 115%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau SF-1; U.S. Census Bureau American Housing Survey; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
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This figures above suggests that median home prices increased in all four cities 
between 1930 and 1950, but not as fast as income. The cost of housing relative to 
income improved significantly in all four cities through the 1950’s and continued to 
improve through the 60s in Chicago and Boston. But in San Francisco and Los Angeles, 
the proportion of a median priced home that a median income could buy declined 
significantly through the 60s. By 1970, the four cities separate into two distinct groups in 
terms of their income housing quotients: median income equaled approximately 50% 
the value of a median home in Boston and Chicago, but only 37% in San Francisco and 
Los Angeles. By 2000, income-housing quotients had a fallen from their respective 
peaks in the 60s and 70s, and quotients were widely dispersed, ranging between 13% 
and 26%. In 2000, median-earning households could afford the largest proportion of a 
median priced home in Chicago and the smallest proportion in San Francisco (see 
Figure 4-3).  
If we look at changes since 1950, when incomes started to rise relative to home 
values, we see that the ratio between income and home value increased only slightly in 
two of the four cities—Boston and Chicago—and declined in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles. In Boston, median income equaled 20% of the median priced home in 1950; 
by 2000 this improved to 22%. In Chicago median income bought approximately 21% of 
a median home in 1950, and this improved to 26% by 2000. In Los Angeles in 1950, 
median income bought 22% of the median priced home; this declined to 17% in 2000. 
And in San Francisco, median income bought approximately 22% of a median priced 
home in 1950; by 2000 this declined to approximately 13% (see Table 4-4 and Figure 4-
3).  
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Looking at these results slightly differently, it took approximately 4.5 year’s worth 
of 2000 median income to buy a median priced home in Boston, 7.5 year’s income in 
San Francisco, 5.6 year’s income in Los Angeles, and 3.9 year’s income in Chicago 
(see Table 4-4). What is most startling about these figures is that median income 
earners’ home purchasing power in 2000 seems to have regressed to levels 
approximate to those in 1950. 
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Table 4-4: Per Capita Year’s Median Income Required to Purchase Median 
Valued Home in Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago, 1950, 
1970 and 2000. 
Metropolitan Area 1950 1970 2000 Change:  1950-2000 
Boston 5.0 2.1 4.5 -0.5 
San Francisco 4.6 2.7 7.5 2.9 
Los Angeles 4.6 2.6 5.6 1.0 
Chicago 4.8 2.0 3.9 -0.9 
Source: Author’s Tabulation of U.S. Census Bureau SF-1; U.S. Census Bureau American 
Housing Survey 
 
It is impossible to capture a national trend by examining four cities, but these 
findings as well as those of other studies indicate that nationally the disparity between 
home prices and income has increased through time, especially through the 1990s and 
early 2000s. For example, Shiller (2005) found that the median price of a home in the 
eight states with the most volatile home price increases between 1985 and 2002 
increased from 4.9 years’ per capita income to 7.7 years’ per capita income.  
While there is little evidence in support of a national housing market, there 
appeared to be enough rapidly moving regional markets in the mid 2000s to suggest the 
semblance of uniformity in the national series (Shiller 2005). In a report released in 
January 2005, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) reported that a record 
number of metropolitan areas showed double-digit annual price appreciation in median 
existing-home prices in the fourth quarter of 2004, and the overall pace of annual price 
growth accelerated from the third quarter. The national median existing-home price 
increased 8.8% to $187,500 from $172,400 the year previous. Of the 129 metropolitan 
areas the NAR covers, 62 showed double-digit increases in median existing home 
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prices and only four posted modest declines. The previous record was in the second 
quarter of 2004 when 49 metropolitan areas showed double-digit median price 
appreciation (Molony and Salvant 2005). 
The sustained increases in housing prices occurring through the 1990s and early 
2000s, the convergence of price performance in local markets, and the erosion of 
median income home buying power should have raised strong concerns about housing 
overpayment. The data discussed thus far has included figures for median income 
households only. In the following section, I turn my attention to housing overpayment in 
low-income households.  
Housing Overpayment Among Low-Income Households 
 
Low-income homeowners pay a significantly larger portion of their income for 
housing costs than higher income households. Households that earned less than 80% 
of AMI paid disproportionately more for housing in 2000 than in 1990. Chart 4-4 show 
the percentages of household by income paying less than 20% of household income or 
greater than 35% of household income for selected housing costs (including mortgage, 
taxes, insurance and utilities) in 2000 and 1990. Households with incomes of $34,999 or 
less, a figure just below 80% of the 2000 national median income of $41,994, paid an 
average of approximately 44% of their monthly income for housing costs. By contrast, 
those with incomes above $35,000 paid an average of approximately 26% of their 
monthly income. 
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Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of homeowner households paying more 
than 35% of their income for housing increased across all income groups, but 
households with incomes of less than $34,999 absorbed the greatest increases (see 
Tables 4-5 and 4-6, and Figure 4-4). For example, the share of households earning less 
than $10,000 per year increased 13 percentage points from 50% to 63% while the 
increase for households earning more than $50,000 per year was less than one 
percentage point from 3.8% to 4.6%. Larger increases were observed in the $10,000-
19,999 and the $20,000-34,999 income brackets, which increased 18 and 14 
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percentage points respectively between 1990 and 2000. In short, while housing costs as 
a percentage of income increased for all income groups, households with incomes of 
less than 80% of national median paid proportionately more for housing in 2000 than in 
1990 compared to those with higher incomes. 
 
Table 4-5: Specified Owner-Occupied Housing Units and Selected Housing 
Costs by Income: U.S. 1990 
 
Annual Household Income 
< $10,000 $10,000-19,999 
$20,000-
34,999 
$35,000-
49,999 > $50,000 
Housing Units 4,120,388 5,972,698 10,132,103 9,505,388  15,819,482 
Percentage of 
Total 9.0% 13.1% 22.2% 20.9% 34.7% 
Paying < 20% of 
H.H. Income 14.4% 23.9% 13.6% 7.1% 3.8% 
Paying > 35% of 
H.H. Income 50.3% 47.0% 54.3% 59.3% 71.5% 
Source: Author’s tabulation of U.S. Census Data STF3, 1990  
 
More troubling, the proportion of households living in very affordable owner-
occupied housingi.e. those paying less than 20% of their income for housing 
costsdecreased across all income groups between 1990 and 2000. The decrease 
was especially sharp for lower-income households. For example, approximately 14% of 
households with incomes of less than $10,000 paid less than 20% of their income for 
housing costs in 1990: By 2000, this fell to less than 5%. Similarly, the percentage of 
households with incomes of $10,000-19,999 paying less than 20% for housing costs 
decreased 19 percentage points from 47% in 1990 to less than 29% by 2000. For 
households with incomes between $20,000-34,999, the percentage fell over eleven 
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points from 54% to 43%. Much less dramatic were decreases in the higher household 
income brackets (see Table 4-6).  
Table 4-6: Percent of Owner-Occupied Households Paying <20% or >35% of 
Income for Selected Housing Costs by Income Group: U.S. 1990-2000 (2000 
dollars) 
Annual 
Household 
Income 
Percent of Households 
Paying <20% of Income for 
Housing 
Percent of Households 
Paying >35% of Income for 
Housing 
1990 2000 Change 1990 2000 Change 
<10,000 14.4 4.9 -9.5 50.3 63.2 12.9 
$10,000-19,999 47.0 28.5 -18.5 23.9 42.3 18.4 
$20,000-34,999 54.3 43.0 -11.3 13.6 27.9 14.4 
$35,000-49,999 59.3 47.0 -12.3 7.1 15.7 8.6 
>$50,000 71.5 67.0 -4.5 3.8 4.6 0.8 
Source: U.S. Census STF3, 1990 and 2000 
 
Maintenance Costs and the Low-Income Homeowner 
The costs of maintaining a home are not included in the percentage of income 
figures and calculations discussed in the previous sections and are absent from the 
studies on the benefits of homeownership discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Maintenance is an important aspect of protecting a home’s value, but costs can be 
substantial. Data from the U.S. Census 2000 indicate that poorer households paid a 
significantly larger share of their income for maintenance costs: Households with 
incomes of less than $20,000 annually paid a little more than one percent of their 
income on maintenance, while households earning $100,000 or more paid less than 
.07%.  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, home maintenance consists of “regular 
activities for the prevention and care of the structure itself, the property it sits on, and 
any fixed equipment” (U.S. Census Bureau 1994). These activities include painting, floor 
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repair/replacement, repairing fences, roofs and plumbing, replacing furnace filters or 
broken windows, and HVAC repairs/replacement. The Census Bureau does not include 
landscaping and gardening costs and tasks that involve homeowner labor (or sweat 
equity) or used materials already on premises in their estimates.  
Estimates on what it costs to maintain a home vary, but several studies offer 
insightful data. One study conducted by Robert Sheehan (2000) for the Wall Street 
Journal found that annual home maintenance costs averaged 4% of original purchase 
price over a 30-year life of the mortgage, and thus exceeded the home’s original 
purchase price through the period of debt (Fletcher 2000). More conservative estimates 
placed home maintenance at one to two percent of a home’s value per year (Clements 
2002). 
In 1991, just over six in ten homeowners spent a median of $315 on home 
maintenance (U.S. Census Bureau 1994). More recent data from the American Housing 
Survey suggest that by 1999 and 2001 the median amount people spent on home 
maintenance declined slightly, but the 1991 data proves useful in this discussion 
because it breaks costs down by household income. The findings suggest that the 
median amount a household spends on maintenance generally increases with income: 
disproportionately more high-income (those with an income of $100,000 or more) spent 
$1000/year or more on maintenance compared to lower-income households. But, while 
lower-income households (those with an income of $20,000 or less) comprised 20% of 
all households that paid for home maintenance, they represented 13% of all households 
that spent $1,000/year or more on maintenance. Also, from figures provided in Table 4-
7, lower-income homeowners paid a disproportionately greater share of their income 
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and house value for home maintenance than did higher income homeowners. 
Households with incomes less than $20,000 pay a little more than one percent of their 
income on maintenance while households earning $100,000 or more pay less than 
.07%. 
Table 4-7: Percent of Owner-Occupied Households Paying for Home 
Maintenance and Median Amount Paid (1991 dollars) by Income: U.S. 
1991 
Household Income Percent Paying for Maintenance (1991) 
Median Amount 
Spent 
Less than $20,000 48% $227 
$20,000-$39,999 60% $245 
$40,000-$59,999 68% $338 
$60,000-$79,999 71% $405 
$80,000-$99,999 71% $495 
$100,000 or more 68% $683 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Statistical Brief SB/94-7 
 
Surprisingly, the age of a home does not appear to be a factor in inducing higher 
maintenance costs. Older homesthose most likely to be owned by lower-income 
householdswere less likely to have maintenance performed than those built in the 
1970s and 1980s. Rather, the size of home and the age of household factored more 
strongly in whether or not and how much a household spent on maintenance. Also 
elderly and single-person households were less likely to spend money on maintenance 
than other types of households. Structure type also proved a strong determinant: a 
disproportionate percentage of households living in manufactured homes were less 
likely to pay for home maintenance. Long-term owners (those who lived in the same 
home in 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1991) were consistent spenders: only 8% of this group 
paid nothing for maintenance each of those years compared to 39% of all homeowners. 
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Returns on Investment: Home Equity and the Low-Income Homeowner 
One of the most commonly discussed benefits of homeownership is its potential 
to build equity, and therefore wealth for the homeowner. It is a hard held belief and an 
oft-repeated reason why the federal government stands so staunchly behind its efforts 
to expand homeownership for the poor. Indeed, in a report issued in 2002 on the 
economic benefits of increasing minority (and therefore low-income) homeownership, 
HUD stated “buyers stand to benefit by building equity through house appreciation and 
paying off their mortgage principal” (HUD 2002). And in discussing the “Blueprint for the 
American Dream,” President Bush’s initiative to expand minority homeownership, HUD 
secretary Mel Martinez cited home equity as a principal economic benefit in the goal to 
help “minority families reap the economic benefits of homeownership” (Martinez 2003). 
But for many, especially the poor, homeownership fails to produce the expected returns 
on investment, and does not match those of other long-term investment vehicles such 
as stocks and bonds.  
This may seem counter-intuitive: homeownership is generally thought of as an 
infallible and strong investment opportunity, a no-lose proposition especially over the 
long haul. Certainly, that thinking influenced much of the government and homebuilding 
industry’s arguments in favor of subsidizing homeownership. The commonly held belief 
that homeownership builds wealth is probably why we believed it is so important to put 
low-income families on the path to homeownership: homeownership first and foremost 
builds equity, so if we can just get them on the first rung of the ladder, they will make it 
the rest of the way.  
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Why are these beliefs so ingrained in our thinking? Part of the reason has to be 
the anecdotes we have all heard about houses bought for a few thousand dollars years 
ago and sold for substantially more years later. Quite often, I believe, we forget to do 
the math. For example, a home purchased in Boston in 1950 for $11,000 (a figure 
slightly above median at the time) and sold for the median $190,000 in 2004 has every 
appearance of a good investment—after all, its value increased better than seventeen 
times. But taking into account inflation (CPI index) through the period, the real value of 
that house increased approximately 145% over 54 years, an average increase of less 
than 6.5% per year. This is not an unusual figure. In the four cities for which I 
constructed my housing price/income index, housing values appreciated an average 
only 1.8% per year (in real dollars) for the period between 1930 and 2000. Inflation 
during that same period averaged approximately 4.5% per year.  
Checking these findings against other studies, I find no evidence to suggest that 
homeownership offers exceedingly greater financial gains over the long run, i.e. 
financial gains better than other available investment vehicles. For example, Shiller 
(2005) found that, while real home prices for the United States as a whole were 66% 
higher in 2004 than in 1890, all the increase occurred in two brief periods: right after 
World War II and the period from 1998 to 2004, which he points out seems to reflect a 
lagged response to the 1990s stock market boom. Except for these two brief periods, 
real home prices overall have been mostly flat or declining. Moreover, the overall price 
increase averages out to an unimpressive 0.6% per year (with real prices up 66% in 114 
years from 1890 to 2004).  
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Admittedly, this is considerably less than the 1.8% increases suggested by my 
four-city analysis, but there are reasons why we might expect these results. First, we 
should expect metropolitan markets (especially those in our largest and "hottest" cities) 
to outperform the national data, which includes less volatile rural markets. Second, we 
must consider differences in reporting between the price data used by Shiller and the 
owners’ estimated home value data that I used in my analysis. Shiller (2005) found 
using decennial owner-estimated home values that the median reported value of homes 
in real inflations-corrected terms increased by 2% per year from 1940 to 2000. And, 
third, as Shiller points out, decennial census data do not account for the increases in 
size or improvements in quality of housing through the study period. 
Another study suggests that homeownership has historically not been a 
particularly lucrative investment vehicle. The Joint Center for Housing Studies at 
Harvard University found that capital appreciation of housing from 1980 to 1999 was 
substantially less than the return to U.S. stocks, bond and mortgage-backed securities 
over the same period (Goetzmann and Spiegel 2001). Basing their analysis on quarterly 
housing price indices from the Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) (an 
independent agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development), 
Goeztmann and Spiegel found that homeowners could have earned more by investing 
in Long-Term U.S. Treasury Bonds. Treasury Bonds are one of the safest and most 
conservative long-term investment vehicle available: these increased 6.4% in real terms 
over the same period. For a home maintained at the same quality level as other homes 
in its neighborhood, OFHEO neighborhood-level price indexes typically explain 80% to 
90% of the change in any one home’s value. Comparing OFHEO home values to other 
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forms of investments, they found that the nominal value of a single-family home in the 
U.S. increased by 138% over the period 1980 to March 2000, an annualized rate of 
4.2% over the past 21 years. Compared to the Consumer Price Index, which increased 
at a 3.7% annual rate over the same period, housing represents a relatively modest 
form of asset growth. But, looking at real housing investment returns (i.e. adjusted for 
inflation which was 4.0% for the same period) for 12 of the largest U.S. cities, returns 
ranged from –1.9% to 3.3%. Many homeowners experienced negative equity and 
“nearly all markets displayed negative risk-adjusted returns over the period” (p. 9). 
Perhaps more troubling is that when comparing differences between housing 
investments in 12 of the largest U.S. metropolitan areas and returns on investment in 
mortgage-backed securities, Goeztmann and Spiegel (2001) found that “on average the 
cost of money to purchase a home far exceeds the growth in that same home’s 
value”(p. 8): the nominal after-tax mortgage income return exceeded home price 
appreciation in 9 of the 12 cities.  
Additionally, while price indexes provide some idea of the growth in housing 
values, they overstate the relative return a family can expect from their house because 
they do not include costs unique to housing such as maintenance and property taxes. 
Taxes vary by location, but annual maintenance costs average between one and two 
percent of a home’s value each year, which can easily wipe out the slight gains that 
returns on homeownership offers over inflation (Clements 2002). In addition, there are 
the statutory and third party costs, lender and finance charges, and other up-front costs 
associated with buying or selling a home. The National Association of Realtors 
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estimates these to be between $3,335 and $8,660 on a $50,000 mortgage and between 
$6,800 and $16,975 on a $150,000 mortgage, not including downpayment (NAR 2005). 
Together these studies provide a reasonably clear picture of aggregate home 
price performance over the long run. The problem is that housing market performance 
varies by location. While the national data suggest flat or declining home prices over the 
last seventy-years or so, the fact is that home prices have increased much faster in 
some places than in others. For example, in the four cities I studied, home appreciation 
varied not just by city but also by decade. Through the seven decades analyzed, 
median home values increased at an average annual rate of 2.62% in San Francisco 
but by less than 1.0% in Chicago during the same period, while average annual 
appreciation in Boston and Los Angeles fell somewhere in between (see Table 4-8) 
 
Table 4-8: Average Annual Median Home Value Increases (Inflation-
Corrected) in Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago, 1930 to 2000.
Metropolitan Area 1930 2000 % Change Annual Rate (%) 
Boston $  78,810 $191,000 149% 1.28% 
San Francisco $  69,942 $427,938 512% 2.62% 
Los Angeles $  68,344 $199,011 191% 2.54% 
Chicago $  84,842 $147,742 231% 0.79% 
Source: Author’s Tabulation of U.S. Census Bureau SF-1; U.S. Census Bureau American 
Housing Survey 
 
The way in which home values varied through time in these cities suggests that 
both the timing of sale and the location of the property affect the profitability of 
residential real estate. For example, there exists an overall trend: home values 
increased up until the 1950s, declined through the 50s and 60s, and increased again 
through the 1970s and 80s only to fall again through the 90s. This varied slightly by 
location, but housing values in these four cities started outpacing inflation beginning in 
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1940, making owning a median-valued home during that decade a reasonable 
investment in all four cities. This was especially true in San Francisco, where housing 
values increased at a rate slightly better than inflation between 1940 and 1950.  
By 1960, however, housing price appreciation converged with the Consumer 
Price Index and housing prices barely outpaced inflation for the decade previous. 
Through the 60s, housing increased steadily in Boston (150%), San Francisco (165%) 
and LA (153%), while home values in Chicago’s lagged behind, increasing at a pace 
equal to inflation at approximately 131%. Housing values saw marked appreciation 
beginning in the 1970s: median house value rose in all four cities, especially in San 
Francisco and LA, whose median housing values increased 350% or better for the 
decade compared to inflation at 212%.  
The trend of housing prices outpacing inflation continued through the following 
three decades to 2000, and remained more pronounced in San Francisco and Boston 
than in Los Angeles and Chicago. Median house prices increased 312% in Boston, 
336% in San Francisco and 259% in LA between 1980 and 1990. Home values 
increased only slightly better than inflation in Chicago for the same period (see Figure 4-
5). 
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Another problem with long- term investment analyses such as this is that 
Americans do not stay in their homes for very long. We change location for schools, 
jobs or family; we move up in value; and we are generally a mobile society. An 
argument can be made that long-term returns in home value matter less under these 
circumstances.  
In the late 1990s, on average approximately 16% of Americans moved every 
year (Klien 1998). This varied by age with younger people moving at about twice the 
national average and with the elderly moving much less than the average (Reynolds 
2004). Variation also happened across racial lines: Hispanics moved the most, but 
whites moved the farthest, with blacks and Asians and Pacific Islanders somewhere in 
the middle (Klien 1998). Renters moved more often than owners and length of tenure 
peaks for middle-income households, especially for those in the best neighborhoods. 
Tenure duration was shorter for those in higher income brackets because the rich can 
afford to move up into more expensive housing and better neighborhoods. For the poor, 
relocation is more complicated. Some low-income households never establish a stable 
home while others stay in subsidized housing for extended periods. At all age levels and 
tenures, it is those in the lower-income brackets that move most often (Long 1990). 
This being the case, we might get a clearer and more realistic picture of home 
returns by looking at home appreciation over a shorter run of time. Previous short-term 
analyses compare the housing market returns to stock market returns over a given 
period of time (10 to 15 years) usually using a nationally recognized indicator such as 
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the Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 index.16 But this period may still be too long in terms 
of representing realistic returns on housing given the frequency that Americans move.  
For example, the National Association of Realtors examined asset growth in 
sliding six-year increments (approximating the frequency that American households 
move) between 1988 and 2003, and found returns on residential real estate investment 
beat those from the S&P index in better than half (six of eleven) of the 6-year periods 
since 1988. But this study did not consider transaction costs of buying and selling. 
Calculating in a very conservative figure to cover home transaction costs17 using the 
same data in the National Association of Realtors' study, housing returns bettered the 
S&P index in only three of eleven 6-year periods from 1988 to 2003. And all of the 
periods in which housing returns bettered those of the S&P index included years 
immediately following the stock market crash of 2000—years in which housing values 
saw unprecedented (and unrealistically maintainable) growth (see Table 4-9).   
                                                     
16 Many of these studies have been conducted by or in association with the National Association of 
Realtors or National Home Builders Association, and have, predictably, reported positive results for 
homeownership. One study, by David Lereah, senior vice president and chief economist at the National 
Association of Realtors, suggests, “Housing builds more wealth than stocks.” In his book, Are You 
Missing the Real Estate Boom?, he compares an investment of $50,000 in the stock market versus real 
estate between the years 1988 and 2003. The $50,000 was calculated as a 20% downpayment on a 
$250,000 home. For the sixteen-year period, home price appreciation averages 4.4% per year, 
generating an average leveraged annual return rate of 22%, compared to an annual return of 14% on the 
Standard and Poors (S&P) 500 index (Lereah 2005). 
17 Home Closing and Transactions Costs Calculation:  
Loan application fees and credit report = $75 to $300; Loan origination fee (1%) = $500; Points (1 to 3%) 
= $500 to $1,500; Title search and insurance fees = $450 to $600; Lender's attorney = $150 to $400; 
Appraisal = $150 to $400; Homeowner's insurance = $300 to $600; PMI = $350 to $675; Inspections = 
$175 to $300; Survey = $125 to $400; Recording fees = $40 to $60; Transfer taxes = $75 to $1,125; 
Buyer's attorney = $400 to $700; Escrow deposit for taxes = $100 to $800; Partial month's interest = $20 
to $400; Totals = $3,335 to $8,660. Lower figure ($3,335) used in calculations. 
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Table 4-9: Homeownership Returns versus Standard and Poor’s 500 in 6-year 
Periods of Investment, 1988 to 2003 (Assuming $50,000 as 20% 
Downpayment on a $250,000 Home) 
Sliding  
6-year 
Investment 
Periods 
$50,000 Invested in Mortgage (i.e. 
leveraged on $250,000 home) 
$50,000 Invested in 
S&P Indexed Stocks Difference in Avg. Annual 
Returns 
(S&P minus 
Real Estate) 
in each 6-yr. 
period 
Avg. Annual 
Percent 
Return on 
Investment 
Gross 
Capital 
Gains 
Net 
Capital 
Gains 
(after 
closing 
costs*) 
Avg. 
Annual 
Percent 
Return on 
Investment 
Net 
Capital 
Gains 
1988-1993 15.42% $   7,708 $   4,373 15.57% $   7,783 $   3,410 
1989-1994 15.33% $   7,667 $   4,332 13.02% $   6,508 $   2,177 
1990-1995 17.42% $   8,708 $   5,373 14.00% $   7,000 $   1,627 
1991-1996 19.50% $   9,750 $   6,415 18.35% $   9,175 $   2,760 
1992-1997 19.25% $   9,625 $   6,290 18.83% $   9,417 $   3,127 
1993-1998 21.25% $ 10,625 $   7,290 22.33% $ 11,167 $   3,877 
1994-1999 22.00% $ 11,000 $   7,665 24.15% $ 12,075 $   4,410 
1995-2000 22.00% $ 11,000 $   7,665 22.42% $ 11,208 $   3,543 
1996-2001 24.58% $ 12,292 $   8,957 14.17% $   7,083 $ -1,873 
1997-2002 26.50% $ 13,250 $   9,915 6.65% $   3,325 $ -6,590 
1998-2003 28.58% $ 14,292 $ 10,957 5.87% $   2,933 $ -8,023 
   
Source: National Association of Realtors, Standard and Poor’s in Lereah 2005. 
* Closing costs calculated at $3,335 (or 1.3% of home’s value) 
Source: http://www.homefair.com 
 
 
Another problem with long-term investment analyses is that they use aggregated 
national data. But as we have seen with the comparison of long-term home values for 
Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Chicago, place matters. Loss of equity can be 
harmful for any homeowner, but it can be disastrous for low-income households who 
hold a proportionately greater share of their wealth in their home than wealthier 
households (Wolff 1996) (Di 2001) (Author’s analysis of Survey of Consumer Finances 
data).  
 94 
 
In the early 2000s, two studies looked at the returns to investment (equity) for 
low-income homeowners. In the first, Case and Maynchenko (2001) examined the 
performance of housing submarkets in Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles between 
1983-1998. They found a complex pattern of house price changes from which 
generalization is difficult to ascertain: optimum location and timing of purchase and re-
sale varied greatly between metropolitan areas, providing good returns in periods of 
economic expansion and losses and/or negative equity in two of the three cities during 
periods of economic decline.  
In the other study, Belsky and Duda (2001) paired home purchases and sales 
between 1982 and 1999 in Boston, Chicago, Denver and Philadelphia and found that 
homeowners frequently sell homes for less than what they paid for them in nominal 
terms, and that it was notable that large shares of homeowners resell after experiencing 
real house price appreciation insufficient to cover even transaction costs.  
Finally, low-income households unable to meet their financial responsibilities face 
loan default and foreclosure, both of which increased steadily through the 90s. Defaults 
on loans in 2000 amounted to approximately one million households losing their homes 
to foreclosure during the height of an unprecedented economic expansion. As the 
economy softened, those numbers worsened to a point that delinquencies and 
foreclosures on all loans reached a then all-time high of 1.23% in the second quarter of 
2002, a 35% increase from the year previous (Fleishman 2002). Foreclosures on FHA-
backed loans to low-income households increased the fastest to a rate of nearly 3%, 
with an additional 12% who were behind in their payments in the second quarter of 
2002 (Pitcoff 2003). One very troubling factor about these increases in low-income 
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mortgage foreclosures is that they occurred while the housing market remained 
exceedingly strong. Typically, foreclosures fall when home prices increase because 
houses can be sold quickly to pay debts and avert default. 
Possibly more troubling about the increases in low-income foreclosures was that 
they appear to have occurred without favoritism in both the manufactured and traditional 
home markets. For example, easy available qualifying terms and broad access to credit 
contributed to a deluge of unstable manufactured home sales in 2000, and well over 
75,000 manufactured homes were repossessed, approximately 30% of all units 
delivered that year (EAB 2005). In 2004, the industry repossessed approximately 
100,000 units because so many customers could not meet their payments under 
arranged financing agreements (Hagerty 2004). Successively, these defaults adversely 
affected the manufactured home market: as the repossessed units flooded the market, 
some marked down to less than 20% of their original price, resale values for existing 
manufactured homes plummeted, and shipments of new houses fell to the lowest level 
in 41-years.  
Sustained high incidence of foreclosures among low-income manufactured 
homeowners should serve to question conventional thinking about the viability of these 
units for low-income buyers. While it is clear that manufactured homes do not 
appreciate as fast or hold their value as well as site-built units (see Chapter 2), 
conventional thinking suggests that such shortcomings should be overlooked because 
manufactured homes are often more affordable. And, while not considered a lucrative 
investment, manufactured homes are often viewed as a reasonably secure starter 
homes or an acceptable first rung on the homeownership ladder. The high incidence of 
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foreclosures among manufactured homeowners and the fact that these units account for 
such a substantial proportion of the increase in low-income homeowner population that 
occurred through the 1990s, should challenge such thinking. It would prudent to 
consider what long term outcomes may be ahead for low-income manufactured 
homeowners under the existing and emerging market conditions observed in the late 
1990s, and how those outcomes fulfilled  or hindered housing policy objectives.  
Homeownership and Low-Income Household Debt 
For most American families, the investment in their home will be the largest they 
will ever make. Between 1989 and 2001, borrowing to purchase a primary residence 
(including improvements) as a percentage of total family debt has increased from 66% 
to 73% (author's analysis of the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finance 1989-
2001). But mortgage borrowing is not the only form of debt associated with 
homeownership. Homeownership provides access to a wide-variety of home equity 
credit options, which, while seductive, may prove disastrous for financially strapped 
lower-income families. And since the 1986 Tax Reform Act phased out the deductibility 
of interest payments on most debt other than that secured by a primary residence, a 
household’s incentive to use home-secured borrowing increased. Admittedly, declining 
interest rates since 1998 may have also provided many families with further incentive to 
borrow against their homes and/or refinance existing mortgages for more than existing 
the existing balance (Aizcorbe, Kennickell et al. 2003).  
Whatever the causes, data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances suggest that among families with any type of home-secured debt (including a 
second mortgage, home equity line of credit, or home equity loan), the proportion of 
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those who used such borrowing for a purpose other than simply financing their home 
increased 10 percentage points between 1995 and 2001. The figure was 32.1% in 2001 
compared to 22.2% in 1995 (Aizcorbe, Kennickell et al. 2003).   
These findings are especially troubling given the higher proportion of wealth that 
lower-income households carry in their homes. For example in 1992, owner-occupied 
housing for all U.S. households represented 28.7% of gross household wealth (assets). 
But households in the bottom wealth classi.e. those with net worth less than $180,700 
(1992 dollars)held 62.8% of their net worth in their homes. The top one percent of 
wealthiest households (i.e. those with net worth greater than $2,420,000 in 1992 
dollars) held less than 8% of their net worth in their homes and the next 19% wealthiest 
households (i.e. with net worth between $180,700 and $2,420,000 in 1992 dollars) held 
less than 31% of their wealth in their homes (Wolff 1996). While about two-thirds of 
American households owned their homes in 1998, less than half owned stocks and 
approximately 60% of households that owned both stocks and homes still held more 
value in home equity than in stocks. In 1998 a majority of homeowners held more of 
their wealth in housing than in stocks, except for those with incomes higher than 
$100,000.  
Data from the 1989 Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Consumer Finance show 
that families earning at or below the 20th percentile of the national income range held 
approximately 32% of all non-financial holdings in their primary residence, while families 
at the 80th percentile and above held approximately 15%. These data also suggest that 
by 2001 families in both income brackets divested the percentage of asset holdings in 
their homes slightly. Households in the 20th percentile of earners divested the 
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percentage of asset holding in their homes to 26%, and those in the 80th percentile to 
14%. But low-income families still hold a disproportionate share of their wealth in their 
homes (Federal Reserve Bank 2003). Ultimately, this places low-income homeowners in 
a very vulnerable position relative to wealthier homeowners, and promotes home value 
to a position of utmost importance and concern in the homeownership debate. 
Chapter Summary 
 In the next chapter (5), I turn my attention to the consumers of housing and 
present a methodology for an empirical study of housing outcomes for low-income black 
households through the 1990s in five metropolitan areas: New York, Los Angeles, 
Detroit, Philadelphia and Washington DC. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate 
housing opportunities the market has or has not provided low-income black 
homeowners and renters. In short, to answer the question: have demand subsidies 
provided low-income minority homeowners with demonstratively better housing 
opportunity than their renting counterparts. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOW-INCOME HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN FIVE LARGE 
METROPOLITAN AREAS: STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Introduction: 
When it comes to putting low-income households into homes, it would seem that 
policy makers hoped to accomplish two things by subsidizing homeownership. The first 
was to expand low-income participation in the housing market by subsidizing a 
household’s ability to qualify for a mortgage. Homeownership has long exemplified 
middle-class success, and it was hoped that giving low-income families a foothold in the 
housing market would lead them to the promised land of middle class economic 
security. Second, policy makers argued that increasing demand would encourage the 
housing market to produce more affordably-priced housing, a response that was 
necessary for demand programs to be successful. Barton (1996) identifies the response 
accordingly:  
 
Improvements in the overall quality of the [private] housing supply in 
the United States over the previous forty years made it plausible to argue 
that the housing problems of the poor were primarily problems of affordability 
and of constraints that prevented the market from responding to higher rents 
by producing more units.  
 
In other words, federal housing policy was predicated, for all practical purposes, 
on the market meeting demand through expanded production of units that would be 
affordable to low-income families, and/or though more efficient filtering of existing units 
in the housing market.  
In theory, these goals approach the affordable housing problem on two fronts—
the first lowers the bar of entry for low-income buyers, thus increasing demand. The 
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second encourages greater housing production (presumably at the top-end of the price 
market), which should lower prices of older housing stock and thus enhance filtering. 
Together, the net expected result would be expanded market choice at a lower market 
equilibrium price, thus making housing more affordable to low-income households. 18  
It appears, however, that subsidizing low-income credit and financing options for 
homeownership did not spur any significant increases in the production of affordably-
priced units or necessarily result in enhanced filtering. As discussed in Chapter 2, in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (at the height of the 1990s housing boom), a time when the 
lending industry saw its lowest interest rates in 40-years and the broadest market 
participation in its history, production of units priced affordably to low- and even median-
income earners decreased, and housing prices increased faster during this period than 
at any other time in recent history. By affordable, I mean housing units that cost low-
income households (those earning no more than 80% of AMI) no more than 30% of total 
household income.  
There is evidence, however, that subsidizing low-income credit and financing 
options positively affected low-income participation in the housing market. Through the 
same period, and indeed through much of the 90s, home purchases by low-income and 
minority households increased, especially among first-time buyers. This leads one to 
wonder about the kinds of housing low-income and minority buyers bought through the 
1990s—e.g. how much did it cost and where is it located?  
                                                     
18 It should also be noted, as Barton (1996) points out, subsidized new construction (i.e. supply) clearly 
costs more than simply providing housing allowances (i.e. demand subsidies) (see also Bradbury and 
Downs, 1981; Dolbeare 1983, 30; Downs 1991) 
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To investigate this question, I draw on 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Bureau 
Public Use Microdata Survey data to conduct a detailed analysis of how housing 
outcomes varied by tenure for low-income black households in five large U.S. 
metropolitan areas (Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC) with 
respect to three indicator variables:  
1. Housing affordability by comparing the proportion of low-income black 
homeowners versus renters who spend greater than 30% of their income 
for housing costs. 
2. Access to elementary schools with low pupil/teacher ratios (P/T-ratios) by 
measuring the proportion of low-income black homeowners versus renters 
that reside in PUMAs with schools that have lower P/T-ratios (i.e. better) 
than the metro-wide average P/T-ratio. 
3. Proximity to workplace by comparing average employment commutes 
(travel time to work measured in minutes) of low-income black 
homeowners versus renters, and comparing those to metro-wide average 
work commutes. 
These variables encapsulate the most potent wealth creation benefits inherent to 
homeownership. Collectively they constitute a more comprehensive measure of low-
income housing outcomes than housing cost alone, something I am calling “low-income 
housing opportunity.” 19 In my analysis, I compare housing outcomes by tenure with 
                                                     
19 Other researchers and organizations have used the term “housing opportunity” to convey the 
importance of considering factors beyond price to gauge successful homeownership. For example, the 
National Association of Realtors’ (NAR) Housing Opportunity Program initiative is structured around the 
finding that “the lack of available and affordable housing is reflected in several ways including access to 
employment, education, a good environment and safe neighborhoods” NAR, N. A. o. R. (2005). Housing 
Opportunity Program.  
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respect to these three variables to determine where low-income black homeowners 
maximize their housing opportunity versus low-income black renters.  
Because housing is a heterogeneous good in the sense that each unit offers a 
unique set of features or bundle of services, all buyers must consider a number of 
factors when purchasing a home. In an effort to satisfy individual needs, buyers shop for 
the best combination of housing features and services given their budgets and 
preferences including size, amenities and location (Heikkila 2000). Whether renting or 
owning, these three components must be recognized as contributing positively to a 
household’s financial well being.  
While housing costs are a primary consideration for all low-income households, 
homeownership can offer numerous other financial and social benefits, many of which 
are tied to location (McCarthy, Van Zandt et al. 2001) (Rohe, Van Zandt et al. 2000) 
(Rossi and Weber 1996). Two of the most important are proximity to a "good" school 
and one's workplace. Living closer to higher quality schools means better educational 
opportunities for children. Proximity to better schools is also recognized to be important 
to households who do not have school-aged children because that factor strongly 
affects a home’s resale value (NAHB 2005) (Bogart and Cromwell 1997) (Crone 1998). 
Proximity to work is probably less important than proximity to schools—most families 
are probably willing to accept a longer commute if it means that their children will attend 
better schools (or they believe that by being located in a higher quality school district 
their home will hold or appreciate in value). Most credible guides on home buying rank 
these variables—price, access to schools, and proximity to work—in that order of 
importance in the home buying process (NAHB 2005) (HUD 2005) (NAR 2002).    
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These three factors consistently resonated with respondents of an extensive 
national public opinion survey conducted by the Fannie Mae Foundation in 2003. The 
survey included focus groups and individual interviews among representatives from the 
fields of public policy and housing, experts in public policy campaigns, and opinion 
leaders. Researchers also conducted 22 focus groups and more than 2,800 phone 
interviews with business and community leaders, journalists, policy makers, and 
individuals active in civic affairs (Stewart 2004). The research found several issues that 
were of great concern with respect to affordable housing costs: a) whether families were 
unfairly strained financially, b) whether costs prevented education or retirement 
opportunities, and c) whether costs prevented parents spending time with children due 
to long commutes (GMHF 2004). These issues are not arbitrary or inconsequential; in 
fact, they matter to most buyers, experts and the general public. 
In this research, I compare housing outcomes by tenure to determine where low-
income black homeowners maximize their housing opportunity versus low-income black 
renters. Low-income level is calculated at 80% of Census reported area median income 
(AMI) (at the PMSA level) for 1990 and 2000. Several reasons make low-income black 
households an appropriate choice for this study:  
 
1) Low-income black households have historically had poorer housing options;  
 
2) Low-income blacks were a target population for many of the changes in federal 
housing (homeownership) policy that occurred during the period of study; and 
 
3) Low-income black homeownership increased markedly through the 1990s. 
 
Finally, one other consideration factored into the selection of this population. By 
contrasting like-race populations of renters and owners (as opposed to similarly tenured 
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populations inclusive of all races), the analysis avoids the not easily quantified variable 
of discrimination in the housing marketin short, this approach holds race more or less 
constant. However, the influence of past discrimination in the housing market cannot be 
avoided and thus any housing outcomes for this population have to be viewed on 
balance with historical discrimination.  
Study Structure, Data and Methodology 
My analysis draws on 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata 
Survey (PUMS) data for black low-income renter and homeowner households in 24 
primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) that comprise five large consolidated 
metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) (1999 division): Chicago, Detroit, New York, 
Philadelphia and Washington DC. PUMS data provides a 5% random sample of 
household and person counts at the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) level that, 
when weighted and calculated appropriately, produces a representative metropolitan 
area population for study.  
Two difficulties arise when making metropolitan-level comparisons across census 
years with PUMS data: a) changes in census-defined metropolitan geography; and b) 
changes in Public Use Microdata Areas boundaries. For this study, spatial differences 
between 1990 and 2000 geographies were reconciled by “building” new GIS coverages 
for each metropolitan area using 1990 and 2000 PUMAs as building blocks. These 
constructed coverages approximate as closely as possible those of the 1999 U.S. 
Census-defined metropolitan areas (see Appendix B) and are referred to nominally as 
the "study metropolitan areas" or "metro areas" in this dissertation.  
 105 
 
Indicator 1: Overpayment for Housing 
For this study, a percentage of income measure is used to determine the 
proportion of low-income black homeowners versus renters that overpaid for housing 
costs. All housing affordability measures rely on two major components—income and 
price. The simplest and most accepted measure is the income/price quotient based on 
area median income (AMI) as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. The measure 
usually sets the upper limit of allowable income spent (over time or at a given point in 
time) at no more than 30% for those earning 80% of AMI. While percentage of income 
measures have some limitations (e.g. they do not control for differences in housing 
quality/features and location, nor do they always account for a household’s real financial 
constraints) (see Linnedman and Megbolugbe 1992; Stone 1993; Bogdon 1996, 
Weicher 1977), they offer several advantages including ease of calculation and 
comprehension, availability of data, and applicability across time and space (Bogdon 
and Can 1997). Analysts continue to rely on the home-price-to-income-ratio because 
home expenditures tend to rise comparably with home price making it an appropriate 
measure across the spectrum of income levels (Megbolugbe 1992). 
The study at hand calculates housing costs for the population of interest in two 
ways: 1) selected monthly housing costs as a percentage of income for owners and 2) 
gross rent as a percentage of income for renters. The U.S. Census Bureau defines 
gross rent as the contract rent plus the estimated average monthly cost of utilities 
(electricity, gas, and water and sewer) and fuels (oil, coal, kerosene, wood, etc.) if paid 
for by renter (or paid for the renter by someone else). Gross rent is intended to eliminate 
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differentials, which result from varying practices with respect to the inclusion of utilities 
and fuels as part of the rental payment.  
The U.S. Census Bureau defines selected monthly owner costs as the sum of 
payments for mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts to purchase, or similar debts on the 
property (including payments for the first mortgage, second mortgage, home equity 
loans, and other junior mortgages); real estate taxes; fire, hazard, and flood insurance 
on the property; utilities (electricity, gas, and water and sewer); and fuels (oil, coal, 
kerosene, wood, etc.). It also includes, where appropriate, monthly condominium fees or 
manufactured home costs (installment loan payments, personal property taxes, site 
rent, registration fees, and license fees).  
Because the PUMS data does not provide a ready-calculated variable for 
“selected monthly owner costs” I calculated one to approximate the Census Bureau’s 
definition as closely as possible. This includes first and second mortgage payments, 
property taxes, property insurance costs, housing association or condo fee when 
applicable, and utility costs (gas, electric, heating fuels, and water). Income level is 
calculated as 80% of Census reported AMI in 1990 and 2000. Using HUD’s standard 
benchmark for housing affordability, a household overpays if it spends greater than 30 
percent of its income for housing costs. 
Indicator 2: Access to Higher Quality Schools 
Elementary school pupil/teacher ratios (P/T-ratios) are used to measure low-
income black homeowners’ versus renters’ access to higher quality elementary schools. 
The P/T-ratio is the number of full-time teachers divided by the number of full-time 
students. While also an approximation of average class size, P/T-ratios tend to be 
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smaller than average class size because, at some point during the day, some teachers 
do not teach (e.g. their day includes preparation time and other non-classroom duties). 
The P/T-ratio has long been an accepted indicator of school quality used by the U.S. 
Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), United 
Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. More important for this study, it is one of 
the most valued neighborhood quality indicators that are consistently capitalized into 
housing market prices (Brasington 1999) (NAHB 2005). According to the U.S. 
Department of Education, the median pupil/teacher ratio for primary schools in the U.S. 
in 2001 was 16.0 (DOE 2003).  
To measure low-income black household access to better schools, I compare the 
percentage of homeowners versus renters who reside in PUMAs with average 
elementary school pupil/teacher ratios lower (i.e. better) than the metro-wide average 
P/T-ratio. Using data from the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) and data from the U.S. Census Bureau, this variable 
evaluates the proximities of low-income black homeowners and renters to elementary 
schools (“regular,” “special education,” “vocational” and “other/alternative” schools 
included—see www.nces.ed.gov for exact definitions) with low pupil/teacher ratios. 
NCES data provides pupil/teacher ratios for schools selected by type and location and 
output is provided with a variety of spatial identifiers including state, county, city, zip 
code and longitude and latitude coordinates. 
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Indicator 3: Travel Time to Work 
Living closer to work can result in substantial household savings not only in time 
but also in money (Calthorpe 1996; Calthorpe and Fulton 2000; Duany 1999). This is 
especially important for low-income households who dedicate a higher proportion of 
their budget to transportations costs than wealthier families.20 But desirable housing 
locations such as those in good school districts and/or close to homebuyers’ places of 
employment may be financially out of reach for low-income buyers. They may therefore 
settle for a location that requires a longer work commute than they might otherwise 
choose. In California, even for middle-income earners, this has become known as 
“driving to qualify” (NAR 2004). Solving metropolitan housing/jobs imbalance has long 
been recognized as an important aspect of the Smart Growth movement (Weitz 2003), 
and more critical perspectives recognize this relationship as well. For example, 
researchers note that commuting times have increased in many metropolitan areas over 
the last decade as a result of increasing land and housing costs, thus affecting low-
income households in particular (Sassen 2001). But more broadly, living closer to where 
one works is a benefit that most households appreciate as a matter of convenience: 
less time spent commuting means greater opportunity to spend with family, tend to 
domestic concerns and/or pursue leisure interests.  
The U.S. Census Bureau defines travel time to work as the “total amount of time 
in minutes that it usually took the respondent to get from home to work last week, 
including any stops the worker usually made on the way to work” (U.S. Census Bureau). 
For this analysis, I considered only employed persons in households in the population of 
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interest, including those who reported no commuting time because possibly they worked 
at or very close to home. I compare average commuting times between low-income 
black renters and homeowners to the average commuting times for the metropolitan 
region (CMSA) at large.  
Methodology Summary and Qualifications: 
The indicators presented in this chapter are sufficient to provide a meaningful 
picture of successful homeownership for low-income black households. There are, 
however, important limitations to the variables, data and methodology employed. First 
the data used for the analysis, while refined in its level of detail, is coarse in its 
geographic coverage. PUMS data is sample data, and therefore has expected variation 
and error, which is controllable but still limits accuracy. PUMAs coverages are large 
geographic areas with a minimum population of 100,000 people, which also limits 
accuracy.  
Second, the variables employed to measure housing opportunity have limitations. 
For example, comparing average low-income household travel times to those for the 
metropolitan area at the large tells us little about changes in inter-tenure travel times 
themselves. In an effort to make fair and accurate inter-metropolitan and inter-regional 
comparisons for the variables at hand, I normalized all variables by their regional and/or 
metropolitan geographies respectively. For example, households were selected as low-
income by determining whether they earned 80% of the median area income or less for 
their PMSA, a slightly finer benchmark that the more popular county-level threshold.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
20 According to a 2004 report on low-income transportation costs in California urban areas, while low-
income households spend less on transportation than wealthier households, transportation costs 
consumed 19% of their household budget compared to 16% for higher-income households (PPIC 2004)  
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Third, while I am convinced that the variables selected are valid measures for the 
research questions at hand, they are complex, tentative and open to other 
interpretations. For example, pupil/teacher-ratio offers certain insights into the 
qualitative aspects of a classroom environment, but it is hardly the definitive measure of 
school excellence.  
Finally, there are obvious limitations associated with selecting low-income black 
households as a population of interest. These include differences in settlement and 
intra-urban migration patterns as they relate and are affected by the presence of racial 
discrimination. These conditions are not accounted for in this study, and therefore the 
analysis should be viewed as a first cut at investigating the research questions at hand, 
and should serve more as a foundation for further research and investigation than as a 
definitive study on the subject.  
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CHAPTER 6 
LOW-INCOME HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN 5 LARGE 
METROPOLITAN AREAS: STUDY FINDINGS 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present an empirical analysis of housing outcomes for low-
income black household housing with respect to three indicator variables: 1) housing 
costs, 2) access to schools with lower (i.e. better) than metro-average pupil-teacher 
ratios (P/T-ratios) and 3) proximity to workplace expressed in community time. Evidence 
from 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Public-Use Micro Sample (PUMS) data 
suggests that, compared to renters, low-income black homeowners in the five study 
metropolitan areas paid more for housing, commuted longer and lived nearer to schools 
with higher P/T ratios than the average school in their metropolitan area. Outcomes 
varied by metropolitan area and my discussion focuses on broader metropolitan 
changes over the decade.  
Examined separately, the three indicators of interest provide ample information 
on inter-tenure differences in overpayment, commuting time, and access to better 
schools, but tell little about their combined effects on low-income black housing 
opportunity. If we are to understand which tenure provides greater housing opportunity, 
these variables must be measured simultaneously. To do this, after presenting 
separately the findings for each indicator variable, I develop a single, simplified 
summary metric called "housing opportunity" that assigns weighted values to each of 
the three indicator variables above, and evaluate the percentages of low-income black 
households by tenure by metropolitan area based on this weighted index summary 
indicator. 
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Indicator 1: Housing Overpayment 
In 1990, PUMS data report a representative population of 713,028 low-income 
black households in the five metropolitan areas examined.21 Representative population 
in the five metropolitan areas increased by 196,386 households (or 28%) to 
approximately 909,386 households by 2000. In 1990, approximately 162,198 (or 23%) 
of black households owned their homes and 550,820 (or 77%) rented. By 2000, the 
number of low-income black homeowners increased by 123,348 households to 285,546: 
an effective increase in the black homeownership rate of 9.0 percentage points from 
23% to 32%. By contrast, the number of renter households increased by 13% (or by 
73,020 households) from 550,820 in 1990 to 623,840 in 2000. This translates into an 
effective rentership rate of 78% in 1990 and 68% in 2000. 
 
Table 6-1: Increases in Black Household Housing Cost Overpayment by Tenure 
and Income, 1990 versus 2000: Study Metropolitan Areas  
BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 1990 2000 CHANGE GROWTH RATE 
Low-Income Black Households (total) 711,028 909,386 198,358 28% 
Low-Income Black Homeowner HH 162,198 285,546 123,348 76% 
Low-Income Black Renter HH 550,820 623,840 73,020 13% 
Burdened Low-Income Black Homeowner 
HH 72,183 136,724 64,541 89% 
Burdened Low-Income Black Renter HH 280,642 310,611 29,969 11% 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
 
 
                                                     
21 For the purposes of this study, low-income black households include those earning less than 80% of 
AMI and have an employed head of householder. 
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Table 6-1 reports the increases in the numbers of black households with housing 
cost overpayment by tenure and income in 1990 and 2000. What is most noticeable is 
the very high growth rate for burdened low-income homeowner households. While the 
number of low-income black households increased approximately 28% and low-income 
black homeownership increased approximately 76%, cost burden22 amongst low-income 
black homeowner households increased approximately 89% through the decade. 
Analysis of renter households suggests a very different outcome: while low-income 
black renter households increased 13%, distress among low-income black renter 
households increased by only 11%.  
These changes resulted in a shift in the percentages of low-income renters and 
homeowners overpaying for housing. While a greater number low-income black renter 
households overpaid for housing compared to owners in 1990 and 2000, the gap 
between the proportion of burdened owners and renters narrowed considerably through 
the decade. This is likely due more to the growth in household overpayment among low-
income homeowners than to any significant improvement in financial conditions for 
renters. The odds that a low-income black homeowner overpaid for housing in 1990 
was approximately 0.88 that for low-income black renters. By 2000, those odds 
increased to 0.96 (see Table 6-2).  
                                                     
22 "Cost burden" refers to households paying greater than 30% of total household income for housing. 
 114 
 
 
Table 6-2: Comparison of Odds Ratios for Burdened Low-Income Black 
Households by Tenure, 1990 versus 2000: Study Metropolitan Areas 
LOW-INCOME BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 
Year & 
Household Tenure 
Not 
Burdened Burdened Total Odds 
Odds 
Ratio 
1990 A B A+B B/A 1990 
Homeowner LI Household 162,198 72,183 234,381 0.45 
0.87 
Renter LI Household 550,820 280,642 831,462 0.51 
Total 713,018 352,825
2000 A B A+B B/A 2000 
Homeowner LI Household 285,546 136,724 422,270 0.48 
0.96 
Renter LI Household 623,840 310,611 934,451 0.50 
Total 909,386 447,335  
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
 
Renter and Homeowner Overpayment Quotients 
As startling as the increases in homeowner overpayment appear, comparisons of 
the number of owner-occupied versus renters that overpaid neglects the nuances of 
these changes and their spatial distribution. To better understand the magnitude and 
spatial distribution of the changes already introduced, a basic housing “overpayment 
quotient” was developed to compare the decade change in the percentage of low-
income households by tenure paying excessively for housing costs in each metropolitan 
area:  
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Similar to a location quotient (essentially the quotient of two percentages), the 
overpayment quotient returns a figure between <1 and >1 for each metropolitan area 
based on its decade change in the proportion of burdened tenure-specific low-income 
households. Metropolitan areas with an index rating equal to 1.0 experienced no change 
in the percentage of burdened low-income households relative to all low-income 
households between 1990 and 2000. Metropolitan areas with an index rating of less 
than 1.0 experienced a reduction in the percentage of burdened low-income 
households, and those with an index rating greater than 1.0 experienced an increase in 
the percentage of burdened low-income households through the decade. Ideally, 
overpayment quotients of less than 1 for both renters and owners would be a desirable 
outcome because it suggests that the proportion of burdened low-income renters and 
owners decreased in a particular metropolitan area over the study period.   
Table 6-3 reports overpayment quotients by tenure for the five study metropolitan 
areas. The overpayment quotient measures the change in burdened low-income black 
households as percentage of all low-income black households by tenure. 
HOpQtenure = 
Burdened Low-
Income Black 
HHMi2000
Low-Income 
Black 
HHMi2000 
Burdened Low-
Income Black 
HHMi1990 
Low-Income 
Black HHMi1990 
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Table 6-3: Housing Overpayment Index Calculations for Low-Income Black 
Households by Tenure, 1990-2000: Study Metropolitan Areas 
Metro Area 
(CMSA) 
1990 2000 
HOpQtenure 
(Housing 
Overpayment 
Quotient)  
(A) 
% Low-
Income 
Burdened 
Owner HH 
(B) 
% Low-
Income 
Burdened 
Renter 
HH
(C) 
% Low-
Income 
Burdened 
Owner 
HH
(D) 
% Low-
Income 
Burdened 
Renter 
HH
(C/A) 
FOR 
OWNERS 
(D/B) 
FOR 
RENTERS 
Chicago 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.47 1.38 0.95 
Detroit 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.44 1.24 0.91 
New York 0.43 0.53 0.68 0.57 1.58 1.07 
Philadelphia 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.51 1.01 0.82 
Washington DC 0.50 0.46 0.37 0.43 0.73 0.94 
TOTAL (All Metros 
Combined) 0.45 0.51 0.48 0.50 1.06 0.98 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
 
Overall, for all five metropolitan areas studied, the analysis suggests a 6% 
increase in the proportion of burdened low-income black homeowner households and a 
2% decrease in the proportion of burdened low-income black renter households 
between 1990 and 2000. Results varied by metropolitan area with Philadelphia and 
Detroit showing greatest improvement for renters (housing overpayment quotients of 
0.82 and 0.91 respectively) and New York showing least improvement for both tenures 
with increases in the proportion of renters and homeowners. In New York, the 
proportion of burdened renters worsened slightly as indicated by a overpayment 
quotient of 1.07, but distress amongst homeowners increased as indicated with an 
overpayment quotient of 1.58. All but one metropolitan area saw increases in the 
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proportion of burdened homeowners. The one exception was Washington DC where it 
appears that a smaller proportion of homeowners overpaid in 2000 than in 1990 
expressed by a housing overpayment quotient for homeowners of 0.73, suggesting that 
the proportion of burdened homeowners in this city in 2000 was 73% of that in 1990.  
Indicator 2: Access to Higher Quality Schools 
The National Center for Education Statistics provided data for elementary 
schools in both study years (1989 and 1999) located within the five study-defined 
metropolitan areas. The average pupil-teacher ratio (P/T-ratio) for these schools in 1989 
was 18.9 students per teacher with a SD of 7.88. The pupil-teacher ratio improved (i.e. 
decreased) to 17.1 students per teacher by 1999 and showed less variance (std. dev. 
5.49827) by 2000.  
For this study, the P/T-ratios used to determine school quality were normalized 
by two geographic scales:  
1. The average P/T ratio for all schools in the PUMA in which a school is 
located; and  
2. The average P/T ratio for all schools in the metropolitan area (CMSA) in 
which a school is located.  
Normalizing by the metro-wide average P/T-ratio provided for a fairer location-
specific metric than would a nation-wide average: For example, a P/T-ratio of 21:1 
would be considered acceptable (and even average) in Riverside-San Bernardino CA 
PMSA but would probably represent a crisis-level ratio in Rochester NY PMSA, where 
class sizes are generally much smaller than in Riverside.  
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The second geographic calibration—normalizing the school P/T ratios by the 
average P/T-ratio for all schools in the PUMA—was necessary because it corresponds 
to the smallest geographic component for which population and income data are 
available in the Public Use Microdata Survey (PUMS). Another reason for normalizing at 
the PUMA level concerns the spatial relationship between home and school. Where a 
child lives usually dictates where s/he will attend school: School access is generally a 
function of proximity, and most children attend school close to where they live. While 
PUMA boundaries are imperfect for delineating school attendance, they represent the 
smallest geography available for the “race by tenure by income” census data for the 
population of interest.23  
With these considerations in mind, I use two criteria to define school quality in 
each PUMA in the five study metropolitan areas by decade:  
1. The average school P/T-ratio was lower (i.e. better) than the average P/T-
ratio for all schools in the metropolitan area in 1990 and remained so 
through 2000; and 
2. The P/T-ratio improved or declined through the study period compared to 
the average for all schools in the metropolitan area by 2000.  
Overall, in the five metropolitan areas studied, the number of low-income black 
households residing in areas with schools with higher than average (i.e. worse) P/T 
ratios increased substantially between 1990 and 2000. In 1990, a total of 250,183 
households resided in such areas compared to 440,464 in 2000, an increase of 76%. 
                                                     
23
 Other political boundaries such as city/town borders and, more important, school district boundaries 
provide better delineation about where children attend schools locally, but no “race by tenure by income” 
census data are readily available for these geographies for the periods analyzed. 
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Approximately 35% of all low-income black households resided in areas with higher 
than metro-average P/T ratios in 1990 compared to 48% in 2000.  
 
Table 6-4: Change in Low-Income Black Household Residing in Areas with 
Lower Performing Schools, 1990 versus 2000: Study Metropolitan Areas  
BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 1990 2000 CHANGE PERCENT CHANGE 
Low-Income Black Households 250,183 440,464 190,281 76% 
Low-Income Black Homeowner HH 54,595 123,713 69,118 127% 
Low-Income Black Renter HH 189,844 316,751 126,907 67% 
Burdened Low-Income Black 
Homeowner HH 27,142 116,855 89,713 331% 
Burdened Low-Income Black 
Renter HH 104,442 157,141 52,699 50% 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. 
Census Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
 
 
Table 6-4 reports the increases in the numbers of black households with housing 
cost overpayment by tenure and income in 1990 and 2000. Substantial increases are 
observed for low-income black homeowner households as compared to renter 
households. For example, the number of homeowner households residing in areas with 
schools with higher than average P/T ratios increased by 69,118 (or 127%) as 
compared to renter households which increased by 67% (or by 126,907). The results for 
burdened low-income households were more stark. Burdened homeowner households 
living in areas with higher than average P/T ratios increased 331% (or by 89,713) 
compared to burdened renters which increased by only 50% (or 52,699). Approximately 
38% of burdened homeowner households were located in areas with poorer performing 
schools in 1990 as compared to 43% in 2000.  
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The odds ratio that a low-income black homeowner lived in an area with a school 
with a higher P/T ratio than the metropolitan area average in 1990 was approximately 
0.94 that for low-income black renters. By 2000, the odds ratio had decreased to 0.74 
(see Table 6-5). This suggests that the probability of a low-income black household 
living in an area with an underperforming school increased for homeowners and renters 
alike.  
 
Table 6-5: Comparison of Odds Ratios for Low-Income Black Household 
Residing in Areas with Lower Performing Schools, 1990 versus 2000: Study 
Metropolitan Areas 
LOW-INCOME BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 
Year & 
Household Tenure 
Better 
Schools 
Poorer 
Schools Total Odds Odds Ratio 
1990 A B A+B B/A 1990 
Homeowner 
Household 105,613 54,595 160,208 0.52 0.94 
 
Renter Household 344,717 189,844 534,561 0.55 
Total 450,330 244,439
 
2000 A B A+B B/A 2000 
Homeowner 
Household 161,833 123,713 285,546 0.76 0.74 
 
Renter Household 307,089 316,751 623,840 1.03 
Total 468,922 440,464
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
 
Table 6-6 presents a comparison of the percentage of low-income black 
households by tenure in each study metropolitan area residing in areas (PUMAs) with 
schools with higher P/T ratios than their metropolitan area average. In 1990, there were 
 121 
 
smaller percentages of homeowners than renters residing in areas with poorer schools. 
In terms of relative advantage, homeowners had access greater to better schools than 
renters in four of five metropolitan areas examined in 1990 and 2000: Chicago, Detroit, 
Philadelphia, and Washington DC. For burdened households, homeowners had relative 
advantage in three of the five metropolitan areas examined in 1990: Detroit, 
Philadelphia, and Washington DC. By 2000, homeowners maintained advantage in 
Washington DC only: Burdened renters had greater access to better schools in Detroit 
and Philadelphia and burdened homeowners had greater access in New York and 
Chicago.  
 
Table 6-6: Comparison of Percentage of Low-Income Black Household by 
Tenure Residing in Areas with Lower Performing Schools, 1990 versus 2000: 
Study Metropolitan Areas 
LOW-INCOME BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 
Year & 
Metro Area Owner Renter Advantage 
Burdened 
Owner 
Burdened 
Renter Advantage 
1990 
Chicago 28.7 32.5 Owner 34.1 33.5 Renter 
Detroit 17.7 25.3 Owner 25.1 27.8 Owner 
New York 36.3 34.2 Renter 36.8 32.8 Renter 
Philadelphia 55.2 64.7 Owner 52.7 66.2 Owner 
Washington DC 31.9 34.1 Owner 36.6 39.5 Owner 
2000 
Chicago 20.6 29.6 Owner 29.6 31.6 Owner 
Detroit 69.4 68.9 Renter 68.9 67.4 Renter 
New York 50.3 59.3 Owner 50.3 58.2 Owner 
Philadelphia 36.0 42.5 Owner 43.1 41.9 Renter 
Washington DC 43.8 50.3 Owner 38.0 49.1 Owner 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
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Low-Income Renter and Homeowner School-Housing Quotients 
The analysis above suggest that low-income black renters found equal or better 
access to schools with lower than metro-average P/T-ratios compared to owners 
through the 1990s. But these findings provide little insight into where tenure choice 
expanded or limited low-income households’ access to schools with smaller class size. 
To do this, we need to look at where the greatest changes occurred, and the degree to 
which school access improved for renters compared to owners in individual cities 
(PMSA). To better understand the magnitude and spatial distribution of changes at the 
metropolitan level, I develop a school-housing quotient to compare the decade change 
in the percentage of low-income households by tenure with access to schools with 
better than metro-average P/T-ratios in each metropolitan area:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to a location quotient (essentially the quotient of two percentages), the 
school-housing quotient returns a figure between <1 and >1 for each metropolitan area 
examined based on its decade change in the proportion of tenure-specific low-income 
black households living in PUMAs with schools with lower than metro-average P/T-
ShQtenure = 
Low-Income Black 
HH living in PUMAs 
with Avg. P/T-ratio 
=< Avg. CMSA P/T-
ratioMi2000 
Low-Income 
Black HHMi2000 
Low-Income Black 
HH living in PUMAs 
with Avg. P/T-ratio 
=< Avg. CMSA P/T-
ratioMi1990 
Low-Income Black 
HHMi1990 
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ratios. Cities with an index rating equal to 1.0 experienced no change between 1990 
and 2000 in the percentage of low-income households by tenure living in PUMA with 
schools with a lower than metro-average P/T-ratio. Metropolitan areas with an index 
rating of less than 1.0 experienced a decrease in the percentage of low-income black 
households living in PUMAs with schools with lower than metro-average P/T-ratios. 
Metropolitan areas with an index rating greater than 1.0 experienced an increase 
through the decade in the percentage of low-income black households living in PUMAs 
with schools with lower than metro-average P/T-ratios. Ideally, for any metropolitan 
area, school-housing quotients of greater than 1.0 for both tenure groups would be 
desirable because that would suggest access to better than average schools increased 
for both low-income black renters and owners through the study period. 
The school-housing quotient presented in Table 6-7 measures the change in the 
proportion of burdened low-income black low-income black households (as a 
percentage of all burdened low-income black households) by tenure living in PUMAs 
with lower than average school P/T-ratios (i.e. better quality schools) than that for its 
metropolitan area as a whole. For the five metropolitan areas studied, the school-
housing quotient between 1990 and 2000 for low-income black renters was 0.8 
compared to 0.9 for owners. This suggests that the percentage of low-income black 
renter households living in PUMAs with schools with higher average P/T-ratios than 
their surrounding metropolitan areas decreased approximately 20% between 1990 and 
2000 compared to about 10% for owners.  
The proportion of burdened low-income black households living in areas with 
schools with lower than metro-average P/T-ratios varied by metropolitan areas. For 
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example, for homeowner households, access to such schools improved or remained 
constant between 1990 and 2000 in three of the five metropolitan areas studied: 
Chicago, Philadelphia and Washington DC. Homeowners in Detroit and New York saw 
access to better schools decrease substantially: by about 20% in New York and 60% in 
Detroit. For renters, access to schools with lower P/T ratios improved or remained 
constant between 1990 and 2000 in two of the five metropolitan areas studied: Chicago 
and Philadelphia. In Philadelphia, approximately the proportion of burdened low-income 
black households with access to better schools almost doubled. Renters' school-
housing quotients were less than one, suggesting that a smaller proportion of renters 
had access to better schools in 2000 than in 1990 in three of the five metropolitan areas 
examined: Detroit, New York and Washington DC. As for homeowners, the sharpest 
decrease occurred in Detroit where approximately half the proportion of renters had 
access to schools with lower than metro-average P/T ratios (see Table 6-7).  
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Table 6-7: School-Housing Quotient for Low-Income Black Burdened 
Households by Tenure, 1990-2000: Study Metropolitan Areas 
Metropolitan 
Area 
1990 2000 
ShQtenure 
(School-Housing 
Quotient)  
 
(A) 
% Low-
Income 
Owner 
HH in 
PUMA w/ 
P/T-ratio 
=< MSA 
P/T-ratio 
 
(B) 
% Low-
Income 
Renter 
HH in 
PUMA 
w/ P/T-
ratio =< 
MSA 
P/T-ratio
 
(C) 
% Low-
Income 
Owner 
HH in 
PUMA w/ 
P/T-ratio 
=< MSA 
P/T-ratio 
 
(D) 
% Low-
Income 
Renter 
HH in 
PUMA 
w/ P/T-
ratio =< 
MSA 
P/T-ratio
(C/A) 
FOR 
OWNERS 
(D/B) 
FOR 
RENTERS 
Chicago 65.9 66.5 70.4 68.4 1.1 1.0 
Detroit 74.9 72.2 31.1 32.6 0.4 0.5 
New York 63.2 67.2 49.7 41.8 0.8 0.6 
Philadelphia 47.3 33.8 56.9 58.1 1.2 1.7 
Washington DC 63.4 60.5 62.0 50.9 1.0 0.8 
TOTAL 62.4 62.8 56.7 49.4 0.9 0.8 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
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Indicator 3: Travel Time to Work 
Collectively, in the 5 metropolitan areas analyzed, between 1990 and 2000 
average commuting times increased for both low-income black homeowners and 
renters, from 29.09 minutes to 30:37 minutes for homeowners and from 29.78 minutes 
to 31.75 minutes for renters. For burdened households (those paying greater than 30% 
of income for housing costs) average commuting times also increased through the 
decade, from 29.65 minutes to 31:33 minutes for homeowners and from 29.28 minutes 
to 32.51 minutes for renters.  
Outcomes varied by metropolitan area (see Table 6-8). For example, in Chicago 
average homeowner commutes decreased 5% from 32.89 minutes to 31.14 minutes, 
while average renter commuting times increased 5% from 33.00 to 34.71 minutes. 
Burdened households in Chicago saw similar results: average commutes for burdened 
homeowners decreased 4% from 33.07 to 31.87 minutes compared to an 8% increase 
in average commuting times for burdened renters from 33.44 to 35.95 minutes. These 
differences between tenure groups were found to be statistically significant (p =0.000). 
In Detroit, renters did slightly better than homeowners. Average homeowner 
commutes in Detroit increased 4% from 23.28 minutes to 24.26 minutes, while average 
renter commuting times increased 3% from 22.68 to 23.40 minutes. Burdened 
households in Detroit saw similar results: average commutes for burdened homeowners 
increased 2% from 23.82 to 24.31 minutes compared to a 1% increase in average 
commuting times for burdened renters from 22.94 to 23.24 minutes. These differences 
between tenure groups were found to be statistically significant (p =0.000). In Detroit, 
while commuting time increased for both renters and homeowners, renters had shorter 
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commutes in 1990 and 2000, and renters experienced a smaller increase in average 
commuting time through the decade. 
New York saw mixed results across tenure. Homeowners had shorter commutes 
than renters in both 1990 and 2000, but homeowner average commuting time increased 
12% from 30.55 minutes to 34.12 minutes while renter average commuting time 
increased by 8% from 33.54 in 1990 to 36.31 in 2000. For burdened households, 
burdened owners had shorter commutes in both 1990 and 2000, and owners saw a 
14% increase in commuting time from 30.84 minutes to 35.06 minutes in 2000 
compared to renters’ commutes which increased 16% from 32.40 minutes in 1990 to 
37.70 minutes in 2000. These differences between tenure groups were found to be 
statistically significant (p =0.000).  
Commuting times in Philadelphia increased for all tenure groups, although the 
increase for homeowners was less than that for renters. Homeowners experienced 
longer average commutes than did renters in 1990, but slightly shorter average 
commutes than renters in 2000. Homeowner average commuting time increased 10% 
from 27.39 minutes to 30.21 minutes in 2000, while renter average commuting time 
increased by 16% from 26.24 minutes to 31.94 minutes in 2000. These differences 
between tenure groups were found to be statistically significant (p =0.000). For 
burdened households, homeowners had shorter commutes than renters in 1990 and 
2000. Both burdened tenure groups saw approximately similar increases of about 4.5 
minutes (or 17%) through the decade. 
Commuting times in Washington DC increased for all tenure groups. 
Homeowners had shorter commutes than renters in 1990 and 2000, but only slightly 
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shorter in 1990. Average commuting times increased 6% from 29.04 minutes to 30.67 
minutes for owners and 6% from 30.14 minutes in 1990 to 31.94 minutes for renters. 
For burdened households, burdened homeowners had longer commutes than burdened 
renters in 1990 but shorter commutes than burdened renters in 2000. Burdened 
homeowners saw only a 3% increase in commuting time from 30.67 minutes in 1990 to 
31.52 minutes in 2000 compared to renters’ commutes which increased 11% from 29.27 
minutes in 1990 to 32.37 minutes in 2000. These differences between tenure groups 
were found to be statistically significant (p =0.000). 
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Table 6-8: Comparison of Travel Time to Work in Minutes for Low-Income 
Black Household Residing by Tenure, 1990 versus 2000: Study Metropolitan 
Areas 
Metropolitan Area & 
Household Tenure 
Travel 
Time 1990 
Travel Time 
2000 Change 
Percent 
Change 
Chicago 
Homeowners 32.89 31.14 -1.75 -5% 
Renters 33.00 34.71 1.71 5% 
Burdened Homeowner 33.07 31.87 -1.20 -4% 
Burdened Renter 33.44 35.95 2.51 8% 
   
Detroit 
Homeowners 23.28 24.26 0.98 4% 
Renters 22.68 23.40 0.72 3% 
Burdened Homeowner 23.82 24.31 0.49 2% 
Burdened Renter 22.94 23.24 0.30 1% 
   
New York 
Homeowners 30.55 34.12 3.57 12% 
Renters 33.54 36.31 2.77 8% 
Burdened Homeowner 30.84 35.06 4.22 14% 
Burdened Renter 32.40 37.07 5.30 16% 
  
Philadelphia 
Homeowners 27.39 30.21 2.82 10% 
Renters 26.24 30.49 4.25 16% 
Burdened Homeowner 26.15 30.72 4.57 17% 
Burdened Renter 26.34 30.90 4.56 17% 
   
Washington DC 
Homeowners 29.04 30.67 1.63 6% 
Renters 30.14 31.94 1.80 6% 
Burdened Homeowner 30.67 31.52 0.85 3% 
Burdened Renter 29.27 32.37 3.10 11% 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
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Summary Indicator: Low-Income Housing Opportunity 
In this part of the study, I examine key variables related to the attainment of 
housing opportunity by comparing differences and changes in overpayment, access to 
schools, and commuting times for burdened low-income black renters and homeowners 
between 1990 and 2000. Findings suggest that homeownership did not result in 
substantially greater percentages (or numbers) of homeowner households paying 30% 
or less of their income for housing, having shorter commutes to work, or improved 
access to better schools in the five metropolitan areas examined.  
Examined individually, indicator variables discussed previously in this chapter—
overpayment, access to better schools and commuting times—tell us little about the 
combined affects these factors have on low-income black housing opportunity. Again, 
good housing opportunity means that low-income buyers can find housing that is 
proportionately affordable to their income; that provides a reasonable financial return on 
investment; and that is located in close proximity to social amenities and public 
services, such as employment and educational opportunities. If we are to understand 
whether one tenure choice provides clearly superior housing opportunity with respect to 
these variables, we must measure these variables simultaneously.  
To measure the overall change in housing opportunity between 1990 and 2000 in 
each study metropolitan area, a simplified metric was developed to assign a weighted 
score for the change in the percentage of population in each metro that minimized 
housing overpayment, minimized work commute time, and maximized access to 
schools. This metric effectively summarizes my findings to answer two important 
questions: 1) Where and in which cities did low-income housing opportunity increase 
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(i.e. improve) or decrease (i.e. worsen) through the 1990s housing boom? And 2) in 
2000, in which cities do low-income homeowners (and renters) find the most and least 
housing opportunity based on the three variables of interest? 
Based on an examination of relevant literature, the three variables of interest—
housing overpayment, access to better schools and shorter than metro-average work 
commutes—were ranked and weighted according to their relative importance to low-
income households as follows.  
The most important factor low-income buyers or renters consider when looking 
for a home is cost. Location matters, but cost overrides. While all buyers (and renters) 
look for the most they can afford in the best location, low-income households must 
consider price and affordability more carefully than wealthier buyers and renters. Once 
price has been sorted, families then consider proximity to good schools as their second 
most important factor. Proximity to good schools is important even to households who 
do not have school-aged children because, as just about every real estate buyer’s guide 
book tells us, that factor affects every home’s resale value (NAHB 2005). Third, while 
commuting time is important to most households, many consider it less important than 
price or proximity to good schools. This assumes that most families are willing to accept 
more time behind the wheel and/or on the bus if it means that their children will attend a 
better school or if they know that they are about to buy a house that will appreciate 
more rapidly because of its location nearer better schools. Many authorities and guides 
on home buying rank these three variables in the same order of importance (NAHB 
2005) (HUD 2005) (NAR 2002).  
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According to this ranking, I weight the numerical percentages of burdened low-
income black households by tenure for each city for each variable of interest. These 
weighted variable scores are then summed to produce a single weighted housing 
opportunity score by tenure for each city. I then compare the change in cumulative 
scores for cities and regions between 1990 and 2000 to see where improvements 
occurred for each tenure group respectively. For example, I multiply by a factor of two-
and-a-half (2.5) the percentage of low-income households that paid 30% or less of their 
household income for housing costs in 1990 and 2000. For these same years, I multiply 
by a factor of one-and-a-half (1.5) the percentages of low-income households by tenure 
that that lived in PUMAs with schools with lower than metro-average pupil-teacher 
ratios. Finally, I multiply by three-quarters (0.75) the percentages of low-income 
households by tenure with shorter than metro-average commutes to work. In this 
calculus, housing cost is considered 1.6 times more important to low-income buyer than 
proximity to a good school and 3.3 times more important than travel time to work. These 
weighted variable scores are then summed to produce a single weighted housing 
opportunity score for each tenure group in each metropolitan area studied. Therefore, 
housing opportunity for any one metropolitan area is measured by the summed value of 
the percentages of the three variables of study weighted by their rank order of 
importance as follows:  
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Table 6-9 summarizes housing opportunity scores for the five metropolitan areas 
examined. The analysis indicates that in 1990 low-income black homeowner 
households found greater housing opportunity as compared to low-income black renter 
households in four of the five metropolitan areas examined. This difference ranged from 
4.9% more in Chicago to 22.2% more in Washington DC. Homeowners found 10.8% 
more housing opportunity in Detroit in 1990 and 8.5% more New York. Washington DC 
was the only metropolitan area where renters found greater housing opportunity in 1990 
(by 4.1%).  
By 2000, renters found greater housing opportunity in three of the five 
metropolitan areas examined—i.e. between 1990 and 2000 the hierarchy reversed to 
Housing 
OpportunitytenureMi = (AtenureMi*2.5)+(BtenureMi*1.5)+(CtenureMi*0.75)  
 
where:  A = Percentage of low-
income black HH that 
pay 30%< of HH 
income for housing; 
B = Percentage of low-
income black HH that 
reside in PUMAs with 
lower than metro-
average school P/T-
ratios; 
C = Percentage of low-
income black HH that 
have shorter than 
metro-average 
commuting times. 
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favor renting versus homeownership for low-income households. Renters found 12.7% 
more housing opportunity in Chicago, 1.4% more in Detroit, and 6.3% more in New 
York. Homeowners maintained an advantage in Philadelphia between 1990 and 2000, 
although this margin decreased significantly from 22.2% in 1990 to just 2.5% by 2000. 
Housing opportunity in Washington DC favored renters by 4.1% in 1990, but by 2000 
homeowners had 11.2% more housing opportunity in this metropolitan area. This was 
the only metropolitan area that reversed housing opportunity to favor of homeowners 
(see Table 6-9).  
 
Table 6-9: Housing Opportunity Scores (1990-2000): Study Metropolitan Areas 
LOW-INCOME BLACK HOUSEHOLDS 
Metropolitan 
Area 
Owner 
Housing 
Opportunity 
Renter 
Housing 
Opportunity 
Points 
Difference 
Percent 
Difference 
Tenure with 
Greater 
Housing 
Opportunity 
1990 
Chicago 271 258 13 5% Owners 
Detroit 318 283 34 11% Owners 
New York 288 263 25 9% Owners 
Philadelphia 241 187 53 22% Owners 
Washington DC 254 264 -10 -4% Renters 
2000 
Chicago 247 279 -31 -13% Renters 
Detroit 246 250 -3 -1% Renters 
New York 200 213 -13 -6% Renters 
Philadelphia 254 248 6 2% Owners 
Washington DC 299 266 33 11% Owners 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of 1990 and 2000 Public Use Micro Data Survey (U.S. Census 
Bureau) accessed through IPUMS (University of Minnesota) 
*NOTE: 1990 and 2000 Housing Opportunity Scores = (Indicator 1 * 2.5)+(Indicator 2 * 
1.5)+(Indicator 3 * 0.75) 
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These summary findings are based on the weighted housing opportunity metric 
presented earlier in this section,24 the calculus of which assigns subjective relative 
importance to the three indicator variables (housing overpayment, access to schools, 
and travel time to work). While I am confident that the metric helps construct a clearer 
picture of housing opportunity as it relates to low-income households’ concerns, the 
measure biases housing costs over school access and both of these over travel time to 
work. The weighted metric could therefore present a misleading picture for cities in 
which the percentage of households overpaying is very high or low compared to 
differences in commuting times and/or access to schools with lower than metro-average 
P/T-ratios. With this in mind, I verified my results using un-weighted percentages for 
each indicator variable, and found very little change in the overall metropolitan ranking 
and spatial distribution for housing opportunity.  
Chapter Summary 
Table 6-10 presents summary results for the three indicators above (housing 
overpayment, access to higher quality schools, and travel time to work) and the 
summary indicator variable, housing opportunity metric. The results suggest compelling 
evidence that in many respects low-income black renters fared better than owners 
through the 1990s.  
                                                     
24 Weighted point-in-time Housing Opportunity = (A*2.0)+(B*1.5)+(C*1.0), where A = % of low-income 
black HH that pay 30% or less for housing; B = % of low-income black HH that reside in PUMAs with 
lower than metro-average school P/T-ratios; and C = % of low-income black HH that have shorter than 
metro-average commuting times. 
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Table 6-10: Study Findings—Summary of Indicators (1990-2000): Study 
Metropolitan Areas 
 
Tenure 
Advantage 
1990 
Tenure 
Advantage 
2000 
Percentage Change (1990-2000) 
(Greatest Improvement Shown in Bold) 
Owners Renters 
Indicator 1: Housing Overpayment
Chicago Owner Renter +38% -5% 
Detroit Owner Renter +24% -9% 
New York Owner Renter +58% +7% 
Philadelphia Owner Renter +1% -18% 
Washington DC Renter Owner -26% -6% 
Indicator 2: Access to Higher Quality Schools
Chicago Renter Owner +10% 0% 
Detroit Owner Renter -60% -50% 
New York Owner Renter -20% -40% 
Philadelphia Owner Renter +20% +70% 
Washington DC Owner Owner 0% -20% 
Indicator 3: Travel Time to Work
Chicago Owner Owner -4% +8% 
Detroit Renter Renter +2% +1% 
New York Owner Renter +14% +16% 
Philadelphia Owner Owner +17% +17% 
Washington DC Renter Owner +3% +11% 
Summary Indicator: Housing Opportunity
Chicago Owner Renter -9% +8% 
Detroit Owner Renter -22% -12% 
New York Owner Renter -30% -19% 
Philadelphia Owner Owner +6% +33% 
Washington DC Renter Owner +18% +1% 
Source: Author's Tabulation of data from U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata 
Surveys, 1990 and 2000 
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Results for Indicator 1, housing overpayment, suggest that the proportion of 
burdened low-income black renters (i.e. those paying greater than 30% of household 
income for housing) either decreased more or increased less than the proportion of 
burdened low-income black owners in four of the five metropolitan areas analyzed (see 
Table 6-10). The only exception occurred in Washington DC where a smaller proportion 
of renters than owners were burdened in 1990 and a greater proportion or renters than 
owners were burdened in 2000. While the percentages of burdened households in 
Washington DC decreased for both tenure groups through the decade, the percentage 
of burdened owners decreased more (-26%) as compared to renters, whose proportion 
decreased by only -6%.  
Results for Indicator 2, access to higher quality schools, suggest that low-
income black owners fared better than low-income black renters, but only slightly better. 
Change in the proportion of burdened low-income black owners with access to higher 
quality schools either increased more or decreased less than the proportion of burdened 
low-income black renters in three of the five metropolitan areas analyzed: Chicago, New 
York and Washington DC (see Table 6-10). Renters fared better in Detroit and 
Philadelphia. In Detroit, the proportion of both tenure groups with access to higher 
quality schools decreased substantially suggesting a severe worsening for both owners 
and renters but more for owners. Approximately 50% fewer renters in Detroit had 
access to higher quality schools in 1990 than in 2000 compared to 60% fewer owners. 
In Philadelphia, access to higher quality schools improved for both tenure groups 
between 1990 and 2000, but more for renters than owners. Access to higher quality 
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schools for renters in Philadelphia increased 70% through the decade compared to only 
20% for owners. 
Results for Indicator 3, travel time to work in minutes, suggest that commuting 
times for burdened low-income black owners either decreased or increased less than 
those for burdened low-income black renters in three of the five metropolitan areas 
examined: Chicago, New York and Washington DC (see Table 6-10). Owner's 
commutes increased equally with renters' in one metropolitan area (Philadelphia). The 
only exception occurred in Detroit where commuting times increased for both tenure 
groups but increased more for owners than renters. Homeowner and renter commuting 
times increased equally (17% longer) in Philadelphia between 1990 and 2000. 
Results for the Summary Indicator, housing opportunity, which combines the 
three indicators just discussed, suggest that burdened low-income black renters 
experienced greater increases or smaller decreases in housing opportunity through the 
decade than did low-income black owners in four of the five metropolitan areas 
examined (see Table 6-10). In Chicago, housing opportunity decreased 9% for low-
income black homeowners through the decade compared to an 8% increase (i.e. 
improvement) for low-income black renters. In 1990, owning a home provided low-
income households with greater housing opportunity compared to renting, but by 2000 
renting provided greater housing opportunity. In Detroit, housing opportunity decreased 
for both tenure groups, but did so less (-12%) for renters than for owners (-22%). In 
New York, housing opportunity also decreased for both tenure groups, but did so less 
for renters (-19%) than for owners (-30%).  
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Philadelphia and Washington DC were the only two metropolitan areas where 
owning a home provided low-income black households with greater housing opportunity 
than renting. In Philadelphia, ownership provided greater housing opportunity in both 
1990 and 2000. Notable is that while housing opportunity improved for both renters and 
owners in Philadelphia through the decade, the increase was substantially greater for 
renters (33%) than for owners (6%). This increase in housing opportunity for renters 
made rental tenure very close (but not quite on par) with ownership in 2000 in 
Philadelphia (Housing Opportunity scores of 254 for owners versus 248 for renters—
see Table 6-9).  
Washington DC was the only other metropolitan area examined where owning a 
home provided greater housing opportunity than renting in 2000. Unlike outcomes in 
Philadelphia, which were close and arguably better given the increases in housing 
opportunity that renters experienced through the decade, homeownership was clearly a 
better tenure choice for low-income households in both 1990 and 2000. Housing 
opportunity in Washington DC improved for both tenure groups through the decade, but 
did so significantly more for owners (18%) than for renters (1%). 
What explains this outcome for the Washington DC metropolitan area? Why did 
owners do so much better there as compared to the other four metropolitan areas 
examined? Several hypotheses suggest explanation. One explanation could be that the 
DC CMSA includes some areas which could provide fairly inexpensive homeownership 
options, thus reducing the housing overpayment element, which factors heavily in my 
summary "housing opportunity" indicator. The Washington DC CMSA is quite expansive 
and includes substantial parts of Maryland, including the Baltimore metropolitan area, 
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and also very rural areas found in Virginia, West Virginia, and in far northern portions of 
Maryland. For example, once you get about an hour south, north or west of Washington 
DC, say near Fredericksburg VA, Martinsburg WV or Hagerstown, MD, there are many 
pockets of rather poor areas with surprisingly low housing costs. But, this fails to fully 
explain why Washington DC was the exception in my analysis because the same could 
be said for the other metro areas examined, including the New York CMSA for example, 
where inexpensive housing (relatively speaking) can be found in the rural areas to the 
north and west of NYC in Orange, Rockland, Putnam and Dutchess Counties.  
A more viable explanation for Washington DC's exceptional performance and 
something that does set it apart from the other metropolitan areas examined are the 
land use regulations/regimes operating in the Washington DC CMSA during the time of 
analysis (1990-2000). These include Maryland's 1992 Economic Growth, Resource 
Protection and Planning Act and the 1997 Priority Funding Areas Act, as well as county- 
and local-level inclusionary housing elements. While both of Maryland's state acts were 
primarily anti-sprawl measures, which according to recent ex post facto research 
actually produced questionable results towards this objective (see Lewis, Knapp and 
Sohn 2009), both acts included provisions that indirectly supported affordable housing 
production through statewide goals, local compliance to these goals, and associated 
preferred funding objectives (DeGrove 2005).  
More important is the long standing practice of inclusionary housing legislation in 
the Washington DC area. Studies suggest that in the Washington DC metro area, four 
county- level programs (passed in 1973, 1990, 1993, and 1991) produced over 15,000 
units over between 1973 and 2000 (Fox and Rose 2003). Two inclusionary programs 
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are particularly noteworthy when it comes to affordable housing production, and are 
considered national models. Montgomery County, Maryland's program alone produced 
over 11,500 affordable units between its inception in 1973 and the early 2000s. This 
program also generated $477.4 million of private sector investment in affordable 
housing (Brunick 2003). Fairfax County, Virginia, produced approximately 2,000 units 
between passage of its program in 1991 and 2000 (Fox and Rose 2003). Additionally, in 
the Washington DC metro area, where the four separate inclusionary housing programs 
operated, there was (and continues to be I believe) little private sector developer and 
realtor opposition to building affordable housing. A Center for Housing Policy (2000) 
study found that a number of key developers and realtors even expressed support for 
and affirmed their ability to profitably build affordable housing. 
I also believe that factors associated the actions of local community-based and 
housing advocacy groups in relation to the way portions of inner-city Washington DC 
and Baltimore were being redeveloped during the period of study are important. While 
inner-city redevelopment efforts especially in Washington DC were often viewed at the 
time as gentrification, community-based and housing advocacy groups in these cities 
fought gallantly to ensure inclusion of substantial affordable housing units in the 
redevelopment process. Such units were likely included either outright as a function of 
the inclusionary programs mentioned above, or as part of land use incentive programs 
that included density bonuses for affordable housing or as units to mitigate primary 
displacement of existing lower-income households displaced during redevelopment. I do 
not think that these community based efforts can be overstated. 
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Together, these suggest strong explanatory factors as to why the Washington 
DC CMSA stands out in my analysis. 
In conjunction with evidence already presented, the next chapter draws broader 
study conclusions and reviews the key findings of this research to support a main study 
conclusion that under the present market structure, low-income homeownership does 
not necessarily result in greater housing opportunity for low-income buyers as 
compared to renters, and demand-side homeownership subsides that encourage and 
support this tenure choice should be reconsidered. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
SUMMARY OF STUDY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the key research findings in support of a study conclusion 
that, under present market conditions, demand-oriented subsidies for homeownership 
are insufficient to substantially expand housing opportunity for low-income black 
households as compared to renting. In many places and in many cases, renting rather 
than buying would better serve low-income households.  
In the first part of the chapter, I summarize the key findings, putting them into a 
national perspective. I then recommend that the federal government undertake another 
shift in housing policy, one equally as dramatic as the one that took place in the early 
1970s. This policy shift would entail re-introducing supply-side housing subsidies to 
supplement the present subsidies in place and to . To be clear, the questions raised in 
this research are not critical of low-income homeownership per se or the policies that 
encourage and support it. Rather, they call into question the dominant role 
homeownership has assumed in federal housing policy and the unintended 
consequences for low income households it has produced. In closing this chapter, I 
offer some thoughts on what a new more balanced housing policy might look like, and 
recommend directions for future research. 
Summary/Analysis of Key Findings: 
This dissertation sought to answer several questions regarding housing 
outcomes of low-income homeownership through the 1990s. To do this, several 
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qualitative and quantitative methods were used to survey the landscape of low-income 
homeownership and to identify issues of concern that have been not been broadly 
discussed in the reporting of the gains in low-income and minority homeownership that 
occurred through the housing boom. At the core of the analysis is a concept of housing 
opportunity: a metric that includes factors that have been proven instrumental in 
successful homeownership, including affordability, employment accessibility and 
educational opportunity. These are especially important for low-income owners if they 
are to build wealth and move up the socio-economic ladder.  
Chapter 1 introduced the main research question: are the demand subsidies that 
promote low-income homeownership on which federal housing policy based potent 
enough to remedy our affordable housing crisis? From there I lay out the conceptual 
framework by which I planned to investigate and described the need for such a study.  
Chapter 2 examined the relationship between the demand for low-income 
housing the supply to answer the question—is there enough affordable for-sale 
housingand by assessing low-income housing outcomes from the 1990s housing 
boom. Evidence presented suggested while there were gains made in low-income 
housing through the 1990s, much of the growth happened in manufactured homes, a 
significant proportion of low-income mortgage lending occurred in the predatory sub-
prime market, and that the increases in low-income and minority homeownership rates 
that occurred through the 1990s may not have resulted in significantly lower levels of 
segregation by race and income. Evidence was presented on the shortage in supply 
and production of affordably-priced housing units, and why production of these units is 
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necessary given the questionable performance of filtering, a key mechanism in the 
economic theory of demand-side housing policy.  
Chapter 3 discussed the origins of demand-side subsidies in federal housing 
policy. It described the shift federal housing policy made from supply- to demand-
oriented programs within the contexts of dismal public housing failures and a larger 
context of economic restructuring that began in the early 1970s. This shift was marked 
by, among other things, a substantial change in the pattern of state intervention in the 
housing market and the social welfare arena. This chapter also presented an audit of 
HUD’s fiscal year budgets between 2000 and 2005, dividing program spending by line 
item for demand- versus supply-based programs. This analysis found that the dollar 
amount and proportion of HUD budgetary spending occurs increasingly in demand-side 
programs, and helps illustrate the extent to which the federal housing policy has 
become entrenched in demand-side housing subsidies. Collectively these analyses help 
explain why U.S. housing policy shifted its focus from supply to demand in the early 
70s, and what has changed since then. 
Chapter 4 assessed the potential risks associated with homeownership for low-
income households. This began with an assessment of the costs many low-income 
households incur through homeownership, including higher income-proportional rents 
and maintenance costs, lower returns on investment, and how and why the mortgage 
interest income tax deduction disproportionately benefits wealthier households while 
eluding many low-income homeowners. Primary evidence was presented that suggests 
that the housing’s expected financial returns in the long run are no better than other 
investment vehicles, even in times of exuberant housing market price growth and a 
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falling stock market. Evidence, both primary and secondary, was presented on the 
importance of timing of sale and location in improving housing financial returns on 
investment. When the risks presented in this chapter are not sufficiently considered in 
the calculus of the purchase, debt accumulation and foreclosure can easily ensue. 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented the methodology and findings of a detailed analysis 
of 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Survey data to determine 
how housing outcomes vary by tenure for low-income black households in five large 
metropolitan areas—Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC. 
Ho—with respect to three indicators: housing costs, proximity to workplace, and access 
to elementary schools with lower (i.e. better) than metro-average pupil/teacher-ratios 
(P/T-ratios). The analysis developed a housing opportunity metric, which combines the 
three indicators of housing overpayment, access to higher quality schools, and travel 
time to work.  
The research findings suggest that a greater proportion of low-income black 
renter households as compared to homeowner households paid a smaller proportion of 
their income for housing, commuted shorter distances to work, and had greater access 
to higher quality schools, in 2000 in three of the five metropolitan areas studied 
(Chicago, Detroit and New York). While outcomes varied by metropolitan area, between 
1990 and 2000 low-income black renters experienced greater increases or smaller 
decreases in housing opportunity than did low-income black owners in four of the five 
metropolitan areas examined (Chicago, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia).  
Homeownership might therefore prove a less desirable tenure choice for low-
income households in these places because it appears to provide less housing 
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opportunity under present market conditions. Low-income renters will likely find more 
affordable homes that are closer to where they work and in closer proximity to better 
schools in these cities. This suggests that subsidies aimed at increasing increase 
demand for low-income homeownership by allowing increasing numbers of low-income 
buyers to participate in the market should be reconsidered. 
Recommendations for a New Supply-Side Housing Policy 
Since the 1970s federal housing policy has focused primarily on subsidizing 
demand for affordable housing by expanding low-income participation in the private 
housing market. This research addressed two questions surrounding this philosophy:  
1. Are these subsidies potent enough to remedy our affordable housing 
crisis; and  
2. Can the housing market meet the demand for housing that these 
subsidies create?  
Related are questions surrounding the types of housing the market can provide 
and the location of units with respect to proximity to workplaces and good schools. 
There is evidence to suggest that in many of the markets where supply is short and 
housing is least affordable, demand-subsidies are not potent enough to encourage 
sufficient production or induce efficient filtering. Also, in four of the five metropolitan 
areas examined, renters experienced greater increases or smaller decreases in housing 
opportunity than did owners. With these findings in mind, how should a new housing 
policy be structured?  
Broadly, beyond re-introducing limited supply-oriented subsidies, any new 
housing policy would have to encompass and accomplish three things:  
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1. It would need to be flexible in how it balances demand- and supply-side 
subsidies;  
2. It would need to operate solidly within the private housing market by 
encouraging public/private partnerships and enlisting the participation and 
expertise of the homebuilding and real estate industries; and 
3. It would need to be tied to overall regional housing goals that are clearly 
and collectively defined and equitably balanced.  
Any new housing policy that is to be successful in effectively addressing the 
affordable housing crisis would require a high degree of flexibility in how it balances 
supply- and demand-side subsidies. Program flexibility is necessary not only because 
local housing requirements and markets vary widely, but also because political realities 
necessitate local autonomy in application. Such demand for autonomy has been part 
and parcel of housing policy since the early 1970s when local jurisdictions won legal 
victories over where federally-funded public housing was to be built (see Hays 1995). 
But beyond the political support it could foster, providing a high-degree of local program 
flexibility could produce some very positive housing outcomes in relation to local 
comprehensive planning goals. Housing problems are often framed only in the context 
of affordability, but housing advocates recognize that successful housing means much 
more than a roof overhead, and that broader, more meaningful metrics have to be 
employed to solve the problem in the long term, such as those used in this dissertation.  
Presently, homeownership subsidies take aim at little more than housing 
affordabilitytheir main objective is to allow low-income households to participate in the 
housing market (i.e. afford to buy a home). After that, the buyer is on his/her own. 
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Several attempts have been made to council buyers before and after the sale (Restinas 
2003), but homebuyer subsidies do little to ensure that a buyer buys wisely, that the 
home s/he buys will provide a reasonable return, or that it is located near good schools 
and/or near places of employment. 
The second point necessary to any new housing policy is the requirement that it 
function as a part of private housing market and homebuilding industry. This vital for two 
reasons: political reality and economic success. New programs should not replicate the 
structure of public housing programs of earlier years; Rather, programs should draw on 
best case example of successful partnerships with local developers and not-for-profit 
community development corporations. Presently, we do some of this in the form of 
public/private partnerships and the small stream of HUD supply programs like Section 
202 (housing for the elderly) and the LIHTC. But the process for developers to access 
programs like these is extremely complicated, costly and time consuming. Therefore 
much of the thinking about encouraging affordable housing development in the market 
seems to revolve around providing developers with tax breaks and development 
incentives, especially land-based incentives such as density bonuses, inclusionary 
housing, etc. Density bonuses appear to be effective, especially when they are attached 
to some form of mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance, but have very high demand 
requirements, and therefore work best in very hot housing markets where developers 
can financially justify the exchange of more units for increased density (otherwise 
developers simply build elsewhere). Funding more inclusionary housing directly is one 
form of supply-oriented subsidy that could be very successful in many markets. 
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Of course, program flexibility and/or market participation would not guarantee 
positive housing outcomes, especially given our present political environment in which 
local governments continually seek to minimize their fiscal responsibility to the poor. 
More apartments often mean more children and increased spending in areas such as 
schools and social services. That is why I believe any housing policy that is to be 
successful would have to be tied into to a fair-share regional housing goal in terms of 
the number, location and type of units needed. Regional goals would vary by 
metropolitan area but each region’s goal would be collectively determined to meet 
locally appropriate and adequate levels of housing based on need and fair distribution. 
Goals and objectives of each regional fair housing plan could be tied to funding. 
If housing cost alone were an acceptable criterion, the outcomes observed in the 
five metropolitan housing markets studied in this research convey that much more 
needs to be done to assist low-income home buyers. As my research argues, 
successful homeownership entails more than enabling a low-income buyer to qualify (or 
even afford) a home. Successful homeownership entails at least two other dimensions 
of housing opportunity, namely proximity to workplace and access to good schools. The 
history of public housing in the U.S. clearly demonstrates that affordability alone should 
never be an acceptable criterion for U.S. housing policy. Location matters, and public 
housing operating at the zenith of supply-subsidy grappled with the socio-economic 
dimensions of location and the problems of segregation and low-income concentration it 
produced. When and where a low-income household buys is almost as important price 
because financial success that homeownership can offer is often contingent on these 
dimensional aspects.  
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Housing policy based in demand subsidy, if it is to be successful, must ensure 
that low-income buyers are able to do more than participate in the market. It must 
ensure that they find good housing opportunity. Thus far it has not been demonstrated 
that these kinds of subsidies alone can accomplish this task—while a greater number of 
low-income households were able to purchase homes through the 1990s, this research 
suggests that the outcomes were less than ideal. Therefore, it may be more effective to 
tandem demand-subsidies with supply-oriented subsidies directly to builders and 
developers willing to build affordable units.  
This policy approach would expand direct funding and support for low-income 
rentership, preferably in mixed-income development. Present funding for rentership 
occurs primarily through HUD Section 8 vouchers, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) used at the municipal and 
county levels of government. The Section 8 voucher program operates on the demand-
side by providing a direct subsidy to a participating landlord on behalf of the family, and 
is the federal government's primary program for assisting low-income families to afford 
affordable rental housing in the private market.25 Because the program is voluntary in 
that it relies on landlords to agree to rent under the program, insufficient supply exists 
and that which does is often located in underserved and distressed neighborhoods 
(Pendall 2000).  
LIHTC and CDBG programs fund supply directly and increasing funding to these 
programs offers the greatest opportunity to expand the supply of affordable rental 
housing. Again, because location matters, expanded funding should be tied to a fair-
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share regional housing plan. The CDBG program offers communities fairly broad 
discretion in how such funds are spent (e.g. funding can be used for infrastructure 
improvements and a wide variety of other project aside from housing). Therefore 
adjusting the spending requirements to focus more directly on rental unit creation and 
tying eligibility requirements to local jurisdictions' participation in a fair share regional 
housing plan could provide substantially greater number of rental units and expand low-
income housing opportunity.  
Finally, one last policy shift to expand housing opportunity would be to expand 
tax incentives for low-income renters. Presently, renters are generally better off taking 
the standardized income tax deduction rather than itemizing on their personal tax 
returns. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is generally the case for low-income 
homeowners as well. Beyond the standardized deduction, there are relatively few other 
deductions that renters (and all taxpayers) may be able to claim, including interest on 
student loans and classroom expenses if one is a teacher. Extending a personal income 
tax deduction to low-income renters similar to those offered owners would put renting on 
a more equal footing with homeownership, thus providing low-income renters with more 
incentive to rent.  
At least two states (Connecticut and Maryland) provide grants to certain low-
income renters (generally the very poor and elderly) to offset local property taxes 
renters pay through rent and utility bills. These programs reduce the property tax burden 
for certain low-income renters without depriving local municipalities of needed revenue. 
The federal government could expand this type of program nationally to low-income 
                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Under certain instances, if authorized by the local housing authority, a family may use its voucher to 
purchase a modest home. 
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renters and also allow renters to deduct a portion of their rent on their federal tax returns 
as homeowners are allowed to do with the mortgage interest deduction. These types of 
renter assistance programs could be funded by shifting present line items in the HUD 
homeownership (and other demand-side) program funding streams.  
Recommendations for Future Research: 
This research has sought to expand our knowledge of low-income 
homeownership and the benefits it offers low-income households as compared to 
renting. Three specific areas of concern were addressed: 1) housing overpayment; 2) 
commuting time to work; and 3) access to better quality schools. In doing so, it has 
raised other questions.  
There are three main questions that would provide fruitful avenues for future 
research. First, what is happening at the intra-metropolitan level with respect to housing 
opportunity? While the geographic coarseness of PUMS data is inappropriate for many 
markets, fruitful intra-metropolitan analysis could be conducted for the five large housing 
markets examined. This might involve more detailed analysis of smaller subsets of 
metropolitan regions, reducing the unit of analysis to the PUMA level for all variables to 
illuminate finer details in intra-metropolitan differences in housing opportunity.  
Second, what explanations can be found for the results presented through a set 
of on-site case studies including interviews and other qualitative methods to seek 
possible explanations for the observed outcomes?  
Third, are the outcomes observed for low-income black household consistent 
across other low-income tenure groups? This would include running similar analysis of 
the same variables for other racial groups and noting similarities and differences.  
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Finally, future research should include in-depth investigation of particular 
explanatory aspects of the study, including more research on manufactured homes and 
their function in the low-income housing market, how producer consolidation in the 
housing market affects low-income housing production, and the relative importance of 
proximity to work and access to good schools as compared to price for low-income 
households.  
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTION OF POPULATION OF INTEREST FOR 
STUDY: LOW-INCOME BLACK RENTER AND OWNER 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
The 2000 Census identifies 280 MSAs with a cumulative population of 
229,192,868 and a black population of 29,885,785 (or 13%). These metropolitan areas 
have 85,373,906 occupied housing units, of which 64.3% (54,936,840) are owner-
occupied and 35.7% (30,437,066) are renter-occupied.  
Of the owner-occupied housing units, 36.8% (20,235,149) are low-income 
(defined by households with incomes at or below 80% of median income for census 
defined metropolitan areas) and the remaining 63.2% (34,701,691) have incomes 
greater than 80% of metropolitan area median income. Of the 20,235,149 owner-
occupied low-income housing units, 11.1% (2,241,151) are black head-of-household 
households and the remaining 88.9% (17,993,998) are non-black head-of-household 
households (i.e. some other race). Of the renter-occupied housing units, 70.4% 
(21,428,839) are low-income and the remaining 29.6% percent (9,008,207) have 
incomes greater than 80% of metropolitan area median income.  
Of the 21,428,839 renter-occupied low-income housing units, 21.7% (4,644,350) 
are black head-of-household-households and the remaining 78.3% percent 
(16,784,509) are non-head-of-household households (i.e. some other race). The 
potential cumulative population of interest for this study in the U.S. is 6,885,501 
households. The population of interest for the five study metropolitan areas in this 
research —Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and Washington DC—was drawn 
from this assembled population.
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APPENDIX B 
BUILDING THE STUDY GEOGRAPHY—RECONCILIATION 
OF 1990 AND 2000 PUMA DEFINED METROPOLITAN 
AREAS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two difficulties that arise when comparing metropolitan-level Public Use Microdata 
Survey (PUMS) data across census years: a) changes in census-defined metropolitan 
geography and b) changes in Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) boundaries. While 
the Office of Management and Budget’s definition for metropolitan area allows the 
Census Bureau to use county boundaries as its primary spatial building block for both 
metropolitan areas (this varies in New England states) and PUMAs, the latter must 
maintain a minimum population threshold of 100,000 people for confidentiality purposes. 
Therefore, PUMA boundaries do not necessarily conform to county boundaries: In less 
densely populated metropolitan areas PUMAs tend to be large and often contain more 
than one county in their spatial coverage, and, in more densely populated metropolitan 
areas, counties often contain more than one PUMA. This creates several unavoidable 
(and intentional, on the part of the Census Bureau) geographic inconsistencies in the 
spatial coverages for 1990 and 2000 decennial PUMS data, which must be discussed at 
this point. 
METHODOLOGY 
For this study, in order to improve the accuracy of making household and population 
metropolitan area comparisons across time using U.S. Census Bureau’s 1990 and 2000 
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PUMS data, spatial differences between 1990 and 2000 geographies were reconciled 
by “building” new matching coverages for each metropolitan area using 1990 and 2000 
PUMAs as building blocks. Where a metropolitan area saw no change in area between 
1990 and 2000, the same counties comprise these metropolitan areas in the study in 
1990 and 2000. In cases where the PUMA or metropolitan area census geography 
changed, differences were resolved in by adding to the 1990 metropolitan area 
coverages additional PUMA data files required to build a representative coverage of the 
2000 metropolitan area spatial footprint. Additional PUMA coverages were drawn from 
the 5% PUMS state samples from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
 158 
 
APPENDIX C 
METHODOLOGY FOR LONG-TERM HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS: BOSTON, SAN FRANCISCO, 
LOS ANGELES AND CHICAGO, 1930-2000 
Introduction 
Rental and owner-occupied housing costs were compared to each city’s median 
household income (see Table 1). All data were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau 
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics unless otherwise noted. Understanding that census 
geography has changed through time, I made efforts to collect data consistently from 
the appropriate metropolitan statistical area or district measured for each city during 
each decennial period. When household variables were not available, the closest 
reasonable equivalent (usually a family unit measurement) was substituted consistently. 
Results are compared with a decade’s inflation rate to provide a clearer picture of how 
housing costs have changed through time. Inflation (a process of a continuously falling 
value of money) can be best explained with the following example. A basket of CPI 
goods that cost $100.00 in 1970 cost $212.40 in 1980 due to a decade-long price 
inflation rate of 112%. Any conservative estimate of changes in the housing market 
would expect housing prices to inflate at approximately the same rate. Median house 
values, rents and incomes were trended between decennial periods when necessary. 
The cost of housing is expressed as the proportion of a median priced house that 
an area’s median income buys at a given point in time, a measure referred to as a 
household’s “income housing opportunity.” Because median house value is greater 
than median annual income for all time periods and locations surveyed, a high absolute 
value of income housing opportunity indicates greater housing affordability. That is, a 
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median income will buy a larger proportion of the median priced home at a given time 
and location.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar calculation was performed using median contract rent producing a 
measure referred to as a household’s “income rental opportunity.” This is expressed 
as the division of an area’s median annual income by its median annual contract rent. 
Because median house value is greater than median annual income for all time periods 
and locations surveyed, a high absolute value of income rental opportunity indicates 
greater housing affordability. Measured on this scale, a rough benchmark for rental 
affordability translates to an income rental opportunity of 3.33. Further, I reduced 
median income by 25% in the income rental opportunity calculation to better 
approximate the after tax scenario from where most rents are paid. I did not reduce 
median income in the housing calculation because homeowners benefit from federal 
and state tax breaks that, while not constituting 25% of income, do amount to a 
consistently sizable income benefit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Median Area Annual Income 
 
       Median House Value 
INCOME HOUSING OPPORTUNITY     = 
Median Area Monthly Income 
 
       Median Area Rent 
INCOME RENTAL OPPORTUNITY     = 
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Strengths and Limitations of the Methodology 
There is no perfect measure of housing affordability. This section discusses 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology employed. First, median 
house value serves as a proxy for median house price, although it is understood that 
the latter can be substantially higher than appraised value and can vary greatly between 
census periods. Second, census income and housing figures suffer from inaccuracies 
in self-reporting and any statistical variation due to the fact that they are estimates 
developed from a sample. Three, any measure that uses percentage of income for 
housing affordability has at least the following limitations:  
 
A) It does not control for quality changes over time or differences in preferences 
amongst householders. Some people, mainly the wealthy, are willing to spend 
a greater proportion of their income for certain housing amenities such as 
more space, and this method cannot capture these differences;  
 
B)  It does not account for differences in location or accessibility requirements. 
For example, being close to where one works can mean substantial savings 
in time and money. This alone qualifies as a worthy variable in affordability 
analysis.  
 
C) It may not accurately reflect a household’s real financial constraints—as 
Stone (1993, 1994) points out in his “Shelter Poverty” measure, not everyone 
can afford to pay 30% of their income for housing and pay for other 
necessities. This may especially be the case for low-wage households with 
children and elderly households.   
 
Finally, a percentage of income measure is based on transitory income 
(earnings) rather than permanent income (wealth) and does not account for true 
housing costs, which must include maintenance and appreciation.  
Despite these shortcomings a percentage of income measure offers several 
positives including an ease of calculation and comprehension, availability of data and 
the fact that it is applicable across time and space. This last point is germane to my 
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study because reports on the worsening conditions for the poor in the cities of the new 
economy often rely on nominal increases in the number of people living at or below the 
national poverty line. This can be misleading because it fails to account for the 
differences in true costs of living between geographic locations, which must include 
changing local costs relative to changes in local income.   
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